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11#
 楼主| 发表于 2013-8-1 08:44:10 | 只看该作者
Slow Ideas

Why do some innovations spread so swiftly and others so slowly? Consider the very different trajectories of surgical anesthesia and antiseptics, both of which were discovered in the nineteenth century. The first public demonstration of anesthesia was in 1846. The Boston surgeon Henry Jacob Bigelow was approached by a local dentist named William Morton, who insisted that he had found a gas that could render patients insensible to the pain of surgery. That was a dramatic claim. In those days, even a minor tooth extraction was excruciating. Without effective pain control, surgeons learned to work with slashing speed. Attendants pinned patients down as they screamed and thrashed, until they fainted from the agony. Nothing ever tried had made much difference. Nonetheless, Bigelow agreed to let Morton demonstrate his claim.
On October 16, 1846, at Massachusetts General Hospital, Morton administered his gas through an inhaler in the mouth of a young man undergoing the excision of a tumor in his jaw. The patient only muttered to himself in a semi-conscious state during the procedure. The following day, the gas left a woman, undergoing surgery to cut a large tumor from her upper arm, completely silent and motionless. When she woke, she said she had experienced nothing at all.
Four weeks later, on November 18th, Bigelow published his report on the discovery of “insensibility produced by inhalation” in the Boston Medical and Surgical Journal. Morton would not divulge the composition of the gas, which he called Letheon, because he had applied for a patent. But Bigelow reported that he smelled ether in it (ether was used as an ingredient in certain medical preparations), and that seems to have been enough. The idea spread like a contagion, travelling through letters, meetings, and periodicals. By mid-December, surgeons were administering ether to patients in Paris and London. By February, anesthesia had been used in almost all the capitals of Europe, and by June in most regions of the world.
There were forces of resistance, to be sure. Some people criticized anesthesia as a “needless luxury”; clergymen deplored its use to reduce pain during childbirth as a frustration of the Almighty’s designs. James Miller, a nineteenth-century Scottish surgeon who chronicled the advent of anesthesia, observed the opposition of elderly surgeons: “They closed their ears, shut their eyes, and folded their hands. . . . They had quite made up their minds that pain was a necessary evil, and must be endured.” Yet soon even the obstructors, “with a run, mounted behind—hurrahing and shouting with the best.” Within seven years, virtually every hospital in America and Britain had adopted the new discovery.
Sepsis—infection—was the other great scourge of surgery. It was the single biggest killer of surgical patients, claiming as many as half of those who underwent major operations, such as a repair of an open fracture or the amputation of a limb. Infection was so prevalent that suppuration—the discharge of pus from a surgical wound—was thought to be a necessary part of healing.


In the eighteen-sixties, the Edinburgh surgeon Joseph Lister read a paper by Louis Pasteur laying out his evidence that spoiling and fermentation were the consequence of microorganisms. Lister became convinced that the same process accounted for wound sepsis. Pasteur had observed that, besides filtration and the application of heat, exposure to certain chemicals could eliminate germs. Lister had read about the city of Carlisle’s success in using a small amount of carbolic acid to eliminate the odor of sewage, and reasoned that it was destroying germs. Maybe it could do the same in surgery.
During the next few years, he perfected ways to use carbolic acid for cleansing hands and wounds and destroying any germs that might enter the operating field. The result was strikingly lower rates of sepsis and death. You would have thought that, when he published his observations in a groundbreaking series of reports in The Lancet, in 1867, his antiseptic method would have spread as rapidly as anesthesia.
Far from it. The surgeon J. M. T. Finney recalled that, when he was a trainee at Massachusetts General Hospital two decades later, hand washing was still perfunctory. Surgeons soaked their instruments in carbolic acid, but they continued to operate in black frock coats stiffened with the blood and viscera of previous operations—the badge of a busy practice. Instead of using fresh gauze as sponges, they reused sea sponges without sterilizing them. It was a generation before Lister’s recommendations became routine and the next steps were taken toward the modern standard of asepsis—that is, entirely excluding germs from the surgical field, using heat-sterilized instruments and surgical teams clad in sterile gowns and gloves.
In our era of electronic communications, we’ve come to expect that important innovations will spread quickly. Plenty do: think of in-vitro fertilization, genomics, and communications technologies themselves. But there’s an equally long list of vital innovations that have failed to catch on. The puzzle is why.
Did the spread of anesthesia and antisepsis differ for economic reasons? Actually, the incentives for both ran in the right direction. If painless surgery attracted paying patients, so would a noticeably lower death rate. Besides, live patients were more likely to make good on their surgery bill. Maybe ideas that violate prior beliefs are harder to embrace. To nineteenth-century surgeons, germ theory seemed as illogical as, say, Darwin’s theory that human beings evolved from primates. Then again, so did the idea that you could inhale a gas and enter a pain-free state of suspended animation. Proponents of anesthesia overcame belief by encouraging surgeons to try ether on a patient and witness the results for themselves—to take a test drive. When Lister tried this strategy, however, he made little progress.
The technical complexity might have been part of the difficulty. Giving Lister’s methods “a try” required painstaking attention to detail. Surgeons had to be scrupulous about soaking their hands, their instruments, and even their catgut sutures in antiseptic solution. Lister also set up a device that continuously sprayed a mist of antiseptic over the surgical field.


-------------

Sometime,the belive of people or the need of the people will help us overcome the old belief and use new technology.
A Some people criticize anestheis as "needless luxuary", clergymen deplored its use to reduce pain during childbirth as a frustration of the Almight's designs.
   Frustration 挫败
B Proponents of anesthesia overcome belief by encouring surgeons to try ether on a patient and witness the results for themselves-to take a test drive.


12#
 楼主| 发表于 2013-8-7 07:55:44 | 只看该作者
Bezos and the Washington Post: A Skeptical View
Posted by John Cassidy



The first and only time I’ve seen Jeff Bezos up close was in 2004, at the White House Correspondents’ dinner. If I remember correctly, and I think I do, he was being led into the Vanity Fair-Bloomberg after-party by Roxanne Roberts, a longtime writer for the Washington Post’s Style section. A skinny, balding, fidgety fellow, he seemed a bit out of place in a black tie and a tux, smiling awkwardly as he shook hands and chatted with the capital’s power brokers and visiting celebrities.
Now, as the new owner of the Post, as well as the chief executive of Amazon, Bezos is Roberts’s boss and a formidable power broker in his own right. Many journalists currently or formerly associated with the Post are saying nice things about him. Appearing on MSNBC’s “Morning Joe” on Tuesday,
Bob Woodward said, “This isn’t Rupert Murdoch buying the Wall Street Journal, this is somebody who believes in the values that the Post has been prominent in practicing, and so I don’t see any downside.” In a statement, Carl Bernstein, Woodward’s former partner, described Bezos as “exactly the kind of inventive and innovative choice needed to bring about a recommitment  to  great journalism on  the scale  many of us have been  hoping for.” Fred Hiatt, the paper’s editorial-page editor, said, “We’ve all been looking for a way to marry quality journalism with commercial success in the digital era, and it’s hard to think of anyone better positioned to figure that out than Jeff Bezos.” Ezra Klein, a columnist and the editor of Wonkblog, wrote, “For now, I’m hopeful.”
It’s all very well to be optimistic and hopeful that Bezos’s purchase of the Post is an essentially philanthropic project, or even a vanity one, and that, after years of cuts at the paper, he will invest the resources needed to restore it to its erstwhile glory. Along with James Fallows, who
wrote about the purchase yesterday at the Atlantic, I would like to think that this marks “the beginning of a phase in which this Gilded Age’s major beneficiaries re-invest in the infrastructure of our public intelligence.” But am I convinced that that’s what’s happening? I am not.
If Bezos’s motives are essentially philanthropic, why isn’t he purchasing the paper through his family foundation, which could probably afford it, especially if he kicked it some more of his estimated twenty-five billion dollars? At the moment, the family foundation, which is run by Bezos’s parents, Jackie and Mike, focusses on preschool and K-12 education. But there’s nothing to stop it from adding saving newspapers that educate the public to its list of aims. For years now, some knowledgeable media people have thought that the only long-term solution for America’s serious newspapers, which do costly, serious journalism, is to have their ultimate owners be charitable trusts, which is how the Guardian was structured until recently.
Evidently, Bezos isn’t taking this route, which leaves two possibilities, not mutually exclusive. The first is he intends to return the Post to its former role as a profitable business, a project with which I wish him good luck. It is surely fanciful to suggest that Bezos, simply because of his experience at Amazon, will immediately come up with a fresh digital strategy to save the Post. If such a wheeze were readily available, somebody at a newspaper company would have thought of it. To be sure, the Post, like most newspapers, was slow to realize the full scale of the threat that it faced from online competitors. In recent years, though, it has invested in the Web, developing some popular and high-quality online products, such as Wonkblog and The Fix. But, so far, this push hasn’t  much helped the paper’s bottom line. In the first half of this year, the Post lost about fifty million dollars, after accounting for pension costs.
The second possibility is that Bezos is buying the Post for political reasons, a theory for which I have no evidence, except that it is neither outlandish nor ahistorical. It is a reason that people buy newspapers. On a personal level, Bezos is a socially progressive libertarian—a fairly common crossbreed in Silicon Valley and on Wall Street, the two arenas where he has spent his business career. Last year, he and his wife pledged $2.5 million to support gay marriage in a Washington State referendum, and the measure passed handily. Over the years, he has contributed modestly to candidates of both major parties, and,
as David Remnick notes, to the nonprofit 501(c)(3) entity that owns the libertarian magazine Reason.
Is Bezos is buying the Post to push a liberal / libertarian agenda—one of the few things in the world that could simultaneously delight Nancy Pelosi and Rand Paul? Somehow, I doubt it. A bit of a recluse, he doesn’t strike me as a political crusader or as someone who wants to be more of a public figure than he already is. If you own a big newspaper, you can’t avoid getting a good deal of attention. If you own a big newspaper and you also have a clear political agenda—like Hearst or Murdoch—you quickly become a lightning rod, and all that furor can cause problems for your other businesses.
I’m pretty sure that’s the last thing Bezos would want. Having spent the past twenty years building Amazon into an online behemoth, he wouldn’t do anything that could harm it. Indeed, I have a nagging, if possibly unfounded, suspicion that his primary motivation in buying the Post is to protect Amazon’s interests in the political battle, which is sure to come, over the company’s monopolistic tendencies. Why do I suspect that? In part, because I am a skeptic. But also because it’s just about the only explanation that makes sense.
For the past fifteen years, Internet companies like Amazon, Google, and Facebook have been rightly lionized as triumphs of American entrepreneurship. As the Web matures, though, they are gradually coming to be viewed in a different light, as quasi-monopolies that need at least a modicum of oversight. Because of the presence of network effects and other sources of increasing returns to scale, there is a natural tendency for successful online companies to increase market share and, eventually, to dominate a specific market. Google dominates search and, through You Tube, it also dominates online video. Facebook dominates social networking and, through Instagram, it also has a big presence in microblogging. And Amazon dominates online retailing.
Any monopoly position in the market comes with the capacity for abuse. And behind Bezos’s public image as a smiling geek there is a ruthless business strategist. In the book market, Amazon has followed the classic monopolist’s script of cutting prices to build up its market share and eliminate competition. Now that its competitors are struggling or gone, there is some evidence Amazon is raising prices, although the company denies this. In other areas, too, the online retailer has thrown its weight around like an old-fashioned monopolist. As Amazon expanded across the country, it has sought to avoid collecting and paying sales taxes on the goods that it sells, thus preserving an unfair price advantage over brick-and-mortar competitors. (For more on this, see the
recent cover story in Fortune “AMAZON’S (NOT SO SECRET) WAR ON TAXES.”)
At this stage, one of the main threats to the fortunes of companies like Amazon, Google, and Facebook comes not from potential competitors but, rather, from the political authorities that are gradually awakening to their market power. Google’s search business has faced antitrust investigations in the United States and Europe. The Justice Department’s competition arm
is moving to regulate


Apple’s iTunes store. And Facebook and other online companies are facing questions about how they protect the privacy of their users.
So far, Amazon has gotten off easy. Rather than investigating whether it was guilty of predatory pricing in the books market, the Justice Department brought suit against some of its competitors, like Apple, and old-line book publishers. But the political climate is changing. At the local level, states like California and Texas have demanded that Amazon pay sales taxes on the goods that it sells to state residents. (In Texas, Amazon responded by shutting down a Dallas distribution center and threatening to abandon the state.) And earlier this year in Washington, D.C., the Senate, with the support of the Obama Administration, passed a bill that would force online companies like Amazon to collect and pay state sales taxes even if they don’t have a physical presence there. The bill, known as the Marketplace Fairness Act, is currently in the House of Representatives, and its prospects are unclear.
As the Fortune article makes clear, Bezos and his lobbyists in Washington have fought a long battle to protect the company’s cost advantage. Bezos now says that he supports the sales-tax legislation, and my guess is that he recognizes that he’s going to lose this one. In California and other states, Amazon has already reached a deal with local authorities to start collecting sales taxes. In anticipation of the new tax regime, it is building dozens of new distribution centers throughout the country, evidently in preparation for a push into selling and delivering produce and other food.
This “local” strategy will bring Amazon into competition with many more retailers. It’s sure to cause controversy and spur demands to restrain the firm’s imperialistic tendencies. And when that happens, Bezos will be the proud owner of the newspaper that, even now, helps to set the agenda in the nation’s capital.
Will he be ordering his editors to publish articles defending Amazon’s business tactics and criticizing those who question them? I very much doubt that, too. Such a tactic would be transparent, counterproductive, and, quite possibly, contrary to his belief in the First Amendment. But through the editorial columns of the Post, as well as through the ready access to powerful people that being the owner of the newspaper brings, he will be able to have his voice heard much more clearly. And that, surely, must be worth something to him. Two hundred and fifty million dollars, perhaps?
Photograph by Reed Saxon/AP.

1. His primary motivation in buying the Post is to protect Amazion's interests in the political battle, which is sure to come, over the company's monopolistic tendencies.
2. In the book market, Amazon has followed the classic monopolistic script of cutting prices to build up its market share and eliminate competition.
3. And eariler this year in Washington, D.C., the Senate, with the support of the obama Administration, passed a bill that would force online companies like Amazon to collect and pay state sales taxes even if they do not have a physical presence there.

13#
 楼主| 发表于 2013-8-8 07:48:12 | 只看该作者
FictionMeet the President!by Zadie Smith                                                                                                                                                                                                                     August 12, 2013

Illustration by Martin Ansin.

“What you got there, then?”
The boy didn’t hear the question. He stood at the end of a ruined pier, believing himself quite alone. But now he registered the presence at his back, and turned.
“What you got there?”
A very old person, a woman, stood before him, gripping the narrow shoulder of a girl child. Both of them local, typically stunted, dim: they stared up at him stupidly. The boy turned again to the sea. All week long he had been hoping for a clear day to try out the new technology—not new to the world, but new to the boy—and now at last here was a break in the rain. Gray sky met gray sea. Not ideal, but sufficient. Ideally he would be standing on a cairn in Scotland or some other tropical spot, experiencing backlit clarity. Ideally he would be—
“Is it one of them what you see through?”
A hand, lousy with blue veins, reached out for the light encircling the boy’s head, as if it were a substantial thing, to be grasped like the handle of a mug.
“Ooh, look at the green, Aggie. That shows you it’s on.”
The boy was ready to play. He touched the node on his finger to the node at his temple, raising the volume.
“Course, he’d have to be somebody, Aggs, cos they don’t give ’em to nobody”—the boy felt the shocking touch of a hand on his own flesh. “Are you somebody, then?”
She had shuffled around until she stood square in front of him, unavoidable. Hair as white as paper. A long, shapeless black dress, made of some kind of cloth, and what appeared to be a pair of actual glasses. Forty-nine years old, type O, a likelihood of ovarian cancer, some ancient debt infraction—nothing more. A blank, more or less. Same went for the girl: never left the country, eighty-five-per-cent chance of macular degeneration, an uncle on the database, long ago located, eliminated. She would be nine in two days. Melinda Durham and Agatha Hanwell. They shared no more DNA than strangers.
“Can you see us?” The old woman let go of her charge and waved her hands wildly. The tips of her fingers barely reached the top of the boy’s head. “Are we in it? What are we?”
The boy, unused to proximity, took a single step forward. Farther he could not go. Beyond was the ocean; above, a mess of weather, clouds closing in on blue wherever blue tried to assert itself. A dozen or so craft darted up and down, diving low like seabirds after a fish, and no bigger than seabirds, skimming the dirty foam, then returning to the heavens, directed by unseen hands. On his first day here the boy had trailed his father on an inspection tour to meet those hands: intent young men at their monitors, over whose shoulders the boy’s father leaned, as he sometimes leaned over the boy to insure he ate breakfast.
“What d’you call one of them there?”
The boy tucked his shirt in all round: “AG 12.”
The old woman snorted as a mark of satisfaction, but did not leave.
He tried looking the females directly in their dull brown eyes. It was what his mother would have done, a kindly woman with a great mass of waist-length flame-colored hair, famed for her patience with locals. But his mother was long dead, he had never known her, he was losing what little light the day afforded. He blinked twice, said, “Hand to hand.” Then, having a change of heart: “Weaponry.” He looked down at his torso, to which he now attached a quantity of guns.
“You carry on, lad,” the old woman said. “We won’t get in your way. He can see it all, duck,” she told the girl, who paid her no mind. “Got something in his hands—or thinks he does.”
She took a packet of tobacco from a deep pocket in the front of her garment and began to roll a cigarette, using the girl as a shield from the wind.
“Them clouds, dark as bulls. Racing, racing. They always win.” To illustrate, she tried turning Aggie’s eyes to the sky, lifting the child’s chin with a finger, but the girl would only gawk stubbornly at the woman’s elbow. “They’ll dump on us before we even get there. If you didn’t have to, I wouldn’t go, Aggie, no chance, not in this. It’s for you I do it. I’ve been wet and wet and wet. All my life. And I bet he’s looking at blazing suns and people in their what-have-yous and all-togethers! Int yer? Course you are! And who’d blame you?” She laughed so loud the boy heard her. And then the child—who did not laugh, whose pale face, with its triangle chin and enormous, fair-lashed eyes, seemed capable only of astonishment—pulled at his actual leg, forcing him to mute for a moment and listen to her question.
“Well, I’m Bill Peek,” he replied, and felt very silly, like somebody in an old movie.
“Bill Peek!” the old woman cried. “Oh, but we’ve had Peeks in Anglia a long time. You’ll find a Peek or two or three down in Sutton Hoo. Bill Peek! You from round here, Bill Peek?”
His grandparents? Very possibly. Local and English—or his great-grandparents. His hair and eyes and skin and name suggested it. But it was not a topic likely to engage his father, and the boy himself had never felt any need or desire to pursue it. He was simply global, accompanying his father on his inspections, though usually to livelier spots than this. What a sodden dump it was! Just as everyone had warned him it would be. The only people left in England were the ones who couldn’t leave.
“From round here, are you? Or maybe a Norfolk one? He looks like a Norfolk one, Aggs, wouldn’t you say?”
Bill Peek raised his eyes to the encampment on the hill, pretending to follow with great interest those dozen circling, diving craft, as if he, uniquely, as the child of personnel, had nothing to fear from them. But the woman was occupied with her fag and the girl only sang “Bill Peek, Bill Peek, Bill Peek” to herself, and smiled sadly at her own turned-in feet. They were too local even to understand the implied threat. He jumped off the pier onto the deserted beach. It was low tide—it seemed you could walk to Holland. He focussed upon the thousands of tiny spirals on the sand, like miniature turds stretching out to the horizon.
Felixstowe, England. A Norman village; later, briefly, a resort, made popular by the German royal family; much fishing, once upon a time. A hundred years earlier, almost to the very month, a quaint flood had killed only forty-eight people. Over the years, the place had been serially flooded, mostly abandoned. Now the sad little town had retreated three miles inland and up a hill. Pop.: 850. The boy blinked twice more; he did not care much for history. He narrowed his attention to a single turd. Arenicola marina. Sandworms. Lugworms. These were its coiled castings. Castings? But here he found his interest fading once again. He touched his temple and said, “Blood Head 4.” Then: “Washington.” It was his first time at this level. Another world began to construct itself around Bill Peek, a shining city on a hill.
“Poor little thing,” Melinda Durham said. She sat on the pier, legs dangling, and pulled the girl into her lap. “Demented with grief she is. We’re going to a laying out. Aggie’s sister is laid out today. Her last and only relation. Course, the cold truth is, Aggie’s sister weren’t much better than trash, and a laying out’s a sight too good for her—she’d be better off laid out on this beach here and left for the gulls. But I ain’t going for her. I do it for Aggie. Aggie knows why. Aggie’s been a great help to me what with one thing and another.”
While he waited, as incidental music played, the boy idly checked a message from his father: at what time could he be expected back at the encampment? At what time could he be expected. This was a pleasing development, being an inquiry rather than an order. He would be fifteen in May, almost a man! A man who could let another man know when he could be expected, and let him know in his own sweet time, when he had the inclination. He performed some rudimentary stretches and bounced up and down on the balls of his feet.
“Maud, that was her name. And she was born under the same steeple she’ll be buried under. Twelve years old. But so whorish—” Melinda covered Aggie’s ears, and the girl leaned into the gesture, having mistaken it for affection. “So whorish she looked like a crone. If you lived round here, Bill Peek, you’d’ve known Maud, if you understand me correctly. You would’ve known Maud right up to the Biblical and beyond. Terrible. But Aggie’s cut from quite different sod, thank goodness!” Aggie was released and patted on the head. “And she’s no one left, so here I am, muggins here, taking her to a laying out when I’ve a million other stones to be lifted off the pile.”
The boy placed a number of grenades about his person. In each chapter of the Pathways Global Institute (in Paris, New York, Shanghai, Nairobi, Jerusalem, Tokyo), the boy had enjoyed debating with friends the question of whether it was better to augment around the “facts on the ground,” incorporating whatever was at hand (“flagging,” it was called, the pleasure being the unpredictability), or to choose spots where there were barely any facts to work around. The boy was of the latter sensibility. He wanted to augment in clean, blank places, where he was free to fully extend, unhindered. He looked down the beach as the oil streaks in the sand were overlaid now with a gleaming pavement, lined on either side by the National Guard, saluting him. It was three miles to the White House. He picked out a large pair of breasts to wear, for reasons of his own, and a long, scaled tail, for purposes of strangulation.
“Oh, fuck a duck—you wouldn’t do me an awful favor and keep an eye on Aggie just a minute, would you?—I’ve left my rosary! I can’t go to no laying out without it. It’s more than my soul’s worth. Oh, Aggie, how did you ever let me leave without it? She’s a good girl, but she’s thoughtless sometimes—her sister were thoughtless, too. Bill Peek, you will keep an eye on her, won’t you? I won’t be a moment. We’re shacked up just on that hill by the old Martello tower. Eight minutes I’ll be. No more. Would you do that for me, Bill Peek?”
Bill Peek nodded his head, once rightward, twice leftward. Knives shot out of his wrists and splayed beautifully like the fronds of a fern.
It was perhaps twenty minutes later, as he approached the pile of rubble—pounded by enemy craft—that had once been the Monument, that young Bill Peek felt again a presence at his back and turned and found Aggie Hanwell with her fist in her mouth, tears streaming, jaw working up and down in an agonized fashion. He couldn’t hear her over the explosions. Reluctantly, he paused.
“She ain’t come back.”
“Excuse me?”
“She went but she ain’t come back!”
“Who?” he asked, but then scrolled back until he found it. “M. Durham?”
The girl gave him that same astonished look.
“My Melly,” she said. “She promised to take me but she went and she ain’t come back!”
The boy swiftly located M. Durham—as much an expedience as an act of charity—and experienced the novelty of sharing the information with the girl, in the only way she appeared able to receive it. “She’s two miles away,” he said, with his own mouth. “Heading north.”
Aggie Hanwell sat down on her bum in the wet sand. She rolled something in her hand. The boy looked at it and learned that it was a periwinkle—a snail of the sea! He recoiled, disliking those things which crawled and slithered upon the earth. But this one proved broken, with only a pearlescent nothing inside it.
“So it was all a lie,” Aggie said, throwing her head back dramatically to consider the sky. “Plus one of them’s got my number. I’ve done nothing wrong but still Melly’s gone and left me and one of them thing’s been following me, since the pier—even before that.”
“If you’ve done nothing wrong,” Bill Peek said, solemnly parroting his father, “you’ve nothing to worry about. It’s a precise business.” He had been raised to despair of the type of people who spread misinformation about the Program. Yet along with his new maturity had come fresh insight into the complexities of his father’s world. For didn’t those with bad intent on occasion happen to stand beside the good, the innocent, or the underaged? And in those circumstances could precision be entirely guaranteed? “Anyway, they don’t track children. Don’t you understand anything?”
Hearing this, the girl laughed—a bitter and cynical cackle, at odds with her pale little face—and Bill Peek made the mistake of being, for a moment, rather impressed. But she was only imitating her elders, as he was imitating his.
“Go home,” he said.
Instead she set about burrowing her feet into the wet sand.
“Everyone’s got a good angel and a bad angel,” she explained. “And if it’s a bad angel that picks you out”—she pointed to a craft swooping low—“there’s no escaping it. You’re done for.”
He listened in wonderment. Of course he’d always known there were people who thought in this way—there was a module you did on them in sixth grade—but he had never met anyone who really harbored what his anthro-soc teacher, Mr. Lin, called “animist beliefs.”
The girl sighed, scooped up more handfuls of sand, and added them to the two mounds she had made on top of her feet, patting them down, encasing herself up to the ankles. Meanwhile all around her Bill Peek’s scene of fabulous chaos was frozen—a Minotaur sat in the lap of stony Abe Lincoln and a dozen carefully planted I.E.D.s awaited detonation. He was impatient to return.
“Must advance,” he said, pointing down the long stretch of beach, but she held up her hands, she wanted pulling up. He pulled. Standing, she clung to him, hugging his knees. He felt her face damp against his leg.
“Oh, it’s awful bad luck to miss a laying out! Melly’s the one knew where to go. She’s got the whole town up here,” she said, tapping her temple, making the boy smile. “Memoried. No one knows town like Melly. She’ll say, ‘This used to be here, but they knocked it down,’ or, ‘There was a pub here with a mark on the wall where the water rose.’ She’s memoried every corner. She’s my friend.”
“Some friend!” the boy remarked. He succeeded in unpeeling the girl from his body, and strode on down the beach, firefighting a gang of Russian commandoes as they parachuted into view. Alongside him a scurrying shape ran; sometimes a dog, sometimes a droid, sometimes a huddle of rats. Her voice rose out of it.
“Can I see?”
Bill Peek disembowelled a fawn to his left. “Do you have an Augmentor?”
“No.”
“Do you have a complementary system?”
“No.”
He knew he was being cruel—but she was ruining his concentration. He stopped running and split the visuals, the better to stare her down.
“Any system?”
“No.”
“Therefore no. No, you can’t.”
Her nose was pink, a drop of moisture hung from it. She had an innocence that practically begged to be corrupted. Bill Peek could think of more than a few Pathways boys of his acquaintance who wouldn’t hesitate to take her under the next boardwalk and put a finger inside her. And the rest. As the son of personnel, however, Bill Peek was held to a different standard.
“Jimmy Kane had one—he was a fella of Maud’s, her main fella. He flew in and then he flew out—you never knew when he’d be flying in again. He was a captain in the Army. He had an old one of them . . . but said it still worked. He said it made her nicer to look at when they were doing it. He was from nowhere, too.”
“Nowhere?”
“Like you.”
Not for the first time the boy was struck by the great human mysteries of this world. He was almost fifteen, almost a man, and the great human mysteries of this world were striking him with satisfying regularity, as was correct for his stage of development. (From the Pathways Global Institute prospectus: “As our students reach tenth grade they begin to gain insight into the great human mysteries of this world, and a special sympathy for locals, the poor, ideologues, and all those who have chosen to limit their own human capital in ways that it can be difficult at times for us to comprehend.”) From the age of six months, when he was first enrolled in the school, he had hit every mark that Pathways expected of its pupils—walking, talking, divesting, monetizing, programming, augmenting—and so it was all the more shocking to find himself face-to-face with an almost nine-year-old so absolutely blind, so lost, so developmentally debased.
This”—he indicated Felixstowe, from the beach with its turd castings and broken piers, to the empty-shell buildings and useless flood walls, up to the hill where his father hoped to expect him—“is nowhere. If you can’t move, you’re no one from nowhere. ‘Capital must flow.’ ” (This last was the motto of his school, though she needn’t know that.) “Now, if you’re asking me where I was born, the event of my birth occurred in Bangkok, but wherever I was born I would remain a member of the Incipio Security Group, which employs my father—and within which I have the highest clearance.” He was surprised by the extent of the pleasure this final, outright lie gave him. It was like telling a story, but in a completely new way—a story that could not be verified or checked, and which only total innocence would accept. Only someone with no access of any kind. Never before had he met someone like this, who could move only in tiny local spirals, a turd on a beach.
Moved, the boy bent down suddenly and touched the girl gently on her face. As he did so he had a hunch that he probably looked like the first prophet of some monotheistic religion, bestowing his blessing on a recent convert, and, upon re-watching the moment and finding this was so, he sent it out, both to Mr. Lin and to his fellow Pathways boys, for peer review. It would surely count toward completion of Module 19, which emphasized empathy for the dispossessed.
“Where is it you want to go, my child?”
She lit up with gratitude, her little hand gripped his, the last of her tears rolling into her mouth and down her neck. “St. Jude’s!” she cried. She kept talking as he replayed the moment to himself and added a small note of explanatory context for Mr. Lin, before he refocussed on her stream of prattle: “And I’ll say goodbye to her. And I’ll kiss her on her face and nose. Whatever they said about her she was my own sister and I loved her and she’s going to a better place—I don’t care if she’s stone cold in that church, I’ll hold her!”
“Not a church,” the boy corrected. “14 Ware Street, built 1950, originally domestic property, situated on a floodplain, condemned for safety. Site of ‘St. Jude’s’—local, outlier congregation. Has no official status.”
“St. Jude’s is where she’ll be laid out,” she said and squeezed his hand. “And I’ll kiss her no matter how cold she is.”
The boy shook his head and sighed.
“We’re going in the same direction. Just follow me. No speaking.” He put his finger to his lips, and she tucked her chin into her neck meekly, seeming to understand. Re-starting, he flagged her effectively, transforming little Aggie Hanwell into his sidekick, his familiar, a sleek reddish fox. He was impressed by the perfect visual reconstruction of the original animal, apparently once common in this part of the world. Renamed Mystus, she provided cover for his left flank and mutely admired Bill Peek as he took the traitor Vice-President hostage and dragged him down the Mall with a knife to his neck.
After a spell they came to the end of the beach. Here the sand shaded into pebbles and then a rocky cove, and barnacles held on furiously where so much else had been washed away. Above their heads, the craft were finishing their sallies and had clustered like bees, moving as one back to the landing bay at the encampment. Bill Peek and his familiar were also nearing the end of their journey, moments away from kicking in the door to the Oval Office, where—if all went well—they would meet the President and be thanked for their efforts. But at the threshold, unaccountably, Bill Peek’s mind began to wander. Despite the many friends around the world watching (there was a certain amount of kudos granted to any boy who successfully met the President in good, if not record, time, on his first run-through), he found himself pausing to stroke Mystus and worry about whether his father would revoke his AG after this trip. It had been a bribe and a sop in the first place—it was unregistered. Bill had wanted to stay on at the Tokyo campus for the whole summer, and then move to Norway, before tsunami season, for a pleasant fall. His father had wanted him by his side, here, in the damp, unlit graylands. An AG 12 was the compromise. But these later models were security risks, easily hacked, and the children of personnel were not meant to carry hackable devices. That’s how much my father loves me, Bill Peek thought hopefully, that’s how much he wants me around.
Previously the boy had believed that the greatest testament to love was the guarantee—which he had had all his life—of total personal security. He could count on one hand the amount of times he’d met a local; radicals were entirely unknown to him; he had never travelled by any mode of transport that held more than four people. But now, almost adult, he had a new thought, saw the matter from a fresh perspective, which he hoped would impress Mr. Lin with its age-appropriate intersectionality. He rested against the Oval Office door and sent his thought to the whole Pathways family: “Daring to risk personal security can be a sign of love, too.” Feeling inspired, he split the visual in order to pause and once more appreciate the human mysteries of this world slash how far he’d come.
He found that he was resting on a slimy rock, his fingers tangled in the unclean hair follicles of Agatha Hanwell. She saw him looking at her. She said, “Are we there yet?” The full weight of her innocence emboldened him. They were five minutes from Ware Street. Wasn’t that all the time he needed? No matter what lay beyond that door, it would be dispatched by Bill Peek, brutally, beautifully; he would step forward, into his destiny. He would meet the President! He would shake the President’s hand.
“Follow me.”
She was quick on the rocks, perhaps even a little quicker than he, moving on all fours like an animal. They took a right, a left, and Bill Peek slit many throats. The blood ran down the walls of the Oval Office and stained the Presidential seal and at the open windows a crowd of cheering, anonymous well-wishers pressed in. At which point Mystus strayed from him and rubbed herself along their bodies, and was stroked and petted in turn.
“So many people come to see your Maud. Does the soul good.”
“How are you, Aggie, love? Bearing up?”
“They took her from the sky. Boom! ‘Public depravity.’ I mean, I ask you!”
“Come here, Aggs, give us a hug.”
“Who’s that with her?”
“Look, that’s the little sis. Saw it all. Poor little thing.”
“She’s in the back room, child. You go straight through. You’ve more right than anybody.”
All Bill Peek knew is that many bodies were lying on the ground and a space was being made for him to approach. He stepped forward like a king. The President saluted him. The two men shook hands. But the light was failing, and then failed again; the celebrations were lost in infuriating darkness. . . . The boy touched his temple, hot with rage: a low-ceilinged parlor came into view, with its filthy window, further shaded by a ragged net curtain, the whole musty hovel lit by candles. He couldn’t even extend an arm—there were people everywhere, local, offensive to the nose, to all other senses. He tried to locate Agatha Hanwell, but her precise coördinates were of no use here; she was packed deep into this crowd—he could no more get to her than to the moon. A fat man put a hand on his shoulder and asked, “You in the right place, boy?” A distressing female with few teeth said, “Leave him be.” Bill Peek felt himself being pushed forward, deeper into the darkness. A song was being sung, by human voices, and though each individual sang softly, when placed side by side like this, like rows of wheat in the wind, they formed a weird unity, heavy and light at the same time. “Because I do not hope to turn again . . . Because I do not hope . . .” In one voice, like a great beast moaning. A single craft carrying the right hardware could take out the lot of them, but they seemed to have no fear of that. Swaying, singing.
Bill Peek touched his sweaty temple and tried to focus on a long message from his father—something about a successful inspection and Mexico in the morning—but he was being pushed by many hands, ever forward, until he reached the back wall where a long box, made of the kind of wood you saw washed up on the beach, sat on a simple table, with candles all around it. The singing grew ever louder. Still, as he passed through their number, it seemed that no man or woman among them sang above a whisper. Then, cutting across it all like a stick through the sand, a child’s voice wailed, an acute, high-pitched sound, such as a small animal makes when, out of sheer boredom, you break its leg. Onward they pushed him; he saw it all perfectly clearly in the candlelight—the people in black, weeping, and Aggie on her knees by the table, and inside the driftwood box the lifeless body of a real girl, the first object of its kind that young Bill Peek had ever seen. Her hair was red and set in large, infantile curls, her skin very white, and her eyes wide open and green. A slight smile revealed the gaps in her teeth, and suggested secret knowledge, the kind of smile he had seen before on the successful sons of powerful men with full clearance—the boys who never lose. Yet none of it struck him quite as much as the sensation that there was someone or something else in that grim room, both unseen and present, and coming for him as much as for anybody. ♦

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Just one picture, too bad.



14#
 楼主| 发表于 2013-8-11 08:30:46 | 只看该作者
SWAT-Team Nation
Posted by Sarah Stillman




The moment the assault rifles surrounded her, Angie Wong was standing in a leafy art-gallery courtyard with her boyfriend, a lawyer named Paul Kaiser. It was just past 2 A.M., in May, 2008. Wong was twenty-two years old and was dressed for an evening out, in crisp white jeans, a white top, and tall heels that made it difficult not to wobble. The couple had stopped by a regular event hosted by the Contemporary Art Institute of Detroit (CAID), a red brick gallery with the aim of “turning Detroit into a model city,” and arrived to find a tipsy, jubilant scene: inside, gallerygoers were looking at art and dancing to a d.j.; outside, on the patio, several young women were goofily belting out the lyrics to “Hakuna Matata,” from “The Lion King”:
Hakuna Matata! What a wonderful phrase.
It means no worries for the rest of your days.
It’s our problem-free philosophy. Hakuna Matata!
Only then did masked figures with guns storm the crowd, shouting, “Get on the fucking ground! Get down, get down!” (I document the basic details of what happened in my story, in this week’s magazine, about the police’s use and abuse of civil-asset-forfeiture laws.) Some forty Detroit police officers dressed in commando gear ordered the gallery attendees to line up on their knees, then took their car keys and confiscated their vehicles, largely on the grounds that the gallery lacked the proper permits for dancing and drinking. (More than forty cars were seized, and owners paid around a thousand dollars each to get them back.) “I was so scared,” Wong told me. At first, she thought the raid was an armed robbery. “Out of the corner of my eye, I could see Paul getting kicked in the face.” In the dimly lit security footage, the scene looks like something out of a thriller about Navy SEALs. Paul said, “I was scared for my life.”
In my magazine article, I focus on one key question about the raid, and about countless others like it across America: Does it make sense that civil-forfeiture laws, which allow police to confiscate and keep property that is allegedly tied to criminal activity, are often enforced at gunpoint against, say, nonviolent partygoers? But there’s another important question, highlighted by the operation at CAID: What, fundamentally, are SWAT teams for? When does it make sense to use machine guns, armored vehicles, and flash-bang grenades on a crowd of people or on a family, and how are these warfare-inspired approaches to law enforcement changing America?
In 1972, America conducted only a few hundred paramilitary drug raids a year, according to Michelle Alexander’s “The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness.” By the early nineteen-eighties, there were three thousand a year; by 2001, Alexander notes, the annual count had skyrocketed to forty thousand. Today, even that number seems impossibly low; with one annual count of combat-style home raids hovers around eighty thousand. (The title of Alexander’s book reflects the racially disparate impacts of these policies.)
In some cases, the rationale for using military weapons and tactics on domestic soil seems obvious: look no further, proponents argue, than the recent hunt for the Tsarnaev brothers after the Boston Marathon bombings. But what’s remarkable is how routine these tactics have become as a means of pursuing nonviolent suspects and low-level investigations, particularly in the war on drugs. Thousands of police departments nationwide have recently acquired stun grenades, armored tanks, counterattack vehicles, and other paramilitary equipment, much of it purchased with asset-forfeiture funds. In addition, as ABC reports, a U.S. Department of Defense program, often called the Pentagon Pipeline, has redistributed billions of dollars’ worth of surplus military gear to local police forces, a significant portion of it repurposed from Iraq and Afghanistan. (For example, a Humvee was used to patrol a school campus.) These acquisitions have no doubt helped to transform full-scale, bust-down-the-door raids on homes and businesses from red-alert rarities, reserved for life-threatening scenarios, to commonplace occurrences.
Few people understand this change as well as Radley Balko, the author of a fascinating and at times wrenching new book, “Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America’s Police Forces.” For years, Balko has been an incisive chronicler of the drug war. In the course of the past few months, on the Huffington Post, he’s featured the “raid of the day,” cataloguing examples of SWAT operations gone hauntingly wrong. (One involved an unarmed twenty-one-year-old named Trevon Cole, who was shot dead during a botched drug raid on his Las Vegas apartment; his name had been confused with that of another man. In another case, a forty-one-year-old computer engineer named Cheryl Ann Stillwell was killed during a SWAT raid in Florida, based on a tip alleging the sale of two Oxycontin pills.) Balko’s raid taxonomy seems almost endless, and, indeed, his book situates these violent incidents in a history that stretches back to the years preceding the American Revolution. The Founders, Balko notes, evinced a clear “wariness of standing armies … born of experience and a study of history,” and they designed the Constitution expressly to guard against the home raids, property seizures, and other routine indignities to which the Britain subjected its colonists. “If even the earlier attempts at centralized police forces would have alarmed the Founders, today’s policing would have terrified them,” Balko writes.
“This is not an anti-cop book,” Balko stresses more than once in “Rise of the Warrior Cop.” His point, rather, is that “systems governed by bad policies and motivated by incentives will produce bad outcomes.”
There is still a lot that we don’t know about what these policies and their outcomes look like. Transparency has been mostly lacking. In March, affiliates of the American Civil Liberties Union filed more than two hundred and sixty public-records requests in twenty-five states, seeking information from law-enforcement agencies and National Guard offices on how federal funding has helped to drive the militarization of local and state police departments. Kara Dansky, the senior counsel of the A.C.L.U.’s Center for Justice, told me that the resulting data have just begun to pour in, and many agencies have proved to be coöperative. The biggest surprise thus far, Dansky says, is how little uniformity and clarity there is about when officers are advised to use extreme SWAT tactics, particularly in cases where mentally ill or suicidal individuals are the targets. “One major trend that we’re seeing is that police departments across the country vary tremendously in terms of how, if at all, they document information pertaining to their SWAT deployments,” Dansky said. “We have very little doubt that there are circumstances where the use of military tactics or equipment would be an appropriate response to a domestic law-enforcement situation.… But there aren’t always clear standards in place for when certain tactics are appropriate.”
One thing that is in place is a growing cadre of citizens who are willing to document their own daily encounters with militarization, and, in some regions, police are willing to engage in critical dialogue about it. (The new film “Fruitvale Station” begins with cell-phone footage of Oscar Grant’s shooting, in San Francisco.) In several of the cases I write about in this week’s magazine, individuals who felt unfairly subjected to hyperaggressive law-enforcement tactics and to racial profiling snuck recording devices into their cars or documented the damage later, with cell-phone cameras. Groups like Copwatch are encouraging people to think of their cell phones as devices for capturing these experiences; there is already a proliferation of such videos on YouTube and elsewhere on the Web.
The raid at CAID took place in the dark, at a moment when cell-phone-camera footage was not yet standard currency. Today, the watched can watch back, on repeat. The next time a young woman starts singing “Hakuna Matata” in a courtyard somewhere, then finds herself thrown to the ground with an assault rifle to her head in the name of public safety, we may be able to see footage of it, and to ask ourselves: Does this approach to keeping the peace make sense?
Photograph by Timothy A. Clary/AFP/Getty.

15#
 楼主| 发表于 2013-8-12 08:30:18 | 只看该作者
Walter White’s Home Town
Posted by Rachel Syme


Driving around Albuquerque, New Mexico, where I grew up, you see “Breaking Bad” pilgrims everywhere. They descend from tour buses and trolleys to snap pictures of Walter White’s house and, possibly, to toss a pizza on the roof (for an extra fee). They visit the city in search of Jesse Pinkman’s R.V. and the wide, cinematic landscapes from the show. Debbie Ball, a local confectioner known as the Candy Lady, who has a shop of the same name, has made a small fortune selling dime bags of blue rock candy meant to evoke Heisenberg’s meth formulation. “They just don’t stop coming,” she told me. “Suddenly, they’re all here.” It took a long time to get people to Albuquerque—but not for locals’ lack of trying.
One hundred and fifty years before Walter White, another would-be empire builder, Franz Huning, set down roots in Albuquerque and erected a squat terra-cotta fortress called La Glorieta, now the city’s oldest standing residence. Huning, a general-store magnate, bought seven hundred acres from Franciscan friars during the Civil War and set about building his dream house, a sprawling adobe hacienda, under the open sky. Passing through town in 1885 on an extended break from Boston, the Harper’s reporter Sylvester Baxter found himself enchanted by the estate; the resulting article he wrote presented New Mexico, then just a lowly territory, as a travel destination. “The gardens along the Rio Grande strike unspeakably joyous notes of color,” he wrote. “I had no idea there could be so much character to the humble adobe!” Much of the literature about New Mexico is about having no idea what it is actually like.
New Mexico wouldn’t see another booster so zealous until Huning’s granddaughter Erna Fergusson, an adventuress in linen pants who was raised between La Glorieta’s mud walls and the society circles of Washington, and who studied history at Columbia University before returning to New Mexico in 1913, on the heels of statehood. Fergusson put on a Stetson hat and a concho belt and immersed herself in the secret kiva dances of Pueblo cultures. She launched a side business showcasing Native American life to those who passed through the region, sometimes against their will. “When the war ended I began to dude wrangle,” she wrote in a memoir. “I dragged tourists all over New Mexico … to see Indians and Indian Ceremonials. They blamed me bitterly for almost everything, but some of them liked it and came again.” She served travellers iced cantaloupe in overheated rancho houses and told them that her Hopi name was Shikya-wa-nim—Beautiful Swift Fox. (She claimed to be a very fast runner.)
In the late nineteen-twenties, Alfred Knopf, on a hunch, contracted Fergusson to write “Dancing Gods,” a guide to indigenous rituals that became a slight national phenomenon. The rest of the country, as it turned out, was also magnetically drawn to the alien rock piles rising from vastness, and to native peoples who danced around flames. They, too, had no idea. Early on, New Mexico’s allure was its exoticism, a patch of America that didn’t feel American. It was wild, distant, dusty, unruly, potentially pagan, polyglot, a frontier on the very edge of society. An 1871 Times editorial that staunchly argued against statehood said the territory was “the heart of our worst civilization”—a theme that Walter White would later fully embody.
Growing up in New Mexico—I was brought up first on the border of the Navajo reservation in rural Gallup, to the west, and then at the foot of the Sandia tramway in Albuquerque—it’s easy to feel that you live on the margins of the country’s consciousness. We New Mexicans are, in many ways, car-bound consumers crawling over the landscape and its resources like other Americans, with the strip malls and Super Walmarts and S.U.V.s to prove it. And yet the state is a flurry of contrasts; the impoverished schools on the reservations struggle while bright scientific minds arrive in Los Alamos to split atoms. The sunsets are rosy, or blood orange, or sometimes a shocking lavender; the night is pitch black, punctuated only by Cassiopeia. This palpable strangeness, the juxtaposition of extreme mountainous beauty with a noir, dull flatness, is always the big surprise to newcomers. Upon arriving in Taos, all Georgia O’Keeffe could think to say was, “Well, well well … no one told me it was like this.”
And now, our strange land has again captured foreign imaginations, an audience from the outside. In the five years since New Mexico’s clever tax code helped bring “Breaking Bad” to Albuquerque instead of its original conceived location of Riverside, California, the show has sparked a global interest in the city. Earlier this year, New Mexico’s governor, Susana Martinez, passed the “Breaking Bad” bill, which insures that future film and television productions get the same hefty rebate that lured AMC. New Mexico now hopes to become a satellite Hollywood—a dream that, if successful, would help lift the state from poverty (it’s currently the eighth poorest in the U.S.) and shift it from cultural isolation to full saturation. New Mexico may soon become the backdrop for a large chunk of our entertainment, beginning the process that nudged Hollywood from a rural industry town into a metropolis where no corner has been left unfilmed.
Since the show began, I have not had a conversation with a new person about my home town that did not involve some question about Heisenberg or blue meth. People want to know if that’s really what it is like there, if I know any addicts (I don’t), if I’ve ever seen a lab (I haven’t). They want to know if I have been to that car wash and Taco Sals (I have). They want to know, just as armchair travellers in 1931 wanted to know, about sword-swallowing dancers.
Many people have asked me if I think “Breaking Bad” shines a “bad light” on the state. I don’t. And, often, the unabashed love of Walt and co. by locals (citywide events, themed microbrews, Heisenberg hat manufacturers) is puzzling to outsiders. The show is a fable about seediness and monstrosity and a city ravaged by drug trouble. Baltimore isn’t exactly putting up billboards about “The Wire.” (But we are!) I try to explain that New Mexicans are proud of anything that draws us out of neglect, out of never really fitting in. We are just happy to be considered, even if it is for our underbelly.
Perhaps it’s also because we realize there is no sense in hiding our dark side, which is so deep a part of living in a state that has been dismissed and economically hobbled from the start. (We tried to become a state for more than fifty years; no one wanted us; we offered to change the state name to Lincoln; they still didn’t.) Living in Albuquerque, at least in recent decades, means accepting a constant low-level fear of violent crime. When I was in grade school, the infamous Hollywood Video murders—a triple homicide—happened at a video store down the street from my house. The same year, the stabbing of a young girl as part of a teen-age dare shut down our local amusement park. We were warned not to venture into the “war zone,” a cluster of blocks along the once glamorous but now abandoned Route 66 where drug feuds often broke out. We got lectures in school on what colors not to wear to avoid conflict, and how not to get caught in the crossfire of initiation rituals. An entire string of kitschy motels in the southeast sector of the city have become permanent junkie enclaves; the dilapidated Fair ‘N’ Square supermarket has become a needle exchange. This year, in April, a man ran into a church during Sunday service and stabbed members of the choir. In Albuquerque, that event came as a shock to few.
“Breaking Bad” is the first story to truly commit the full spectrum of New Mexico to film: the grandiose vistas, the soaring altitudes, the banal office complexes, the Kokopellis and Kachina dolls, the seamy warehouses, the marshmallow clouds. The show seems to root itself deeper in the landscape with every new montage. It has become our newest monument.
On television, Albuquerque still looks like the Wild West, a scorched, hazy, lawless place where rugged individualism might just tip over into criminal behavior at any moment—it’s not wholly inaccurate. “Breaking Bad,” for all its extreme tensions and plot twists, is a show organically tied to its shooting location. Vince Gilligan, in speaking with Charlie Rose about relocating the show to Albuquerque, said that he could not possibly imagine the story without it, that all of the action spawned from the “postmodern Western” spirit of the land. The isolated oddness of the Southwest dictates Walt’s transformation into a one-man axis of evil as much as anything else; the possibilities for empire can feel endless when the sky goes on forever. Standing on a mesa with sand stretching in all directions is so surreal as to make one feel invincible. In a new promo for the show, Bryan Cranston recites “Ozymandias,” Shelley’s paean to the Egyptian pharaoh Ramses II and his tragic ambition in an ancient land. “Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair! Nothing beside remains.” The desert has a way of breeding conquistadors and then committing them back to the dust.
When I spoke with Ball, the Candy Lady, about the influx of interest in the state’s more sordid affairs, she told me that she doesn’t see a downside to it. She also told me that last year, just as her sugary narcotics made national news, her daughter-in-law died from a meth overdose. The reality of her life and that of the show are constantly in collision, in a way that might make other people turn away and look forward to its end. But she doesn’t want “Breaking Bad” to be over. She’ll keep selling blue rocks as long as the people arrive. “The whole world can see Albuquerque now,” she says. “They see us with all our problems. We’re not shy about it, just as I’m not shy about mine. But the people … they also see the sky. They never knew! I get so many travellers who tell me they can’t believe this place. They can’t believe this has been a part of their country, this whole time.”
Illustration by Maximilian Bode

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And yet the state is a flurry of contrasts: the impoverished school on the reservations struggle while bright scientific minds arrive in loa Alamos to split atoms. The sunsets are rosy, or blood orange, or sometimes a shocking lavernder; the night is pitch black, punctuated only by cassiopeia. This palpable strangeness, the juxtaposition of extreme maintanous beauity with noir, dull flatness, is always the big surprise to newcomers.







16#
 楼主| 发表于 2013-8-13 07:41:54 | 只看该作者
The Pay Is Too Damn Low
by James Surowiecki

                          
A few weeks ago, Washington, D.C., passed a living-wage bill designed to make Walmart pay its workers a minimum of $12.50 an hour. Then President Obama called on Congress to raise the federal minimum wage (which is currently $7.25 an hour). McDonald’s was widely derided for releasing a budget to help its employees plan financially, since that only underscored how brutally hard it is to live on a McDonald’s wage. And last week fast-food workers across the country staged walkouts, calling for an increase in their pay to fifteen dollars an hour. Low-wage earners have long been the hardest workers to organize and the easiest to ignore. Now they’re front-page news.
The workers’ grievances are simple: low wages, few (if any) benefits, and little full-time work. In inflation-adjusted terms, the minimum wage, though higher than it was a decade ago, is still well below its 1968 peak (when it was worth about $10.70 an hour in today’s dollars), and it’s still poverty-level pay. To make matters worse, most fast-food and retail work is part time, and the weak job market has eroded what little bargaining power low-wage workers had: their earnings actually fell between 2009 and last year, according to the National Employment Law Project.
Still, the reason this has become a big political issue is not that the jobs have changed; it’s that the people doing the jobs have. Historically, low-wage work tended to be done either by the young or by women looking for part-time jobs to supplement family income. As the historian Bethany Moreton has shown, Walmart in its early days sought explicitly to hire underemployed married women. Fast-food workforces, meanwhile, were dominated by teen-agers. Now, though, plenty of family breadwinners are stuck in these jobs. That’s because, over the past three decades, the U.S. economy has done a poor job of creating good middle-class jobs; five of the six fastest-growing job categories today pay less than the median wage. That’s why, as a recent study by the economists John Schmitt and Janelle Jones has shown, low-wage workers are older and better educated than ever. More important, more of them are relying on their paychecks not for pin money or to pay for Friday-night dates but, rather, to support families. Forty years ago, there was no expectation that fast-food or discount-retail jobs would provide a living wage, because these were not jobs that, in the main, adult heads of household did. Today, low-wage workers provide forty-six per cent of their family’s income. It is that change which is driving the demand for higher pay.
The situation is the result of a tectonic shift in the American economy. In 1960, the country’s biggest employer, General Motors, was also its most profitable company and one of its best-paying. It had high profit margins and real pricing power, even as it was paying its workers union wages. And it was not alone: firms like Ford, Standard Oil, and Bethlehem Steel employed huge numbers of well-paid workers while earning big profits. Today, the country’s biggest employers are retailers and fast-food chains, almost all of which have built their businesses on low pay—they’ve striven to keep wages down and unions out—and low prices.

This complicates things, in part because of the nature of these businesses. They make plenty of money, but most have slim profit margins: Walmart and Target earn between three and four cents on the dollar; a typical McDonald’s franchise restaurant earns around six cents on the dollar before taxes, according to an analysis from Janney Capital Markets. In fact, the combined profits of all the major retailers, restaurant chains, and supermarkets in the Fortune 500 are smaller than the profits of Apple alone. Yet Apple employs just seventy-six thousand people, while the retailers, supermarkets, and restaurant chains employ 5.6 million. The grim truth of those numbers is that low wages are a big part of why these companies are able to stay profitable while offering low prices. Congress is currently considering a bill increasing the minimum wage to $10.10 over the next three years. That’s an increase that the companies can easily tolerate, and it would make a significant difference in the lives of low-wage workers. But that’s still a long way from turning these jobs into the kind of employment that can support a middle-class family. If you want to accomplish that, you have to change the entire way these companies do business. Above all, you have to get consumers to accept significantly higher, and steadily rising, prices. After decades in which we’ve grown used to cheap stuff, that won’t be easy.
Realistically, then, a higher minimum wage can be only part of the solution. We also need to expand the earned-income tax credit, and strengthen the social-insurance system, including child care and health care (the advent of Obamacare will help in this regard). Fast-food jobs in Germany and the Netherlands aren’t much better-paid than in the U.S., but a stronger safety net makes workers much better off. We also need many more of the “middle-class jobs” we’re always hearing about. A recent McKinsey report suggested that the government should invest almost a trillion dollars over the next five years in repairing and upgrading the national infrastructure, which seems like a good place to start. And we really need the economy as a whole to grow faster, because that would both increase the supply of good jobs and improve the bargaining power of low-wage workers. As Jared Bernstein, an economist at the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, told me, “The best friend that low-wage workers have is a strong economy and a tight job market.” It isn’t enough to make bad jobs better. We need to create better jobs. ♦

----
This article is the easist for me to read
1. it is not enough to make bad jobs better. we need to create better jobs.
2.The situation is the result of a tectonic shifts in the American economy. In 1960, the country's biggest employee, GM, is also its most profittable company and one of the its best paying. It had high profit margins and real pricing power, even as it was paying its workers union wages. Today, the country's biggest employers are retailers and fast food chains, almost all of which have built their business on low pay-they have striven to keep wages down and union out-and low prices.
3. In fact, the combined profits of all the major retailers, restaurant chains, and supermarkets in the fortune 500 are smaller than the profits of Apple alone. Yet Apple employs just 76,000 people, while the retailers, supermarkets and restaurant chains employ 5.6 millions.




17#
 楼主| 发表于 2013-8-14 07:26:23 | 只看该作者



J. C. Penney’s Martha Stewart Mistake
Posted by Amy Merrick






The early covers of Martha Stewart Living magazine, in the nineteen-nineties, featured Stewart’s name in bold type and photos of the namesake herself, frosted hair lacquered in place, arranging sunflowers or canoeing past russet-leaved trees. By 2004—the year Stewart began her five-month prison sentence, after being convicted of lying to investigators in an insider-trading scandal—her company, Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, was beginning to deëmphasize its founder’s image. The latest cover of Martha Stewart Living marginalizes Stewart’s name in tiny block print; the photo shows well-organized closet shelves and a butterfly trapped under glass.
While M.S.L.O. struggles to find its identity and its business model beyond Stewart, who turned seventy-two earlier this month, J. C. Penney has multiplied its bets on the domestic artist and her company. Penney—whose sales dropped more than four billion dollars last year—has staked its turnaround, in large part, on remodelling its home departments to showcase new, Martha Stewart–branded merchandise: sixty-five-dollar serving bowls, thirty-seven-dollar muffin pans, thirty-dollar pastel-hued bath towels.

The Penney deal, signed at the end of 2011, infuriated Macy’s, which thought that its own deal with M.S.L.O. gave the company exclusive rights in the bed, bath, and kitchen categories. Stewart’s line is the biggest seller in Macy’s home section, and it wasn’t happy seeing similar products in a middlebrow chain like Penney. It sued Penney, arguing that it had interfered with Macy’s contract with M.S.L.O., and also M.S.L.O., for breach of contract. After hearing closing arguments for the non-jury trial on August 1st, Judge Jeffrey Oing said he would issue a decision soon. (The trial covers both lawsuits.)
Penney has defended itself loudly in court, even making the case that creating Martha Stewart departments within its stores didn’t breach Macy’s contract because the departments counted as “stand-alone shops,” which are allowed under its terms. (Macy’s insists the contract allows freestanding Martha Stewart boutiques, not a section of floor space within a Penney store labelled with a Martha Stewart sign.) Penney has also fought to develop workarounds to an injunction, from last summer, that prevents it from using Stewart’s brand within the product categories where Macy’s claims exclusivity, plastering her name on items not covered by the order, such as curtains, party favors, and olive oil. Meanwhile, the serving bowls and muffin pans, though designed by M.S.L.O., are being sold under the generic-sounding brand name JCP Everyday.
Yet, for all the time and legal fees Penney has invested in the case, the company actually might be better off losing it, and leaving Stewart behind. Penney agreed to a ten-year, two-hundred-million-dollar licensing deal with M.S.L.O., which requires payments to Stewart’s company for the merchandise it designs, even if the products don’t carry her name. At the time the deal was announced, in December, 2011, Penney had also purchased nearly seventeen per cent of Stewart’s company, for $38.5 million; the company has two representatives on the M.S.L.O. board.
Penney began stocking the Martha Stewart merchandise on Mother’s Day, so it’s too soon to tell whether her presence will improve sales in Penney’s home department, which accounts for ten per cent of over-all sales, a declining share in recent years. The retailer may give an update on the brand when it reports its quarterly earnings next week. However, many of the JCP Everyday items have been marked down, and some Martha Stewart lamps are already on clearance. Prices may be too high for the average Penney customer, analysts say; some of the rugs, for example, cost more than two thousand dollars.
Macy’s is the only big retail partner to find a comfortable fit between its customers and Stewart’s products. M.S.L.O.’s work for Kmart—which also sparked a lawsuit—ended in 2009. Since 2010, Home Depot has stocked a range of Martha Stewart items, but sales in categories such as flooring and paint have been weak recently, and this year Home Depot cut back its orders of patio furniture. Although M.S.L.O. hired an international merchandising head to work with retailers outside the U.S., the company hasn’t struck any deals so far.
Penney’s investments prop up the declining Martha Stewart brand. Since the deal with Penney was announced, M.S.L.O. shares have dropped nearly forty per cent. The company has lost money in nine of the past ten years. It recently discontinued two print magazines, Everyday Food and Whole Living; this year, the publishing frequency of the flagship magazine, Martha Stewart Living, is decreasing, from twelve issues to ten, amid declining newsstand sales and fewer advertising pages. And last year, Stewart’s television show on The Hallmark Channel was cancelled. As Stewart’s presence shrinks, her value to Penney also diminishes.
Penney is in worse shape, however. In the past two years, it has burned through nearly a billion dollars in cash. Its flamboyant former chief executive, Ron Johnson—who struck the licensing deal with Stewart and gloated about it in e-mails, which were read in court—was ousted in April, after a series of costly missteps, including banishing coupons, that drove down sales by twenty-five per cent and culminated in a loss of nearly a billion dollars last year.
Johnson doesn’t bear all the blame for the company’s failures. Turning around a major company such as J. C. Penney, especially in a fast-moving industry like retail, is a herculean challenge, as James Surowiecki wrote recently in The New Yorker. In any case, today, the company should be focussed on fixing its own problems rather than on keeping Stewart’s company afloat.
Penney’s seeming lack of urgency has sparked an embarrassing public struggle between the company’s board and its largest investor, William Ackman, the head of the investment firm Pershing Capital Management L.P. and a Penney director. On Thursday, Ackman publicly released a letter addressed to Penney’s board, complaining that the search process to replace the interim C.E.O., Myron Ullman III—who had been supplanted by Johnson, then rehired after Johnson was fired—only began three weeks ago, following a four-month delay. J. C. Penney “is at a very critical stage in its history and its very existence is at risk,” Ackman wrote in a follow-up letter on Friday.
The acrimony on Penney’s board emphasizes how much effort has been wasted on the distraction of the Martha Stewart court case. In going to such lengths to keep Stewart’s brand, Penney executives are succumbing to what economists call the “sunk-cost fallacy,” in which people justify escalating investment in a decision, even after it becomes clear that the cost of continuing the present course outweighs the benefits.
A classic example of the sunk-cost fallacy is the bidding war; often, rival bidders feel they’ve invested so much time in research and preparation that they escalate their offers beyond reason. Exhibit A in business-school case studies is Robert Campeau, who jockeyed with R.H. Macy & Co. in 1988 to buy Bloomingdale’s and other department-store chains. Campeau’s winning bid of $6.6 billion was considered well above the value of the stores. His company couldn’t handle the ensuing debt load from the leveraged buyout, and ultimately it had to file for bankruptcy. (The lesson here, then, might be that those who fight with Macy’s end up wounding themselves more grievously.)
Among the words of advice in “Living the Good Long Life,” Stewart’s new book on aging gracefully, is this line: “Life is a pile of problems that have to be solved one way or another, and the best way is to look at each one individually, figure it out, and move on.” Penney executives might consider whether it’s worth moving on from this battle and addressing the rest of their mounting pile of problems.
Amy Merrick, a writer and a former Wall Street Journal reporter, teaches journalism at DePaul University, in Chicago.
Photograph by David Handschuh/Pool/Bloomberg/Getty.












18#
 楼主| 发表于 2013-8-18 09:53:14 | 只看该作者



Why Can’t My Computer Understand Me?
Posted by Gary Marcus
  






Hector Levesque thinks his computer is stupid—and that yours is, too. Siri and Google’s voice searches may be able to understand canned sentences like “What movies are showing near me at seven o’clock?,” but what about questions—“Can an alligator run the hundred-metre hurdles?”—that nobody has heard before? Any ordinary adult can figure that one out. (No. Alligators can’t hurdle.) But if you type the question into Google, you get information about Florida Gators track and field. Other search engines, like Wolfram Alpha, can’t answer the question, either. Watson, the computer system that won “Jeopardy!,” likely wouldn’t do much better.
In a terrific paper just presented at the premier international conference on artificial intelligence, Levesque, a University of Toronto computer scientist who studies these questions, has taken just about everyone in the field of A.I. to task. He argues that his colleagues have forgotten about the “intelligence” part of artificial intelligence.
Levesque starts with a critique of Alan Turing’s famous “Turing test,” in which a human, through a question-and-answer session, tries to distinguish machines from people. You’d think that if a machine could pass the test, we could safely conclude that the machine was intelligent. But Levesque argues that the Turing test is almost meaningless, because it is far too easy to game. Every year, a number of machines compete in the challenge for real, seeking something called the Loebner Prize. But the winners aren’t genuinely intelligent; instead, they tend to be more like parlor tricks, and they’re almost inherently deceitful. If a person asks a machine “How tall are you?” and the machine wants to win the Turing test, it has no choice but to confabulate. It has turned out, in fact, that the winners tend to use bluster and misdirection far more than anything approximating true intelligence. One program worked by pretending to be paranoid; others have done well by tossing off one-liners that distract interlocutors. The fakery involved in most efforts at beating the Turing test is emblematic: the real mission of A.I. ought to be building intelligence, not building software that is specifically tuned toward fixing some sort of arbitrary test.
To try and get the field back on track, Levesque is encouraging artificial-intelligence researchers to consider a different test that is much harder to game, building on work he did with Leora Morgenstern and Ernest Davis (a collaborator of mine). Together, they have created a set of challenges called the Winograd Schemas, named for Terry Winograd, a pioneering artificial-intelligence researcher at Stanford. In the early nineteen-seventies, Winograd asked what it would take to build a machine that could answer a question like this:
The town councillors refused to give the angry demonstrators a permit because they feared violence. Who feared violence?
a) The town councillors
b) The angry demonstrators
Levesque, Davis, and Morgenstern have developed a set of similar problems, designed to be easy for an intelligent person but hard for a machine merely running Google searches. Some are more or less Google-proof simply because they are about made-up people, who, by definition, have few Google hits:
Joan made sure to thank Susan for all the help she had given. Who had given the help?
a) Joan
b) Susan
(To make things harder to game, an alternative formulation substitutes “received” for “given.”)
One can’t simply count the number of Web pages in which people named Joan or Susan gave other people help. Instead, answering this question demands a fairly deep understanding of the subtleties of human language and the nature of social interaction.
Others are Google-proof for the reason that the alligator question is: alligators are real, but the particular fact in question isn’t one that people usually comment on. For example:
The large ball crashed right through the table because it was made of Styrofoam. What was made of Styrofoam? (The alternative formulation replaces Stryrofoam with steel.)
a) The large ball
b) The table
*
Sam tried to paint a picture of shepherds with sheep, but they ended up looking more like golfers. What looked like golfers?
a) The shepherds
b) The sheep
These examples, which hinge on the linguistic phenomenon known as anaphora, are hard both because they require common sense—which still eludes machines—and because they get at things people don’t bother to mention on Web pages, and that don’t end up in giant data sets.
More broadly, they are instances of what I like to call the Long-Tail Problem: common questions can often be answered simply by trawling the Web, but rare questions can still stymie all the resources of a whole Web full of Big Data. Most A.I. programs are in trouble if what they’re looking for is not spelled out explicitly on a Web page. This is part of the reason for Watson’s most famous gaffe—mistaking Toronto for a city in the United States.
The same problem comes up in image search, in two ways: many kinds of pictures are rare, and many kinds of labels are rare. There are millions of pictures of cats labelled “cat”; but a Google Image search for “scuba diver with a chocolate cigarette” yields almost nothing of relevance (dozens of pictures of cigars, pin-up girls, beaches, and chocolate cakes)—even though any human could readily summon a mental image of an appropriately adorned diver. Or take the phrase “right-handed man.” The Web is filled with pictures of right-handed men engaged in unmistakeably right-handed actions (like throwing a baseball), which any human working in a photo archive could rapidly sort out. But very few of those pictures are labeled as such. A search for “right-handed-man” instead returns a grab bag of sports stars, guitars, golf clubs, key chains, and coffee mugs. Some are relevant, but most are not.
Levesque saves his most damning criticism for the end of his paper. It’s not just that contemporary A.I. hasn’t solved these kinds of problems yet; it’s that contemporary A.I. has largely forgotten about them. In Levesque’s view, the field of artificial intelligence has fallen into a trap of “serial silver bulletism,” always looking to the next big thing, whether it’s expert systems or Big Data, but never painstakingly analyzing all of the subtle and deep knowledge that ordinary human beings possess. That’s a gargantuan task— “more like scaling a mountain than shoveling a driveway,” as Levesque writes. But it’s what the field needs to do.
In short, Levesque has called on his colleagues to stop bluffing. As he puts it, “There is a lot to be gained by recognizing more fully what our own research does not address, and being willing to admit that other … approaches may be needed.” Or, to put it another way, trying to rival human intelligence, without thinking about all the intricacies of the human mind at its best, is like asking an alligator to run the hundred-metre hurdles.


19#
 楼主| 发表于 2013-8-19 09:43:30 | 只看该作者

Days of Rage                                                     by David Remnick August 26, 2013                                       
                                                            


                                            




From the start of the Arab Spring, it has always been worth remembering that the ecstasies of uprising are rarely followed by immediate pacific and democratic resolution. The Terror and Bonapartism shadowed the storming of the Bastille. The American Revolution did not emancipate the slaves; a gulf of nearly two centuries lay between Washington’s march and the March on Washington. The hopes of the Prague Spring, in 1968, crushed by Moscow’s tanks, did not revive until 1989. And, in the former Soviet imperium, democratic Prague is a happy exception. What is Vladimir Putin if not the scowling visage of history, a secret policeman who mocks the earnest ambitions of liberty?
And yet, after the bloody events in Egypt last week, it strains decency to ask historical patience of the bereaved. Nearly seven hundred people were killed and four thousand wounded—a slaughter initiated by the military commander, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, a man no longer willing to countenance protests against the coup that brought him to power. The spectacle of defiance—of thousands of supporters of the deposed President, Mohamed Morsi, staging sit-ins in Cairo, Giza, and elsewhere—had to end, General Sisi declared. Municipal traffic could no longer be rerouted. “We bent over backwards to bring in the Brotherhood,” an official in Cairo airily informed the Wall Street Journal. “No responsible government could take any more of this.”
So it began. On August 14th, Sisi and his allies, claiming unconvincingly that the Muslim Brotherhood demonstrators were “terrorists” responsible for hoarding huge quantities of arms, acted as a junta is apt to. The Interior Ministry promised that security forces would clear the streets with the gentleness of lambs, in order “not to shed any Egyptian blood.” Instead, they set out, at around 7 A.M., armed with tear gas and bulldozers, and moved quickly to live fire. They aimed, according to witnesses, at the head, neck, and chest.
You can mistrust the politics and the ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood. You can point out that, during its year at the head of an elected government, it exploited its victory to embed its religious ideology and its goals as deeply as possible in the new constitution. Its views on women’s rights, its efforts to intimidate journalists, and attacks by its supporters on Coptic churches and Christian believers are just a few of its deplorable features. The history of the Brotherhood and of its impact in the Middle East inspires no admiration. But how does a military coup, along with the kidnapping of an elected President, and widespread, indiscriminate arrests, announce the resumption of democratic practice? Islamists make up roughly a third of the Egyptian population. The slaughter on the streets will surely radicalize many of them, and set back democratic development throughout the region.
In fact, the temptation is to declare the Arab Spring over—for now, at least. Leaders of the secular opposition have been gunned down in Tunisia. Libya, dominated by rival militias, flounders in a state of chaos. Thanks largely to the ministrations of Iran and Hezbollah, the Syrian autocrat Bashar al-Assad is regaining authority in his shattered country with victories over the divided, and increasingly jihadist, rebels. The monarchs of Jordan and Morocco can reassure themselves that the spectacles of blood and disorder elsewhere in the Middle East will help forestall any uprisings and safeguard their thrones.

Leaders and diplomats in the West, meanwhile, have run up against the limits of their influence. The task of statesmen is, often enough, to utter the indefensible and the insupportable in the greater interest of their nation. The Obama Administration has carefully avoided using the word “coup”—a linguistic trip wire that would trigger the automatic withdrawal of the $1.3 billion in aid that Washington annually remits to Egypt. On August 1st, a month after the coup, Secretary of State John Kerry declared that the Army was “restoring democracy.” In his parsing of events, “The military was asked to intervene by millions and millions of people. . . . The military did not take over, to the best of our judgment—so far.” The same day, Sisi, talking to the Washington Post, showed his gratitude to the friendly obfuscations of the Administration by saying, “You turned your back on the Egyptians, and they won’t forget that.”
Sisi, who studied at the U.S. Army War College—where he wrote a paper called “Democracy in the Middle East”—told the Post that he did not “aspire for authority,” as other Egyptian military men had in the past, but he couldn’t restrain himself from preening in such a way that suggested his greater sense of destiny. “The most important achievement in my life is to overcome this circumstance,” he said, to insure “that we live peacefully, to go on with our road map and to be able to conduct the coming elections without shedding one drop of Egyptian blood.” He added, “When the people love you, this is the most important thing for me.”
In recent weeks, the leadership of the E.U. and members of Obama’s Cabinet were in regular contact with Sisi, imploring him not to use violence. He took a casual attitude toward these admonishments. Already, in July, the security forces had killed more than a hundred demonstrators, and the sole U.S. sanction had been to delay the delivery of four F-16 fighter jets. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates were, meanwhile, propping up Sisi with many billions more than the Americans have ever offered. And, when last week’s slaughter came, Kerry swallowed the bile of outrage and insisted that the United States could still make inroads with the Egyptians if given a chance. “From my many phone calls with many Egyptians, I believe they know full well what a constructive process would look like,” he told reporters. “I am convinced that that path is, in fact, still open.” The next day, President Obama emerged from a vacation rental on Martha’s Vineyard to rap the General’s knuckles, if lightly. He cancelled a biennial joint military exercise with the Egyptians. This was a baby step forward, but he again avoided using the word “coup” to describe the coup. He called it “the military’s intervention.”
When White House advisers formulate a position that they believe is correct but which manages to repel everyone, they say that they have “hit the sweet spot.” In Egypt, they have struck it with regularity. Obama has succeeded in angering Egypt’s Islamists, its military, and what few liberals remain on the scene—this is the price we pay, above all, for decades of fealty to Hosni Mubarak. But the Administration also insists on the need to stay engaged, even with a military leadership as heedless and as brutal as Sisi’s. After all, it says, if the U.S. withholds its relatively modest contribution, Russia, among others, will surely rush in to make up the shortfall and gain the kind of foothold it has not had in Egypt since it was kicked out by Anwar Sadat, in the early nineteen-seventies.
The Administration prides itself on taking the long view in foreign policy, forgoing the morally satisfying gesture in pursuit of a cooler calculation of outcomes. Yet gestures and words matter, too. There comes a point when a thing demands its proper name. A coup is a coup. A despot is a despot. And a massacre is a massacre. ♦



ILLUSTRATION: Tom Bachtell

======
The Administration prodes itself on taking the long view in foreign policy, forgoing the morally satisfying gesture in pursuit of a cooler calculation of outcomes. Yet gestures and words matter, too. There comes a point when a thing demands its proper name. A coup is a coup. A despot is adesport. And a massacre is a maccare.

20#
 楼主| 发表于 2013-8-21 09:12:32 | 只看该作者



Edward Snowden’s Real Impact
Posted by Jeffrey Toobin
  








The assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert F. Kennedy led directly to the passage of a historic law, the Gun Control Act of 1968. Does that change your view of the assassinations? Should we be grateful for the deaths of these two men?
Of course not. That’s lunatic logic. But the same reasoning is now being applied to the actions of Edward Snowden. Yes, the thinking goes, Snowden may have violated the law, but the outcome has been so worthwhile. According to Glenn Greenwald, the journalist who was one of the primary vehicles for Snowden’s disclosures, Snowden “is very pleased with the debate that is arising in many countries around the world on Internet privacy and U.S. spying. It is exactly the debate he wanted to inform.”
In this debate, Snowden himself says, those who followed the law were nothing better than Nazis: “I believe in the principle declared at Nuremberg, in 1945: ‘Individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience. Therefore individual citizens have the duty to violate domestic laws to prevent crimes against peace and humanity from occurring.’ ”
To be sure, Snowden has prompted an international discussion about surveillance, but it’s worthwhile to note that this debate is no academic exercise. It has real costs. Consider just a few.
What if Snowden’s wrong? What if there is no pervasive illegality in the National Security Agency’s surveillance programs?

Indeed, for all the excitement generated by Snowden’s disclosures, there is no proof of any systemic, deliberate violations of law. Based on the ruling in a 1979 Supreme Court case, Smith v. Maryland, it is well established that individuals do not have an expectation of privacy in the phone numbers they call. This is not entirely surprising; we all know that we’re already sharing that information with the phone company. In the same way, it’s long established that the government has great latitude in intercepting communications between the United States and other countries. It’s true, too, that while the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court is largely toothless, it has, on occasion, rejected some N.S.A. procedures, and the agency has made adjustments in response. That is not the act of an entirely lawless agency.
It is true that, as the Washington Posts Barton Gellman recently reported, the N.S.A. sometimes went beyond its authority. According to Gellman, the agency privately admits to two thousand seven hundred and seventy-six incidents of unauthorized collection of data within a twelve-month period. This is bad—but it’s not clear how bad. If it’s that many incidents out of a total of, say, three thousand initiatives, then it’s very bad. But if—as is far more likely—it’s two thousand seven hundred and seventy-six incidents out of many millions, then the errors are less serious. There should be no mistakes, of course. But government surveillance, like any human activity, is going to have errors, and it’s far from clear, at this point, that the N.S.A.’s errors amounted to a major violation of law or an invasion of privacy.
What are the actual dollar costs of Snowden’s disclosures?
The United States, like any great power, is always going to have an intelligence operation, and some electronic surveillance is obligatory in the modern world. But, because of Snowden’s disclosures, the government will almost certainly have to spend billions of dollars, and thousands of people will have to spend thousands of hours, reworking our procedures. This is all because a thirty-year-old self-appointed arbiter of propriety decided to break the law and disclose what he had sworn to protect. That judgment—in my view—was not Snowden’s to make. And it is simply grotesque that Snowden compares these thousands of government workers—all doing their jobs to protect the United States—to the Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg.
What did China and Russia learn about American surveillance operations from Snowden—and what will they do with this information?
As part of Snowden’s flight from American justice, he went to two of the most repressive and technologically sophisticated countries on earth. (Hong Kong is, of course, part of China.) In an interview with Greenwald, Snowden said that the authorities in those countries behaved like perfect gentlemen.
“I never gave any information to either government, and they never took anything from my laptops,” Snowden said.
Oh, really? Is he serious? Should anyone believe a word of this? China and Russia spend billions of dollars conducting counterintelligence against the United States. An American citizen walks into their countries bearing the keys to our most secret programs, and both—both!—China and Russia decline to take even a peek. That is a preposterous proposition. Even assuming that Snowden believes he had control of his computers 24/7 (he never slept?), there is simply no way that China and Russia would pass up that kind of bounty.
There is obviously some legitimate debate to be had about the extent and the legality of American surveillance operations. But there is no doubt about the nature of China and Russia. Snowden’s pious invocation of the Nuremberg trials will probably be small comfort to the dissidents and the political prisoners whose cell doors may be locked a little tighter today because of what these authoritarian governments may have learned from his hard drive.
Photograph: Maxim Shemetov/Reuters

===
1. In this debate, Sonowden himself says, those who followed the law were nothing better than Nazis:"I believe in thr principle declared at Nuremburg, in 1945:'individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligation of obedience. Therefore individual citizens have the duty to violate domestic laws to prevent crime against peace and humanity from occuring.'"
2. Indeed, for all the excited generated by Snowden's disclosures, there is no proof of any systemic, deliberate violations of law. Based on the ruling in a 1979 Supreme Court case, Smith vs. Maryland, it is well established that individuals  do not have an expectation of privacy in the phone numbers they call. This is not entirely surprising; we all know that we are already sharing that information with the phone company. In the same way, it is long established that the government has great latitude in intercepting communications between the United States and other countries. It is true too that while the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court is largely tootless, it has, on occasion, rejected some N.S.A. precudures, and the agency has made adjustments in response. That is not the act of an entirely lawless agency.
3.There is no doubt about the nature of Eussia and China. Snowden's pious invocation of the Nuremburg trial will probably be small comfort to the dissidents and the political prisoners whose cell doors may be locked a little tighter today because of what those authoritarian governments may have learned from his hard drive.

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