【越障】1-2 (商业金融) America's mortgage giants :Fannie and Freddie ride again The subprime mess provides anopportunity for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to salvage their reputations WHERE there is crisis, there isalso opportunity. The turmoil afflicting parts of America's giant residentialmortgage market has already claimed dozens of casualties, including two BearStearns hedge funds that bet the wrong way on structured products backed byloans to subprime borrowers. But Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, thegovernment-chartered siblings that tower over the market, spy gold in therubble—or at least a chance to polish their tarnished reputations. Founded to promote affordablehousing, Fannie and Freddie make life easier for lenders by buying their homeloans and packaging them as securities, or by guaranteeing third parties'issuance of mortgagebacked bonds. Between them they hold or support assetsworth more than $4 trillion. It was, therefore, no trifling matter when theywere found to have misreported earnings in 2001-04—by a combined $11 billion.Top executives were jettisoned, huge fines imposed, and the pair were hit withportfolio caps and higher capital requirements. The journey to redemption has beenbackbreaking. They have spent billions of dollars on new systems and controls.At one point, more than 60 “restatement teams” were beavering away at Fannie,trying to make sense of its labyrinthine books. Their work is finally paying off.Fannie said recently that it will return to timely reporting next spring,earlier than expected, while Freddie will do so this year. The surprise liftedFannie's shares, which are up by around 13% this year. Fannie and Freddie also hope toregain credibility by portraying themselves as buyers of last resort in thesubprime market, as private lenders belatedly tighten standards and investorsrun from toxic mortgagebacked debt. They have pledged to buy tens of billionsof dollars of new subprime mortgages, and are working on products to alleviatethe plight of the worst-hit borrowers. As a result, their market share hasgrown in recent months, though not quite to the level it was at before thescandals. Remarkably, Fannie's portfolio grew at an annual rate of 14% in May.The news this week of problems at another group of hedge funds where subprimebets turned sour, run by United Capital, is likely to send more business theirway. Some question the motives of theso-called government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), accusing them of using thecrisis to cherry-pick the best subprime customers without taking much extrarisk. “They paint themselves as saviours, but they are essentiallyopportunists,” says Bert Ely, a consultant and long-time critic of the pair. Satoshi Kambayashi But with Congress having declaredwar on “predatory” lending, the move is politically smart. Nor can anyone denythat Fannie and Freddie are well placed to take a lead. Sentiment has swungquickly away from exotic adjustable-rate mortgages towards the safer fixed-rateproducts that are their bread and butter. And because they were forced to showrestraint while others grabbed every bit of business going, their portfolioshave plenty of room to grow. James Lockhart, the director of the Office ofFederal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), the GSEs' regulator, sees it asan opportunity for them to educate the market in sound underwriting. This is a time when Fannie andFreddie can prove their worth as market stabilisers, argues Patricia Cook, asenior Freddie Mac executive. And because the lack of liquidity that comes withinstability means higher spreads, they should be able to meet the mission intheir charters (to provide liquidity, stability and affordability) while alsopleasing their shareholders. “Sometimes it's a very elegant model,” she says.Analysts agree: they have been raising the GSEs' price targets. But not everyone is so sanguine.Though they do not engage in subprime lending, Fannie and Freddie hold largepiles of bonds linked to such mortgages, some of it packaged externally. Asmall but significant share of this “private label” paper is rated below AAA,the top notch. In a recent report, Federal Financial Analytics, a consultancy,noted that a 15-30% writedown of this non-AAA slice—hardly inconceivable giventhe continuing rise in subprime delinquencies—would result in losses of up to$3 billion for Freddie and $3.6 billion for Fannie. That would knock back theirreturn to financial normalcy. This kind of analysis sets pulsesracing at the Treasury, where officials worry about the threat the GSEs pose tothe broader financial system. The problem is not just their size. The implicitgovernment guarantee they enjoy, thanks to their charters, means they canborrow at rates close to those on risk-free Treasury bonds, whatever theirfinancial state. This encourages them to grow recklessly. Mr Lockhart pointsout that between 1990 and 2005 their portfolios grew tenfold. American GDPdoubled over the same period. If Fannie or Freddie were to getinto serious trouble, taxpayers would be on the hook for huge amounts. Worse,banks would be severely hurt, since they are allowed to hold as much of the twoinstitutions' debt as they want. Thousands do. Many hold more GSE paper than theydo regulatory capital. This raises the spectre of a broad financial crisis ifeither of the mortgage giants were to collapse. That seems highly unlikely at themoment. Indeed, as Brian Harris of Moody's points out, even without theirimplicit guarantee Fannie and Freddie would be among the most highly-ratedfinancial institutions. And yet things can change quickly: Fannie, remember,fell into technical insolvency in the 1980s, not long after having been inapparently fine fettle. This is why the Treasury, OFHEO and others are urgingCongress to pass a bill that gives the currently feeble regulator similarpowers to those of bank supervisors. The GSEs seem unworried by theprospect of more stringent regulation. Deep down they are probably moreconcerned about threats from new forms of competition, such as covered bonds(on-balance-sheet instruments that enjoy a AAA rating because they are wellcollateralised) and home-loan securitisation trusts, which serve groups ofbanks. These innovations, as well as an increasingly liquid secondary marketwhen times are good, could allow commercial banks to muscle in on the GSEs'turf. Fannie and Freddie should enjoy their subprime bounce while it lasts. (1038 words)
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