P1. CEOs are often driven by short-term personal interests than by the long-term good of their company.
→board should link theexecutive compensation to the targets that:
- cannot be easily gamed by the CEO
- can be achieved only if he creates actual and sustainablevalue for the company
→meet targets = miss targets
However, (实际上)CEOs meet>miss their targets.
P2. The performance targets of CEOs are often based on a single metric such as quarterly profitability or earnings per share.
Shortcomings: can be easily manipulated by CEOs
In contrast, 3 to 5 performance targets
→Miss target=excel target
P3. Boards often determine their CEO's performance goals based on the company and sector growth forecasts provided by external analysts and the CEO himself.
→Q1. CEOs lowball forecasts to get easily achievable targets→prevent their company from growing to its full potential.
→Q2. no bonus below the minimum performance threshold for their CEOs:
- rewards rise steeply until the target is reached;
- rewards for performing beyond this target grow much more slowly and eventually taper off.
→CEO rarely strives for them.
Conclusion:The result of all this is a sated CEO but a stunted company.