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Deregulation of brokerage firms by commission. 影响full-service....以及造成了broker公司能提供的service and product的变化。 但是最后作者说这个改变使得customer最终受益
【以往考古版本】
V1.就说说大意,首先是Deregulation in broker industry 的影响 ,楼主broker居然不认识,但是不影响做题。第一段说 deregulation of the commission of broker 是啥 就是好像原来美国政府对broker的报酬有规定,后来取消了。第二段说 人们本来以为后果是 原来捆绑的service 会debundle (解体)怎么样,后来发现其实没这样,前两年没明显变化(有题,很简单,错误选项都有began,正确的是一个延续的收费模式)然后就变化了 因为一大堆(忘了)discounted broker service company(类似于批发零经纪业务的经纪公司) 和前面的所说的broker industry(就是打包经纪业务)两者界限越来越模糊。。。。最后说individual investor 从中获利(有题问为啥,我选的broker company make efforts to compete with discounted broker company for individual services)
V2. 证券市场出现的什么broker(好像是掮客这种东西),大的券商和小券商的表现。一开始人们推测会怎样怎样,但是,事实上,头两年怎样怎样,后来,怎样怎样,最后老百姓投资者捞到了实惠。By bonniechou
V3讲什么discount broker什么的,说一开始deregulation实行之前,大家是怎么期望这个计划的,后来就说,嘿,真是好用啊。
V4.比较全的是discount breaker,就这里帮我省了一点verbal 的时间。问题有after initial regulation ,discount 跟 full-service 的主要区别是什么。我选的是,full-service 仍然提供固定的commission rate。还有 高亮了 free service 后面的解释,很简单,问括号里面解释的作用,很简单,答案就是改写的。free service 其实不是免费的. by fish0111
V5.就说说大意,首先是Deregulation in broker industry 的影响 ,楼主broker居然不认识,但是不影响做题。第一段说 deregulation of the commission of broker 是啥 就是好像原来美国政府对broker的报酬有规定,后来取消了。第二段说 人们本来以为后果是 原来捆绑的service 会debundle (解体)怎么样,后来发现其实没这样,前两年没明显变化(有题,很简单,错误选项都有began,正确的是一个延续的收费模式)然后就变化了 因为一大堆(忘了)discounted broker service company(类似于批发零经纪业务的经纪公司) 和前面的所说的broker industry(就是打包经纪业务)两者界限越来越模糊。。。。最后说individual investor 从中获利(有题问为啥,我选的broker company make efforts to compete with discounted broker company for individual services)
V6. 证券市场出现的什么broker(好像是掮客这种东西),大的券商和小券商的表现。一开始人们推测会怎样怎样,但是,事实上,头两年怎样怎样,后来,怎样怎样,最后老百姓投资者捞到了实惠。By bonniechou
V7讲什么discount broker什么的,说一开始deregulation实行之前,大家是怎么期望这个计划的,后来就说,嘿,真是好用啊。
V8.比较全的是discount breaker,就这里帮我省了一点verbal 的时间。问题有after initial regulation ,discount 跟 full-service 的主要区别是什么。我选的是,full-service 仍然提供固定的commission rate。还有 高亮了 free service 后面的解释,很简单,问括号里面解释的作用,很简单,答案就是改写的。free service 其实不是免费的. by fish0111
Wall Street brokerage firms have been enjoying a robust business climate in recent years. Braced by a seemingly inexhaustible bull market and heavy trading volumes, full-service firms -- the traditional Wall Street powerhouses -- are, by and large, consistently reporting increased profits. Assets in mutual funds have soared as well, as more baby boomers have become concerned about the financial needs of retirement.
But these heady market conditions, while seemingly a recipe for continued success, mask looming problems for the full-service firms. That is because they are losing a significant portion of their business to discount brokers, mutual fund companies and other specialized providers, a group that has already captured 25 percent of the retail market with its generally lower prices and more enterprising use of technology. In particular, new entrants have been quick to capitalize on the growth of direct channels, e.g., discounters now moving to the Internet.
All of which has left the full-service firms with a bottom line that is bigger but is also under siege. To fight back, the firms need to play to their strengths and shore up their weaknesses. On the strength side, they need to aggressively market their product breadth, personalized service and "one-stop shopping" convenience. As for their weaknesses, they need to focus on costs and operating efficiency, and pass on as much of the savings as possible to their customers. And they need to proactively manage their key client relationships through superior service and attractive customer loyalty programs.
These firms unbundled the offerings of the full-service providers and concentrated on specific sources of value to investors. (See Exhibit I.) They also developed direct channels to circumvent the physical footprint advantage of the established players at a time when consumer adoption of electronic and other forms of direct access was increasingly replacing the need for face-to-face dealings. Paced by technological advances that made "self-service" a reality, as well as by a rising level of investor sophistication, the trend toward specialization gained momentum.
At the same time, the ranks of individual investors swelled, sparking tremendous growth in mutual funds and employer-sponsored 401(k) plans. Recognizing that growth, the specialized firms focused more and more on specific sources of value to address targeted customer needs, fostering the perception that their services are "cheaper" (although, given fair comparison, that is not always the case).
These specialized providers have enjoyed significant growth at the expense of the full-service firms. In the 10 years since 1985, the discounters' share of retail equity trading commissions nearly tripled. Clearly, investors perceive significant value from the discounters' price and convenience advantages.
The competitive environment has changed dramatically for full-service brokerage firms. Until the mid-1980's, these firms dominated the landscape. Their product offerings were primarily stocks and bonds, and their customers were usually affluent. Securities regulations mandated a level playing field that gave firms little beyond their image and reputation to differentiate themselves. As a result, customer turnover was typically low.
But price deregulation and technological advances dramatically changed that paradigm. A new breed of specialized firms and discount brokers appeared on the scene, offering services at vastly lower costs
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