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them; it is unlikely that, if no manipulation takes place, CEOs will just overperform
most of the time. 如果不进行操纵，CEO 们就不可能在大多数时候超额完成任务 （双重否定）下文否定了这个观点 说明 不进行操纵ceo也能完成任务 However, recent research has found that, in actual practice, CEOs meet their targets far often than they miss them.
设定不同metricThe performance targets of CEOs are often based on a single metric such as quarterly
profitability or earnings per share. Such a system can be easily manipulated by them –
by, for example, cutting the research and development spending that is critical for the
organization's future. In contrast, when their payouts depend on three to five
performance targets – based on metrics that are not closely correlated – CEOs are
found to be just as likely to miss a given target as they are to exceed it. 错过某个目标和超过目标的可能性一样大。
Boards often determine their CEO's performance goals based on the company and
sector growth forecasts provided by external analysts and the CEO himself. CEO的做法，后给出 批判
1. In self-interest, CEOs often lowball forecasts to get easily achievable targets. However, the resulting low performance targets prevent their company from growing to its full
potential. Another feature of the executive compensation structure compounds this
problem. Most boards specify a minimum performance threshold for their CEOs,
below which the CEO receives no bonus. Then, his rewards rise steeply until the
target is reached. Rewards for performing beyond this target grow much more slowly
and eventually taper off. Thus, a CEO does not receive much personal profit from
achieving spectacular results as opposed to 相对于merely satisfactory ones and, therefore,2
2.
rarely strives for them. The result of all this is a sated CEO but a stunted company.
be aligned to 与。。对标；保持一致
1. The author of the passage would be most likely to attribute the research finding mentioned in the first paragraph to which of the following causes原因?
A. Most boards act in their personal best-interest even if it is to the detriment of their organization.
B. Most boards fail to set such executive performance targets that cannot be manipulated by the CEOs.
C. Most boards use closely correlated performance metrics to measure executive performance.
D. Most boards accept without debate the company and sector growth forecasts presented to them by the CEOs.
E. Most boards offer lucrative丰厚的报酬 payouts to CEOs upon the achievement of the set performance targets.
1. 这段话的作者最有可能把第一段中提到的研究结果归结为以下哪种原因？
A. 大多数董事会的行为符合他们个人的最大利益，即使这对他们的组织是不利
的。（未涉及董事会与个人利益关联，非正确选项）
B. 大多数董事会没有制定出不能被 CEO 们操纵的高管业绩目标。（正确，参见首段倒数 2 句）
E. 大多数董事会在实现既定的业绩目标后向 CEO 提供丰厚的报酬。（非第一段内容，且第二段奖励与目标挂钩并不能激励 CEO 实现目标，非正确选项）
2. The passage implies that which of the following is likely to be true about metrics X, Y and Z if the CEOs who are given performance targets based on these three metrics are far more likely to meet their targets than to miss them?与原文结论相反，那前提也与原文相反
A. The boards which set performance targets based on X, Y and Z metrics do not consult external analysts before deciding the targets.
B. X, Y and Z are quantitative metrics and, therefore, easy to track.
C. X, Y and Z encompass a broad range of corporate activities.
D. Achievement of the target value of one of the three metrics automatically results in achievement of the target values of the other two.相关联的 正好与原文相反
：削弱假设提，给一个与原文相反的结论，对应相反的前提
3. According to the passage, which of the following is not a feature of good performance targets set by a board for its CEO文中的 事实题?坏的
B. They are challenging to achieve.好的
C. They cannot be easily gamed by the CEO.这是好的
D. They reward the CEO for superlative过度的 performance.与原文CEO的做法不符
E. They are aligned to the long-term good of the company.好
3. 根据这段话，以下哪项不是董事会为其 CEO 设定的良好业绩目标的特征？
事实细节题，不涉及作者态度
4. Which of the following rationale理由 to taper off逐步减少 CEO rewards for performance beyond the set targets can be inferred from the passage?推断题，推断董事会的理由
A. Most boards are concerned that executive compensation should seem reasonable to the shareholders.
B. It is highly unlikely that CEOs will achieve beyond their set targets.
C. CEOs are usually more interested in earning their bonus than in improving their performance beyond the set targets.
D. If the rewards are not capped around the set targets, CEOs are encouraged to game their performance.
E. If payouts increase at a constant rate relative to performance, CEOs are likely to
take excessive risks to achieve higher and higher payouts.
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发表于 2023-4-27 21:36:08
