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OG-15-89
Most large corporations in the United States were
once run by individual capitalists who owned enough
stock to dominate the board of directors and dictate
company policy. Because putting such large amounts of
(5) stock on the market would only depress its value, they
could not sell out for a quick profit and instead had to
concentrate on improving the long-term productivity of
their companies. Today, with few exceptions, the stock
of large United States corporations is held by large
(10) institutions-pension funds, for example-and because
these institutions are prohibited by antitrust laws from
owning a majority of a company's stock and from
actively influencing a company's decision-making, they
can enhance their wealth only by buying and selling
(15) stock in anticipation of fluctuations in its value. A
minority shareholder is necessarily a short term trader.
As a result, United States productivity is unlikely to
improve unless shareholders and the managers of the
companies in which they invest are encouraged to
(20) enhance long-term productivity (and hence long-term
profitability), rather than simply to maximize short-
term profits.
Since the return of the old-style capitalist is unlikely,
today's short-term traders must be remade into
(25) tomorrow's long-term capitalistic investors. The legal
limits that now prevent financial institutions from
acquiring a dominant shareholding position in a corpora-
tion should be removed, and such institutions encouraged
to take a more active role in the operations of the
(30) companies in which they invest. In addition, any institu-
tion that holds twenty percent or more of a company's
stock should be forced to give the public one day's
notice of the intent to sell those shares. Unless the
announced sale could be explained to the public on
(35) grounds other than anticipated future losses, the value of
the stock would plummet and, like the old-time capital-
ists, major investors could cut their losses only by
helping to restore their companies' productivity. Such
measures would force financial institutions to become
(40) capitalists whose success depends not on trading shares
at the propitious moment, but on increasing the produc-
tivity of the companies in which they invest.
89. It can be inferred from the passage that which of the following is true of majority shareholders in a corporation?
(A) They make the corporation's operational management decisions.
(B) They are not allowed to own more than fifty percent of the corporation's stock.
(C) They cannot make quick profits by selling their stock in the corporation.
(D) They are more interested in profits than in productivity.
(E) They cannot sell any of their stock in the corporation without giving the public advance notic.
OG地解释：
The best answer is C. According to lines 4-8 of the passage, those individual capitalists who were once majority shareholders in a corporation would not be able to make a quick profit by selling a large amount of stock because such a sale would depress the stock’s value. It can be inferred from the passage that this would be true of any majority shareholders.
我的问题：
1,为何理解问题中majority shareholders in a corporation 是指old style individual capitalists. 也可以解释为today's short term traders的呀？如果这样，答案就矛盾了。
2。OG地解释，我感觉就是指old style capitalists.对吗？ |
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发表于 2005-3-12 20:06:00
