(The following passage was written in 1977.)
Changes in the volume of unemployment are governed by three fundamental forces: the growth of the labor force, the increase in output per man-hour, and the growth of total demand for goods and services. Changes in the average hours of work enter in exactly parallel fashion but have been quantitatively less significant. As productivity rises, less labor is required per dollar of national product, or more goods and services can be produced with the same number of man-hours. If output does not grow, employment will certainly fall; if production increases more rapidly than productivity (less any decline in average hours worked), employment must rise. But the labor force grows, too. Unless gross national product (total final expenditure for goods and services corrected for price changes) rises more rapidly than the sum of productivity increase and labor force growth (again modified for any change in hours of work), the increase in employment will be inadequate to absorb the growth in the labor force. Inevitably the unemployment rate will increase. Only when total production expands faster than the rate of labor force growth plus the rate of productivity increase and minus the rate at which average annual hours fall does the unemployment rate fall. Increases in productivity were more important than growth of the labor force as sources of the wide gains in output experienced in the period from the end of World War II to the mid-sixties. These increases in potential production simply were not matched by increases in demand adequate to maintain steady full employment.
Except for the recession years of 1949, 1954, and 1958, the rate of economic growth exceeded the rate of productivity increase. However, in the late 1950s productivity and the labor force were increasing more rapidly than usual, while the growth of output was slower than usual. This accounted for the change in employment rates.
But if part of the national purpose is to reduce and contain unemployment, arithmetic is not enough. We must know which of the basic factors we can control and which we wish to control. Unemployment would have risen more slowly or fallen more rapidly if productivity had increased more slowly, or the labor force had increased more slowly, or the hours of work had fallen more steeply, or total output had grown more rapidly. These are not independent factors, however, and a change in any of them might have caused changes in the others.
A society can choose to reduce the growth of productivity, and it can probably find ways to frustrate its own creativity. However, while a reduction in the growth of productivity at the expense of potential output might result in higher employment in the short run, the long-run effect on the national interest would be disastrous.
We must also give consideration to the fact that hidden beneath national averages is continuous movement into, out of, between, and within labor markets. For example, 15 years ago, the average number of persons in the labor force was 73.4 million, with about 66.7 million employed and 3.9 million unemployed. Yet 14 million experienced some term of unemployment in that year. Some were new entrants to the labor force; others were laid off temporarily. The remainder were those who were permanently or indefinitely severed from their jobs. Thus, the average number unemployed during a year understates the actual volume of involuntary displacement that occurs.
High unemployment is not an inevitable result of the pace of technological change but the consequence of passive public policy. We can anticipate a moderate increase in the labor force accompanied by a slow and irregular decline in hours of work. It follows that the output of the economy—and the aggregate demand to buy it—must grow by more than 4 percent a year just to prevent the unemployment rate from rising, and by even more if the unemployment rate is to fall further. Yet our economy has seldom, if ever, grown at a rate greater than 3.5 percent for any extended length of time. We have no cause of complacency. Positive fiscal, monetary, and manpower policies will be needed in the future.
请教
7. The passage contains information that answers all of the following questions EXCEPT:
(A) What is gross national product?
(B) What effect does a change in productivity invariably have on gross national product?
(C) Under what conditions might employment rise in the short run?
(D) What effect does an increase in output and a decrease in number of hours worked have on productivity?(B)
(E) What was the average number of people unemployed in 1962?
9. Which of the following proposals best responds to the author’s concerns?
(A) The government should manipulate the size of the labor force to prevent future recessions.
(B) The government should maintain some controls over the economy, but it should allow the employment rate to rise and fall with the gross national product, as a check on labor costs.
(C) People should accept that unemployment is undesirable but unavoidable.
(D) The government should manage the economy carefully.(D)
(E) The government should not interfere in the interplay among the three forces affecting unemployment.
10. Which of the following best summarizes the main idea of the passage?
(A) We can and must take steps to ensure that the unemployment rate does not continue to rise as our population and our use of technology increase.
(B) Increases in potential production must be matched by increases in demand in order to maintain steady full employment.
(C) High unemployment is not an inevitable result of the pace of technological change but the consequence of passive public policy.
(D) If part of the national purpose is to reduce and contain unemployment, arithmetic is not enough.(A)
(E) Full employment, regardless of fluctuations in the economy, is within the realm of possibility.
为什么7 不选D, 9 不选 B , 10 不选 C?
谢谢!
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