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- 2023-4-21
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- 1970-1-1
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P1. 健保的設計會依照特定人口分布的平均風險去設計標準化的保費 ->衍生出一個問題"逆向選擇", 所以老年人通常在選擇保單上比較不公平
※逆向選擇: 不健康的人越會買保險(健康的則認為自己不需要所以不買) -> 不健康的投保人變多, 保險公司在理賠上就有困難了※
P2. 有些人認為保險公司這樣對老年人不公平, 作者反駁。表示其實年輕人多有工作, 因此都會參加公司的投保
老年人才表較可能是"逆向選擇"導致理賠出問題的原因
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P1
1. Context: health insurance – higher risk, higher rates -> a standard rate for for a particular segment of the population (average risk of the group)
2. Problem:
“adverse selection” – poor health – willing to pay for the insurance (healthy X)
the riskier members of a group -> the group of insurance applicants
market failure -> insurance companies can’t afford to offer insurance at any price
3. Example: the elder have difficulty obtaining fairly priced medical insurance
P2
1. Argument: insurance company is not against the elderly – the reality of adverse selection
2. Explanation: younger people – generally employed – employers’ group insurance plan -> charge a lower premium (without worrying they opt out of the plan)
3. Conclusion: the elderly(not employed and thus seeking insurance) – vulnerable to market failure
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