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板凳

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发表于 2014-11-7 16:29:15
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Part III: Obstacle
Monetary policy: Quite enough
Nov 3rd 2014, 13:00 by R.A. | LONDON
[Paraphrase 7]
ON WEDNESDAY of last week the Federal Reserve completed its taper of the programme popularly known as QE3. (This week's Free exchange column examines whether the programme worked as advertised.) And on the face of things, the move looks entirely justified. Last month America's unemployment rate fell to 5.9%, while in the year to September firms added 2.6m new jobs: the best 12-month performance of the recovery. The Bureau of Economic Analysis said last week that the American economy grew at a 3.5% annual pace in the third quarter, a second consecutive strong performance after growth at a 4.6% annual pace in the second quarter. Surveying the fundamentals, the Fed struck a rather hawkish tone in its statement:
Moreover, the Committee continues to see sufficient underlying strength in the broader economy to support ongoing progress toward maximum employment in a context of price stability.
Quite right, many observers argue. But the Fed's move looks shortsighted and dangerous to me. Why?
There are any number of reasons one might want the Fed to continue forward with its asset purchases. There is little sign that labour markets are running out of slack. There are lots of downside risks abroad. The Fed should be trying to overshoot its target in order to build up more of a cushion against low inflation and interest rates, and so on. But convinced as I am of the sense in doing more on these grounds, not everyone buys that these are good reasons to maintain asset purchases. So let's stick with the most basic argument of all: the Fed is taking a serious risk in undermining the credibility of its nominal anchor.
In the 1970s and 1980s, as independent central banks were grappling with high inflation on the one hand and a dawning awareness of the importance of expectations on the other, the economics profession emphasised the importance of establishing a credible nominal anchor: a variable entirely under the central bank's control that it would use as the basis for policy and against which its performance could be measured. Strong anchors were critical in reining in inflation. Setting one, it was thought, should help coordinate public expectations around the desired, lower inflation rate. And setting a public target carries significant reputational risk for a central bank, since any failure is there for all to see. It should therefore be easier for the central bank to credibly commit itself to hitting the target.
Once inflation was whipped, the nominal anchor took on a new, or more generalised role as a stabilising force. If the public found the target credible, then the central bank would not need to work as hard to offset shocks in either direction. Firms and workers would be less inclined to react to temporary divergences from the target by adjusting prices or demanding offsetting wage changes. That, in turn, should tend to push the target variable back toward the desired level—and the economy with it.
The choice of anchor varies by countries and has changed over time. The Fed long operated with an informal inflation target as anchor until January of 2012, when it declared:
The inflation rate over the longer run is primarily determined by monetary policy, and hence the Committee has the ability to specify a longer-run goal for inflation. The Committee judges that inflation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate. Communicating this inflation goal clearly to the public helps keep longer-term inflation expectations firmly anchored, thereby fostering price stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhancing the Committee's ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances.
The Fed's mandates are maximum employment and stable prices (with sub-mandates for moderate interest rates and financial stability). The best way to deliver on those mandates, it reckons, is by targeting a rate of inflation of 2%, as measured by the price index for personal consumption expenditures. This is monetary orthodoxy of the highest order, delivered directly from the Fed. It could not be clearer.
Here is what has happened to the price index for personal consumption expenditures since that time:
As you can see, inflation has been below the desired level for all but a handful of months since the target was announced. In the nearly three years since the Fed has operated under an explict 2% inflation targeting regime, annual inflation has been 1.5% on average. In the two most recent months, year-on-year inflation has been 1.4%, below both the target and the average for the period under which the target has been in place. Market-based measures of inflation expectations are not perfect, but for most of the last few years they have indicated that inflation is likely to be below target on average over the next five years. It would be shocking if that were not the case, given that the most recent Fed projections also indicate that inflation will be below target for the foreseeable future.
We can debate whether the Fed has the right target or not; that's an open and interesting question on which there are plenty of views worth considering. Do you know what's not up for debate? Whether what we have experienced in America over the last few years represents good monetary policy making. It doesn't. Setting a public target, consistently missing that target, projecting that the target will be consistently missed in future, and conducting policy so as to make sure the target is in fact missed: that is lousy monetary policy making. And I cannot understand why the Fed does not see this record as detrimental to the recovery and highly corrosive of the Fed's credibility.
The Fed needs a change in behaviour, a change in target, or a change in personnel.
Now the typical response to criticisms of this sort is that the Fed has done what it can do and shouldn't be bothered to do more. Monetary policy has done its part some reckon, while others insist monetary policy can't do anymore. This newspaper has joined many others in arguing that more of the burden of stimulus should fall on fiscal authorities.
It is true that governments have been foolish in cutting budgets and refusing to take advantage of cheap financing to invest in badly needed public infrastructure. But that failure does not absolve the Fed. To assign responsibility for countercyclical policy—or indeed, for hitting the nominal anchor—to the legislature would represent a truly radical change.
Economists reckoned that business cycle management should fall to the central bank for good reasons. The short-run reasons—that fiscal stimulus will often fail to meet the conditions for appropriate countercyclical policy, that it be timely, targeted, and temporary—are not particularly relevant now (but would be if ever the economy escaped this mess). But what is relevant is the fact that governments are really bad at providing sufficient fiscal stimulus to boost the economy (at least when the threat of massive global conflict is not providing the necessary incentive). The rich-world record on this score over the last few years is simply abysmal. Counting on elected governments to do better in future is a recipe for deeper recessions and more volatile business cycles. Neither are the cases where fiscal stimulus has worked particularly encouraging. In China, fiscal spending has been an instrument of corruption, and the spigot has been difficult to turn off despite the fact that the growth returns to marginal debt appear to be diminishing rapidly.
Monetary policy is not a switch you turn on when the economy is rocky then turn off again when things improve. So long as the economy relies on money there is a monetary policy, and its stance is too loose, too tight, or about right. Measuring the stance of policy isn't a cut and dry matter, but a pretty sensible place to start is by comparing the state of the economy against the central bank's public, self-chosen target. On that simple basis policy is too tight, has been so for some time, and is very likely to be so in future. It strikes me as much more likely that PCE inflation will centre on 1.5% over the next few years than on 2%. That's Fed credibility eroding. It may find itself wishing it had a bit more of the stuff if a nasty shock comes along.
I understand why so many people are uncomfortable with QE. It would be much more satisfying if the Fed could stimulate the economy by printing money to give to orphanages; sadly it is not allowed to do so. But the central bank's job is not to give us all the warm fuzzies. We should not let distaste with the means to drift into tolerance for a failure to achieve the Fed's self-adopted ends. So, QE critics, what should the Fed do?
[1492 words]
Source: Economist
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2014/11/monetary-policy
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