PRER2-15-Q51

evelyn205205

After the Second World War, unionism in the Japanese auto industry was company-based, with separate unions in each auto company.Most company unions played no independent role in bargaining shop-floor issues or pressing autoworkers' grievances.In a 1981 survey, for example, fewer than 1 percent of workers said they sought union assistance for work-related problems, while 43 percent said they turned to management instead.There was little to distinguish the two in any case: most union officers were foremen or middle-level managers, and the union's role was primarily one of passive support for company goals.Conflict occasionally disrupted this cooperative relationship--one company union's opposition to the productivity campaigns of the early 1980s has been cited as such a case.In 1986, however, a caucus led by the Foreman's Association forced the union's leadership out of office and returned the union's policy to one of passive cooperation.In the United States, the potential for such company unionism grew after 1979, but it had difficulty taking hold in the auto industry, where a single union represented workers from all companies, particularly since federal law prohibited foremen from joining or leading industrial unions.

The Japanese model was often invoked as one in which authority decentralized to the shop floor empowered production workers to make key decisions.What these claims failed to recognize was that the actual delegation of authority was to the foreman, not the workers.The foreman exercised discretion over job assignments, training, transfers, and promotions; worker initiative was limited to suggestions that fine-tuned a management-controlled production process.Rather than being proactive, Japanese workers were forced to be reactive, the range of their responsibilities being far wider than their span of control.For example, the founder of one production system, Taichi Ohno, routinely gave department managers only 90 percent of the resources needed for production.As soon as workers could meet production goals without working overtime, 10 percent of remaining resources would be removed.Because the "OH! NO!" system continually pushed the production process to the verge of breakdown in an effort to find the minimum resource requirement, critics described it as "management by stress."

It can be inferred that the author of the passage sees which of the following as the primary advantage to companies in implementing the "OH! NO!" system?

(A) It permitted the foreman to take initiative.
(B) It minimized the effort required to produce automobiles.
(C) It ensured that production costs would be as low as possible.
(D) It allowed the foreman to control the production process.
(E) It required considerable worker empowerment to achieve managers' goals.

答案是C。我选的是B，为什么B不对呢，不解~

evelyn205205

麻烦各位NN啦~~~

evelyn205205

先谢谢各位啦~

evelyn205205

求解求解啊~~~

evelyn205205

怎么没人理我呢~~~

evelyn205205

求助求助啊~

Kb24

Japanese workers were forced to be reactive, the range of their responsibilities being far wider than their span of control - 没说生产需要的effort被minimize了
这个"OH! NO!" system的核心理念是减少 resources的使用，而不是efforts。关键字很重要
比如倒数第二行：in an effort to find the minimum “resource” requirement, 以及倒数第三行routinely gave department managers only 90 percent of the “resources” needed

所以B不对。B强调的变成efforts了

evelyn205205

yeah， I got it！
THX very much，Kb24！