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【越障1-10】 之前因为无网站没读到。。。囧。。
Today's Topic: Commuting,congestion tolls and the structure of the labour market: Optimal congestionpricing in a wage bargaining model
Congestion is a serious problem in manylarge urban areas throughout the world. In the US, for example, the TexasTransportation Institute reports very high increases in traffic congestion overthe past two decades (Schrank and Lomax, 2002). In Europe, a comparative study offive urban areas, including London, Amsterdam and Brussels, shows a dramaticdecline in average speed over the past decade;marginal external congestioncosts have been estimated to exceed 1 Euro per kilometre in the most congestedcities (De Borger and Proost, 2001). Economists have suggested a largevariety of policy instruments to cope with congestion, andthe use of some formof congestion pricing has gained prominence in the literature (see, among manyothers,[Arnott et al., 1993], [Verhoef et al., 1995], [Mayeres and Proost, 1997] and [Small and Yan, 2001]).1 Congestion taxes are also high on the political agendain several countries, and the first examples of actual implementation areavailable (e.g., Singapore, Trondheim, Stockholm, Oslo and London). In many othercases, road pricing is under serious consideration. In Europe, e.g., this isthe case in the Netherlands and Germany. Similarly,several US states, includingCalifornia, Florida and Texas, are considering congestion pricing.2
The most severe congestion problems aretypically associated with the journey-to-work, and there is some concern aboutthe employment effects of congestion taxes. Not surprisingly, several papershave looked into this issue. For example, Parry and Bento (2001) focused on the interaction betweencongestion taxes and outcomes on the labour market. They analyse the implicationsof a revenue-neutral congestion tax financed by a reduction in the tax onlabour. They show that such a tax reform does not necessarily reduce laboursupply owing to the feedback effects of congestion. In fact, at relatively lowlevels of the transport tax, the employment effects of raising the tax areshown to be positive. Calthrop (2001) extends the model by introducing multipletrip purposes (commuting and non-commuting) and analyses in detail theimplications of the complementarity of commuting with labour supply. Morerecently,Van Dender (2003)developed a detailed numerical model to studyoptimal labour and transport taxes, allowing for multiple trip purposes andtransport modes. He found empirical support for taxing commuting at a lowerrate than non-commuting transport. Finally, both Safirova (2002)and Verhoef (2005)develop general equilibrium models of a monocentric city with endogenous labour supply. The former numerically analyzes theimplications of agglomeration effects and telecommuting for various second-bestpolicies to cope with congestion; the latter studies the welfare effects ofcordon charges and kilometre taxes, and carefully compares results to the first-best.
Although these studies have revealed important new insights, they all assumeperfectly competitive labour markets. This is less than desirable, especiallyin a European context, since in most countries wages and employment levels arethe result of an explicit bargaining process between unions and employerorganisations (see, e.g., Lockwood and Manning,1993). The purpose of this paperis,therefore, to provide a detailed analysis of optimal transport and labourtaxes in a wage bargaining environment.3Indeed, given the close relation between commuting,congestionand the labour market, a relevant question is whether the structure of thelabour market itself has implications for the optimal tax treatment of transportand labour markets. For purposes of concreteness, we focus on aright-to-managesetting in which wages are the result of negotiations between firms and alabour union; employment is then determined by the firm,conditional on thenegotiated wage. We assume that transport trips consist of both commuting andnon-commuting. In this framework, we study the optimal second-best tax problemfaced by a budget-constrained benevolent government that cares about thewell-being of all its citizens (both the employed and people that, for variousreasons, do not work); moreover, it cares about private sector profits. It usestaxes on transport and on labour as the main instruments. We consider both thecase where transport taxes cannot be differentiated according to trip purpose,and the case of optimal tax differentiation between commuting and othertransport.
We obtain several interesting results. First, using two different (butadmittedly highly stylised) labour market settings, we show the relevance ofthe structure of the labour market for optimal taxation of road transport.Where as competitive labour market conditions produce Ramsey-type taxes, wagebargaining implies that optimal transport taxes strongly depend on unionpreferences.Second, wage bargaining implies that exogenous increases incongestion levels and in transport taxes raise negotiated wages and reduceemployment levels.Third, when taxes cannot be differentiated according to trippurpose, we show that the optimal transport tax positively depends on theimpact of congestion on negotiated wages, and negatively on the wage effects ofthe congestion tax itself. Using a specific but standard specification forunion preferences, we find that the transport tax exceeds the marginal externalcongestion cost to the extent that transport flows include demand by people whoare not currently active on the labour market. Finally, if taxes can bedifferentiated according to trip purpose, commuting subsidies — in the sense oflower transport taxes on commuting trips than on non-commuting transport — maybe justified if at least some part of the transport flows are from people thatare inactive on the labour market. This allows shifting the tax burden awayfrom the employed. Moreover,in this case the optimal congestion tax oncommuters is strictly below the marginal external cost.
This paper is related to several strands ofthe literature. First, relaxing the assumptions underlying the earliertransport literature (see the references given above) allows us to preciselyidentify the role of the labour market implications of congestion and congestiontaxes for the optimal tax structure.Second, the paper fits in with the growingliterature on the implications of externality taxation in bargaining models ofthe labour market (see, e.g., [Koskela et al., 1998],[Schneider, 1997], [Holmlund and Kolm, 2000], [Bayindir-Upmann andRaith, 2003]and [Schöb, 2005]). Unlike these models, we explicitly allow theexternality to affect the outcome of the bargaining process. Third, the papercontributes to the literature on the potential desirability of ‘subsidising’commuters, in the sense of allowing tax deductibility of commuting expenses.4Economic arguments in favour include the presence ofdistortionary or suboptimal labour taxes ([Wrede, 2000] and [Van Dender, 2003]), the mobility of firms and households in aspatial economy (Wrede, 2001), and the distribution of landownership acrossincome classes combined with the location of different income groups in anurban area (Borck and Wrede, 2005). This paper reconsiders the issue in awage bargaining framework, capturing the close connection between congestion,commuting and employment.
The paper is organised as follows.To setthe stage, we start in Section 2 with a very simple optimal tax problem oflabour and transport markets in a world without congestion. This allows us toillustrate and intuitively explain the potential importance of the structure ofthe labour market for the optimal tax structure. In Section 3 we then turn to the basic model analysed inthis paper. We study optimal labour and transport taxes in a wage bargainingmodel; both commuting and non-commuting transport contribute to congestion. Theunion cares about both its employed and unemployed members, the firm caresabout profit. We derive and interpret the optimal tax structure for the case ofuniform transport taxes across trip motives. Moreover, we provide a briefcomparison of the results with those derived under competitive labour marketconditions. In Section 4, we analyse optimal tax differentiation betweencommuting and non-commuting transport. Section 5 relaxes some of the strong assumptionsunderlying the model and discusses several extensions. A final sectionsummarises the main findings.
8分49S,学习了,我是学HR的。。。
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