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From Airline Reservations to Sonic the Hedgehog : A History of the Software Industry
By Martin Campbell-Kelly
A business history of the software industry from the days of custom programming to the age of mass-market software and video games.
第24/390 页
Corporate Software Products
第一段讲到软件的一个发展。软件在1980还是1960年代得到了发展,然后讲具体怎么发展的....这段失忆了
第二段继续讲发展，一开始由于一些大的软件制造商已经向很多顾客提供免费的软件了，所以一些独立的软件制作商没有优势。（这里有出细节题）然后一些独立的软件制造商就开始创造商机，提供一些顾客意料不到的服务。（unanticipated）然后说这个时期一些成功的制造商基本都是走这个路子，这里举了一些例子。然后讲到他们开始采取一种unbundling的策略，开始将软件制造从传统的服务中独立出来，单独出售。
Two packaged programs, Applied Data Research’s Autoflow and Informatics’ Mark IV (announced in 1965 and 1967, respectively), are generally agreed to be, if not the first, certainly the most influential of the early software products. These products and a few others had already proved viable in the market in January 1970, when IBM implemented its “unbundling” decision. Previously, IBM had provided programs free of charge to customers on request, as had the other computer manufacturers. This made it difficult for software entrepreneurs to establish a market. Therefore, the software products that succeeded were ones that satisfied needs not yet anticipated by the computer manufacturers. Under antitrust pressure (perhaps assisted by an independent lawsuit from Applied Data Research), IBM decided to charge separately for software and other services. Unbundling had the effect of establishing a vibrant market for software products, which previously had been merely embryonic. It was a turning point for the industry.
第三段主要讲这些软件制造商在转型之后怎么进行销售和管理的。一开始人们认为软件制作和音乐制作很像（这里针对类比有出题，问为啥提到音乐），因为都是低成本的，但是后来人们逐渐认识到软件属于capital的一种，因此那些软件制造商们开始学习一些capital行业的管理模式和销售方式。然后具体下面就是怎么学习怎么管理的。
At first, because of the analogy between the low incremental costs of reproducing programs and recorded music, the software products business was likened to the recorded-music industry. This turned out to be an illusion. Because of their high marketing costs and the need for sales support, corporate software products were classic capital goods. Thus, the business model adopted by the software products firms, often quite consciously, was that of a producer of capital goods—and the firms often looked to computer manufacturers, particularly IBM, for role models. The critical capabilities that the firms developed were exploitation of scale, corporate marketing, quality assurance, and pre- and after-sale support. Exploitation of scale was the most important of these capabilities, because selling in volume was the only way to recover the high initial development costs of a generalized software product, which were much higher than for custom software. Because sales volume was so important, it was necessary to develop quota-based sales operations, typically on the IBM model, and for this reason firms often recruited former IBM salespeople. Software products, such as database programs or industrial applications, were usually “mission critical,” and for this reason product reliability was paramount. The software firms developed skills in quality assurance, using such techniques as beta testing to ensure that programs were ruggedly “productized” and reliable in use. Finally, as with all capital goods, pre- and after-sale support was needed to establish a long-term relationship with the customer. In the case of software products, this took the forms of product customization, user training, and regular upgrades. These services turned out to be unexpected sources of income for which the pioneers of the industry had not initially planned.
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发表于 2018-11-6 18:06:49
