【每日阅读训练第四期——速度越障22系列】【22-04】经管 Shadow Banking

杀G给猴看

似乎群众反映今天作业有点难…TT…LZ非常抱歉没有控制好难度TT。在后面跟帖中，LZ根据个人理解写了些Notes，仅供讨论/ 参考，详见回帖推荐。 希望能有所帮助~
目前进度：Notes for Article 1 更新完毕~

—— by 杀G给猴看

大家好，周四经管~
非常抱歉上周由于个人安排不周，在外网络条件不好，没有及时给大家发文章，下次一定吸取教训，提前做好预备方案！ BOW~
今天准备的话题是 Shadow Banking （影子银行），也是金融界近来比较热门的话题。其中，TIME 1/ 2/ 3是一篇，TIME 4/ 5是一篇。二楼是关于影子银行的简介，大家可以先看看哦~

【PART I: SPEED】

Article 1: Dealing With the Shadow Banking System
BY DEALBOOK OCTOBER 8, 2009

【WARM UP】
The origins of the recent financial crisis will no doubt be the subject of intense debate for generations, much as the origin of the Great Depression still generates debate to this day. Likewise, the wisdom of the government’s response will consume academic and policy debate for some time. Many commentators, somewhat unfairly, have criticized the government response as overly situational or ad hoc.
What should be clear at this stage is that the Federal Reserve and other government regulators were significantly hamstrung in their efforts to contain the crisis by the absence of an effective set of regulatory tools that would have enabled them to address problems at nonbank credit providers.
【111 WORDS】

【TIME 1】
Historically, regulated banks were the primary engines of credit growth. The public made short-term loans to banks in the form of demand deposits, which were then used to make new loans. However, beginning in the mid-1980s and accelerating in the decades that followed, there was a fundamental change in the nature of credit creation. Credit growth shifted from the traditional banking system to what has been termed the “shadow banking system.”
In this shift, bank deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation had to compete with money market funds. Securitization trusts supplemented traditional bank balance sheets. Asset-backed commercial paper conduits and structured investment vehicles transformed short-term liabilities into long-term assets. And lightly regulated and unregulated affiliates of broker-dealers facilitated the functioning of the system through derivatives and trading activities.
In a speech in June 2008, Timothy F. Geithner, then the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, estimated the size of the unregulated lending market at roughly $10 trillion, equal to the total assets of the entire banking system.
These innovations brought many beneficial changes, but the regulatory and central banking tool kits honed through decades of experience were largely unavailable when crisis struck. The textbook response to a financial crisis is well established: the central bank acts as the lender of last resort to solvent (or near-solvent) financial institutions while the regulators seize and “resolve” insolvent institutions. The problem that the government faced in 2008 was that the American central banking and regulatory system had not adapted to the growth and increasing importance of the shadow banking system.
As a result, the government lacked many of the necessary tools for regulators to resolve insolvent institutions and provide liquidity to solvent ones. The problem was compounded by the fact that the participants in the shadow banking system traded extensively among themselves, thus creating a measure of interconnectivity that was underappreciated by market participants and the regulators.
In the absence of regulatory regime for nonbank credit providers, the primary legal mechanism for resolving troubled institutions is the Federal Bankruptcy Code. The problem was, and remains, that the bankruptcy code is ill-suited for resolving financial institutions, particularly those that are parties to repurchase agreements or derivative contracts.
【TIME 1 ENDS – 368 WORDS】

【TIME 2】
Under normal circumstances, when a company files for bankruptcy, its creditors are prohibited from exercising rights as creditors without permission of the bankruptcy court. This allows for an orderly disposition of a bankrupt company’s assets and liabilities. In recent years, Congress has excluded repurchase agreements and derivatives (and other similar financial contracts) from the automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy laws. Because of this, when a financial institution files for bankruptcy, its counterparties are free to seize their collateral and rush to recreate their pre-existing economic arrangements elsewhere.
As was seen in the aftermath of the failure of Lehman Brothers, this is an ugly and inefficient process for all involved, and means that there is effectively no controlled procedure for shutting down insolvent financial institutions through bankruptcy.
It was with this inadequate regulatory authority that the government confronted the Bear Stearns crisis in early 2008. Bear Stearns was an enormous provider of credit, particularly to the real estate market. It financed itself in the repurchase market and was party to billions of dollars of derivative contracts. Thus, Bear Stearns presented an unprecedented crisis — the potential failure of a systemically significant institution with no real vehicle for providing it liquidity or forcing an orderly liquidation.
Under traditional notions of the Federal Reserve’s mandate, it could not lend to Bear Stearns. However, everyone understood that a bankruptcy of Bear Stearns and the potential unwinding of its derivative book and repurchase agreements would have caused a disastrous domino effect. In response, the government stretched Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act and Delaware law to synthetically qualify Bear Stearns as an appropriate borrower from the Fed. When it quickly became clear that this extension of credit was inadequate, the government effectively appointed JPMorgan Chase as a receiver-liquidator of Bear Stearns.
As the financial crisis escalated in the summer and fall of 2008, regulators used traditional authority where they could. In the case of insolvent banks like IndyMac and Washington Mutual, the F.D.I.C. was able to seize the banks and transfer their deposits to healthier institutions. Using newly created legislative powers, conservators were appointed for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These measures, which allowed the conservator to assume derivative contracts, showed the efficacy of resolution authority when available for systemically important institutions, and losses were minimized with minimal collateral damage.
【TIME 2 ENDS – 386 WORDS】

【TIME 3】
However, as larger institutions like Lehman, the American International Group and Merrill Lynch (as well as arguably other broker-dealers) began to teeter, the government was again forced to reckon with the lack of an appropriate resolution mechanism. The government’s response was necessarily ad hoc, because resolution mechanisms were either unavailable or potentially disastrous.
Lehman’s failure demonstrated in spectacular fashion how unsuited existing insolvency regimes were for institutions of systemic importance. No regulator had power of conservatorship or the power to assume derivative contracts; nor was there an equivalent power to bank seizure that could be applied to a nonbank institution. Facing a “run on the bank,” but with none of the traditional protections available to an insolvent bank, Lehman was left with little choice but to file for protection under Chapter 11. As is now widely recognized, ripple effects from Lehman’s collapse quickly spread into the broader economy, causing rapid economic deterioration and threatening to set off a cascade of other failures.
What can be done to prevent a repeat of the events of 2008? Over the past several decades, our financial system has evolved in ways never contemplated when current banking laws were drafted. Reasonable people can debate the merits of these changes, but it is unrealistic to expect that these changes will be completely reversed. It is critical to update the regulatory framework to address the system as it is today.
Ideally, it would be possible to foresee and prevent another financial crisis. Such is the goal of the proposed systemic risk regulator. But since even the most ardent proponents of such a system recognize that next crisis will be difficult to predict and avoid, it is more important to make sure that regulators have the tools to deal with crises when they do occur. Granting resolution authority to facilitate an orderly wind-down of failed, systemically important nonbank institutions is the single most important regulatory change that could be made to prevent a repeat of the crisis of 2008.
【TIME 3 ENDS – 331 WORDS】
Source: New York Times
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/10/08/dealbook-dialogue-isaac-corre/

Article 2: Will Your Bank Die of Cancer or a Heart Attack?
By James Greiff Apr 17, 2013

【WARM UP】
Banks and financial companies tend to die in one of two ways: from cancer or from a heart attack.
When a firm has cancer, its assets -- loans, securities and other investments -- either aren't repaid or turn out to be worth less than expected. Losses erode capital, leading to insolvency. To help avoid this, banks should hold more capital than regulations now require.
More capital, though, does little to avert a heart attack: a frenzied run on a bank that can spread and shatter the entire financial system.
Economists and academics have understood how to contain traditional bank runs for decades. Now a handful, including Morgan Ricks, Enrico Perotti and Gary Gorton, are exploring what measures might work in a financial landscape where changes have outpaced regulation.
It is no accident that the U.S. financial system experienced no systemic blowups from the mid-1930s through 2007. In a stroke, the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. in 1934 blunted the incentive that depositors had to race to the bank for their money at the first whiff of distress.
But there was a run on the U.S. financial system in 2008. This time, though, it was investors and traders sitting at desks in front of computer screens who pulled their money. Had the Federal Reserve not injected hundreds of billions of dollars of liquidity into the financial system, something akin to the Great Depression might have occurred.
These investors and traders work in the so-called shadow banking system made up of securities firms, money-market mutual funds, hedge funds and other financial intermediaries. The firms they work for and do business with don't fund themselves with deposits. Instead, shadow banks rely on short-term funding in the form of IOUs that mature in anywhere from a day to several months. These IOUs resemble deposits in many ways.
【305 WORDS】

【TIME 4】
Deposits can cause all sorts of trouble for a bank because they can be yanked so fast. But banks usually make loans and investments that mature in weeks, months or years. Borrowing short-term at low interest rates and lending longer-term at higher rates, and managing the inherent risk, is the essence of banking.
The IOUs in shadow banking -- which have found their way into the regular banking system, too -- have the same problems. The absence of something like deposit insurance means investors have a motive to reclaim their money as fast as possible if trouble is afoot. When that happens, a firm has to sell assets to come up with the necessary cash. If more than one company tries to sell assets at the same time, prices fall, and even more assets must be sold. A death spiral ensues.
This was what happened to Bear Stearns Cos., which went bust in less than a week once its funding dried up. The same was true of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., which had about $600 billion in assets and $200 billion in short-term funding.
Yet there may be ways to rein in the over-dependence of the financial system on unstable short-term IOUs and lessen the odds of another catastrophic run.
One idea, proposed by Ricks, a former U.S. Treasury official now at Vanderbilt University, is to place legal limits on which firms could use short-term IOUs. Banks, for example, are the only institutions allowed to fund themselves with deposits. They must pay for that privilege by purchasing insurance. In turn, there are constraints on how banks invest that money -- they can make loans and buy U.S. Treasury securities or high-grade bonds. Stocks, junk bonds, derivatives and other risky investments are generally off-limits (although compliance has been lax, which is why we need the Volcker rule that bars banks from reckless wagering with depositors' money).
【TIME 4 ENDS – 315 WORDS】

【TIME 5】
As Ricks sees it, restricting who can use short-term funding will force businesses that want to speculate to rely more on equity (capital) and longer-term debt. Imagine if Lehman Brothers had used debt that matured on average in 180 days, rather than about a week: Only a bit more than a half-percent of its IOU funding could have disappeared in a day, a serious brake on panicked withdrawals.
Ricks says the equivalent of deposit insurance for IOUs might also enhance stability. It would have the added virtue of recapturing at least part of the implicit subsidy the biggest banks and securities firms get because their creditors believe they will be propped up by the government in a crisis.
But IOU insurance would be an expansion of the federal safety net, a political non-starter. There also is the moral-hazard dilemma: Insurance might cause a company to take foolish risks.
Perotti, a professor of international finance at the University of Amsterdam, favors a tax on short-term funding. That too would encourage firms to use more stable, long-term debt. The absence of an insurance guarantee also would ensure that investors remain exposed to the discipline of market risk.
Gorton, a professor at Yale University, takes a different approach: The key to stability is developing sound collateral to pledge against the IOUs. During the financial crisis, confidence in the quality of assets used to secure short-term funding -- remember all that AAA-rated junk? -- collapsed.
It took the U.S. almost 70 years, from the end of the Civil War to the Great Depression, to figure out how to contain old-fashioned bank runs. There's no reason to wait that long to head off another run on shadow banking's IOUs.
【TIME 5 ENDS – 284 WORDS】
Source: Bloomberg
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-16/will-your-bank-die-of-cancer-or-a-heart-attack-.html

【PART II: OBSTACLE】

Article 3: The credit kulaks
The growth in wealth-management products reflects deeper financial distortions
Jun 1st 2013 | HONG KONG |From the print edition

【WARM UP】
AS THE grandson of a “rich farmer”, a stigmatised class in communist China, Joe Zhang grew up on the wrong side of the ideological tracks. At school he envied the town-kids who could look forward to a cushy job minding grain-stores or writing propaganda. But after winning a spot at university, he eventually escaped into central banking in Beijing and, later, investment banking in Hong Kong. By pleading, petitioning and playing a lot of ping pong (a sport he hates) he was even admitted into the Communist Party in 1985.
Then, in 2011, his social climb suffered an abrupt reversal. He took on a role that remains stigmatised and discriminated against in today’s China: he became a shadow banker. His new book, “Inside China’s Shadow Banking: the Next Subprime Crisis?”, recounts his trials as the head of a microlender in Guangdong. Elsewhere in the world, microcredit is a respectable, even canonised, endeavour. In China, Mr Zhang complains in his book, it is “only slightly more respectable than perhaps massage parlours or nightclubs.”
He describes the variety of institutions and instruments that operate and innovate in the shadow of China’s mammoth banks, where they are hard for the authorities to see. They include the informal lenders, kerbside capitalists and back-alley bankers for which China is famous. But the most important institutions are China’s 67 trust companies, lightly regulated finance firms that make loans and other investments but cannot collect deposits. And the most significant instruments are the uncountable wealth-management products (WMPs), which raise money from better-off investors, in large increments (at least 50,000 yuan, about $8,160) and for short periods (typically less than six months, sometimes much less).
【277 WORDS】

【OBSTACLE】
Like banks, shadow banks are middlemen, issuing liabilities and holding assets. Another point of resemblance is that their assets are often less liquid, longer-term and riskier than their liabilities purport to be. Yet unlike banks they lack an official safety net, such as a lender of last resort, should these mismatches ever be exposed.
That makes shadow banking a bit scary. The International Monetary Fund frets that “a fast-growing share of credit is flowing through the less-well-supervised parts of the financial system.” Mr Zhang’s book is marketed to people who suspect that systemic dangers lurk in these shadows. But the tale it goes on to tell is more interesting. Shadow banking, he argues, is “more a symptom than the disease itself.”
The disease itself is financial repression. China imposes a ceiling on the interest rate that banks can pay to depositors. This keeps banks’ cost of funding low, making them eager to lend. To curb their enthusiasm, the regulators must impose offsetting limits on their lending, as Dong He and Honglin Wang of the Hong Kong Institute of Monetary Research have pointed out. These limits range from conservative loan-to-deposit ratios to heavy reserve requirements and blacklists of overexposed borrowers, such as property developers or local governments.
Where there is regulation, there is evasion, notes Mr Zhang. Much of China’s shadow-banking system serves merely to help banks evade deposit ceilings and lending guardrails. It would be less pervasive if China’s lending limits were less strict. But then those limits would not need to be so tight if banks’ funding costs were not repressed.
Neglected by the banks, small firms are willing to pay the 20-24% interest rates charged by China’s 6,080 microlenders. But micro-loans amounted to only 592 billion yuan ($97 billion) at the end of last year, equivalent to less than 1% of bank credit. A far bigger source of finance for illiquid firms is other more liquid ones. Non-financial companies are barred from lending directly to each other, but they can make “entrusted” loans via a bank or trust company. This lending is sizeable, but also relatively safe, according to Standard & poor’s. Most of the loans are made by big firms to their sister companies.

WMP! There it is

As well as midwifing loans from one firm to another, trust companies also raise pools of money from investors by issuing their own WMPs. These products amounted to 1.9 trillion yuan at the end of 2012. Most mature within 1-3 years, according to Jason Bedford of KPMG, an auditing firm. The money is often invested in loans to credit-starved enterprises. Some products are, however, more imaginative, speculating on tea, spirits, or even graveyards. In at least one case, a product was not just imaginative but entirely imaginary: raising money for a non-existent project dreamed up by a rogue trust-company manager.
These products are, then, risky. But potential losses are cushioned by collateral and unmagnified by leverage, Mr Bedford points out. In principle these losses are also borne by investors. The buyers of two faltering products issued by CITIC Trust, China’s largest trust company, have been told not to expect a bail-out. In practice, however, many trusts are less stiff-spined. They are tempted to rescue investors to maintain their good name.
Often, these trust products are sold through banks, which distribute them, without guaranteeing them. The public, however, “pretends not to understand the distinction”, Mr Zhang says. By feigning ignorance, aggrieved investors hope to browbeat the government into holding the banks liable, he argues. In Hong Kong banks had to ease the pain of losses on Lehman minibonds sold through their branches. It is notable that one of the banks involved, Bank of China, has been unusually reluctant to sell WMPs in the mainland, points out Mike Werner of Sanford C. Bernstein, a research firm.
Trust products sold by banks tend to be confused with a less risky kind of WMP: bank products packaged by trusts. In the first case, Mr Bedford explains, the bank provides a service to the trust companies, offering its staff and branches as a distribution channel. In the second case, the roles are reversed: trust companies and, increasingly, securities companies, provide a service to the bank, helping it to package assets in its WMPs.
Unlike trust products sold by banks, bank products packaged by trusts are fairly conservative. They are mostly “deposits in disguise”, as Standard & poor’s put it, offering yields one or two percentage points higher than the deposit-rate ceiling. As well as helping banks to breach this ceiling, these products allow banks to window-dress their balance-sheets, points out Mr Werner. The WMPs are typically timed to mature just before the end of each quarter. As the money is returned to the WMP-buyers, it is paid into their deposits at the bank, just in time to bring the bank’s loan-deposit ratio below the regulatory limit of 75%.
If enough of the riskier WMPs fail, it might prompt investors to stop buying fresh products. Since WMPs usually mature long before the underlying assets do, that could inflict a nasty credit crunch on otherwise solvent ventures. But the impact on the banking system would be less obvious. If investors lose confidence in WMPs, they are likely to switch to deposits instead. The result would be a run to the banks, not a run on them. The only worry is that investors may not run to the same banks that issued most of the WMPs. China’s smaller joint-stock banks, which have led WMPs issuance, could therefore face a funding squeeze.
One answer would be to introduce formal deposit insurance. That would force banks to pay for the implicit backing they enjoy from the state. It would instil confidence in the smaller banks, as well as the ones that are obviously too big to fail. It would also draw a clearer distinction between safety (insured deposits) and risk (uninsured investments).
Critics of China’s shadow banking like to compare WMPs to the collateralised debt obligations at the heart of the global financial crisis. But according to Ting Lu of Merrill Lynch, the banks’ WMPs bear a closer resemblance to American money-market funds, investing mostly in safe, liquid, short-term paper. Those funds, which first arrived in America in 1971, competed successfully with bank deposits, forcing legislators to phase out America’s caps on deposit interest rates in the 1980s. Perhaps the banks’ WMPs will prove a similar spur to reform in China.
Mr Zhang is impatient for that day. He graduated from the central bank’s academy back in 1986 with a thesis entitled “The Path to Interest-Rate Liberalisation”. Then, he thought the removal of interest-rate controls was only five years away. Over a quarter of a century later, students are still writing the same thesis, he says. “Those five years have never ended.”
【OBSTACLE ENDS – 1133 WORDS】
Source: The Economist
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21578668-growth-wealth-management-products-reflects-deeper-financial-distortions

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今天的阅读就先到这里啦！下面的链接属于拓展阅读，感兴趣的队友们可以随便看看~

Bloomberg: Why I Became A Chinese Shadow Banker
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-08/why-i-became-a-chinese-shadow-banker.html
注：此文的作者就是越障中提到的Joe Zhang，看看他对中国影子银行的看法吧~

《华尔街日报》中文版：中国政府打击影子银行的真正意图
http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20130710/opn071057.asp
注：同时推荐本文旁边的相关报道

杀G给猴看

【Notes for Article 1】

(warm up) 公众会持续的讨论金融危机的缘起。一些评论认为政府对于危机的反应太specific。需要明确的是，由于缺乏有效的对非银行金融机构的监管工具，政府对危机的控制能力大大下降。

(Time 1)早期，受监管的银行是创造信用的主体，但上世纪80年代中期以后，影子银行（非传统意义上的银行性金融机构，详细介绍见二楼）越来越多的参与到创造信用中来。文章接着介绍了一些相关的变化，如经纪商们通过交易一些衍生工具促进了金融系统的运作等。这个不受监管的借贷市场非常巨大。【创造信用的主体发生变化】
虽然金融创新有好处，但是传统的监管工具无法处理因为这些金融创新而产生的危机。传统而言，央行可以充当金融机构的“最后贷款人”（last resort to solvent）；但现在，央行没有办法解救失去偿付能力的影子银行 并为有偿付能力的机构提供流动性，另外，影子银行的参与者们很大程度上是在系统内部相互交易，无论是监管层还是参与者都很难准确估计这个相互联系的程度。在这种情况下，联邦破产法成为了解决问题的主要机制，但它不大适合于那些参与回购协议和衍生工具合约的金融机构。【产生的问题：传统的救市办法失效，破产法也不适用】

(Time 2) 在正常情况下，当公司申请破产时，其债权人不可以在没有破产法庭的允许下行权。这样的规定使得破产公司的财产和债务可以合理分配。但由于近来国会将回购协议和衍生工具合约排除破产法保护之外，金融机构申请破产时就会陷入困境。雷曼兄弟就是个例子。贝尔斯登（Bear Stearns）也是由于大量使用回购协议、衍生品融资，缺乏提供流动性的工具而面临危机。按照原来的规定，美联储不能向贝尔斯登提供贷款，但贝尔斯登一旦破产后果将十分严重，于是政府不得不修改了法案。但修改法案还是无法解决问题，后来摩根大通收购了贝尔斯登。在2008下半年，随着金融危机的深化，对银行 政府采用传统办法，对例如房地美和房利美，则采取新办法接管，以将损失降到最小。【破产法不适用的原因，以及举例：贝尔斯登 等】

(Time 3) 雷曼、AIG、美林开始面临困境，政府缺乏解决方案的问题又浮现出来。因此，政府推行特定政策是必要的。举雷曼一例，没有监管部门或者银行能接管它，雷曼只能申请破产保护，而此举波及范围甚广，导致了一系列危机。
防止2008年悲剧重演的办法就是建立健全监管框架，使得它适用于当下。目前金融体系的发展已经远远超过了现有法案所能及的范围。
理想状态下，监管者最好可以预计并防止危机的产生，但必须承认的是，要做到这点非常困难。重要的是，当危机真正发生时，监管者要有办法解决，拯救这些重要的非银行金融机构，防止2008年危机再次发生。【举例：雷曼，引出观点：要防止类似危机，必须升级监管体系】

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LZ再啰嗦两句……此文年代比较久远，距今4年。个人认为虽然文章挺长，但其实只是说了一件事：当时因为缺乏监管机制，所以危机深入，所以要加强监管。不过可能由于文章所限，它并没有提出可能的监管思路。

杀G给猴看

【Notes for Article 2】

(Warm up) 金融机构可能死于“癌症”：资产（贷款、证券以及其他投资品）无法收回，或资产减值。为防止这种情况发生，公司可以更多的持有资本。但持有资本无法使其避免“心脏病”：疯狂的挤兑。学者们知道如何应对传统的银行挤兑，但对当前的新情况（影子银行）并没有成型的办法。如果美联储没有向金融系统注入数十亿资金，大萧条可能再次发生。
影子银行体系由证券公司、货币市场基金、对冲基金等组成，他们不通过吸收存款融资，而是依靠短期的借据（IOU，一天或几个月内到期）。IOU和存款存在一定相似之处。

杀G给猴看

WORD LIST
【SPEED】
1.        ad hoc  英[,æd'hɔk]  adj. 特别的；临时；专设  adv. 特别地
2.        hamstring  英['hæmstrɪŋ] n. 腿筋  vt. 切断腿筋使成跛腿；使残废
3.        Wikipedia: A money market fund is an open-ended mutual fund that invests in short-term debt securities such as US Treasury bills and commercial paper. Money market funds are widely (though not necessarily accurately) regarded as being as safe as bank deposits yet providing a higher yield.
4.        securitization  英[si'kjurətizaiʃən] 美[si'kjurətizaiʃən]  n. 证券化，资产证券化 (百度百科：将缺乏流动性的资产，转换为在金融市场上可以自由买卖的证券的行为，使其具有流动性)
5.        conduit  英['kɒndjʊɪt; 'kɒndɪt] 美['kɑnduɪt]  n. [电] 导管；沟渠；导水管
6.        affiliate  英[ə'fɪlɪeɪt] 美[ə'fɪlɪet]  n. 联号；隶属的机构等  vt. 使附属；接纳；使紧密联系  vi. 参加，加入；发生联系
7.        solvent  英['sɒlv(ə)nt] 美['sɑlvənt]  adj. 有偿付能力的；有溶解力的  n. 溶剂；解决方法
8.        repurchase agreement 回购协议 （内容较多，详情可维基或百度）
9.        unwinding[ʌn'waɪnd]  n. 退绕；[生物物理] 解旋，循环  v. 解开；使松弛（unwind的现在分词）
10.        teeter  英['tiːtə] 美['titɚ]  vi. 摇晃；玩跷跷板；步履蹒跚；摇摇欲坠  vt. 使…摇摆；使…上下晃动  n. 跷跷板；摇摆
11.        seizure  英['siːʒə] 美['siʒɚ]  n. 没收；夺取；捕获
12.        Chapter 11 is a chapter of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which permits reorganization under the bankruptcy laws of the United States. Chapter 11 bankruptcy is available to every business, whether organized as a corporation or sole proprietorship, and to individuals, although it is most prominently used by corporate entities.
13.        contemplate  英['kɒntempleɪt; -təm-] 美['kɑntəmplet]  vt. 沉思；注视；思忖；预期  vi. 冥思苦想；深思熟虑
14.        ardent  英['ɑːd(ə)nt] 美['ɑrdnt]  adj. 热情的；热心的；激烈的；燃烧般的
15.        frenzied  英['frenzɪd] 美['frɛnzɪd]  adj. 疯狂的；狂乱的；激怒的  v. 使狂乱（frenzy的过去式）
16.        run on banks  挤提存款；（到银行）挤兑
17.        blunt  英[blʌnt] 美[blʌnt]  adj. 钝的，不锋利的；生硬的；直率的  vt. 使迟钝
18.        akin  英[ə'kɪn] 美[ə'kɪn]  adj. 类似的；同类的；同族的
19.        afoot  英[ə'fʊt] 美[ə'fʊt]  adj. 在进行中的；徒步的；准备中  adv. 在进行中，在准备中
20.        prop  英[prɒp] 美[prɑp] vt. 支撑；维持 n. 支柱；支持者
21.        pledge  英[pledʒ] 美[plɛdʒ]  n. 保证，誓言；抵押；抵押品，典当物  vt. 保证，许诺；用……抵押；举杯祝……健康

【OBSTACLE】
1.        kulak  英['kuːlæk] 美[kʊ'lɑk]  n. （沙俄时代的）富农
2.        stigmatise['stiɡmətaiz] v. 使……蒙上污名
3.        cushy  英['kʊʃɪ] adj. 轻松的；容易的；轻松又容易赚钱的
4.        canonize  英['kænənaɪz] 美['kænə'naɪz]  vt. 推崇；使加入圣徒之列；褒扬；将…封为圣徒
5.        massage parlour  按摩院，挂推拿牌子的妓院
6.        kerbside  英['kɜːbsaɪd] 美['kɝbsaɪd]  n. 马路边；街边（等于curbside）
7.        back-alley  英['bæk'æli] adj. 陋巷的；不登大雅之堂的；卑劣的；鬼鬼祟祟的  n. 穷街陋巷；狡诈的手段；（英）街后窄巷
8.        fret  英[fret] 美[frɛt]  vt. 使烦恼；焦急；使磨损  vi. 烦恼；焦急；磨损  n. 烦躁；焦急；磨损
9.        faltering['fɔ:ltəriŋ]  adj. 蹒跚的；犹豫的；支吾的  v. 支吾地说，蹒跚地走（falter的现在分词）
10.        feign  英[feɪn] 美[fen]  vt. 假装；装作；捏造；想象  vi. 假装；装作；作假；佯作
11.        aggrieve  英[ə'ɡriːv] 美[ə'griv]  vt. 使悲痛；冒犯；侵害…的合法权利
12.        browbeat  英['braʊbiːt] 美['braʊ'bit]  vt. 恫吓，吓唬；欺侮
13.        instil[in'stil]  vt. 逐渐灌输；使渗透；滴注

---

Shadow Banking 简介（From Wikipedia）

The shadow banking system is the collection of non-bank financial intermediaries that provide services similar to traditional commercial banks. It is sometimes said to include entities such as hedge funds, money market funds andstructured investment vehicles (SIV), but the meaning and scope of shadow banking is disputed in the academic literature. Investment banks as well as commercial banks may conduct much of their business in the shadow banking system (SBS), but most are not generally classed as SBS institutions themselves. At least one financial regulatory expert has said that regulated banking organizations are the largest shadow banks.
The core activities of investment banks are subject to regulation and monitoring by central banks and other government institutions - but it has been common practice for investment banks to conduct many of their transactions in ways that don't show up on their conventional balance sheet accounting and so are not visible to regulators or unsophisticated investors. For example, prior to the financial crisis, investment banks financed mortgages through off-balance sheet securitizations (e.g. asset-backed commercial paper programs) and hedged risk through off-balance sheet credit default swaps. Some experts have said that regulated banking organizations are the largest shadow banks. No major investment banks exist in the United States other than those that are part of the regulated banking system. (In 2008, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs became bank holding companies, Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns were acquired by bank holding companies, and Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy.)

AceJ

人生第一次沙发~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Dealing with the Shadow Banking System
Time1: 2'39'' Credit growth was largely due to shadow banking, which has $10 trillion, and regulators now have no suitable kit to monitor shadow banking
Time2: 3'05'' Fed stretched regulation to help Bear Stearns
Time3: 2'15'' But Lehman's failure demonstrated that regulating system has to be improved in preventing crisis or resolving crisis

Will Your Bank Die of Cancer or a Heart Attack?
Warm up: 1'56'' financial system faces two kind of crisis: cancer-money depreciates and heart attack-a frenzied run
Time4: 2'07'' Problems that happened in regular Banks also happened in shadow banking
Time5: 2'19'' How to deal with short-term funding and IOUs of shadow banking to ensure stability of financial system

The credit kulaks
Warm up: 1'57'' As a shadow banker in Guangdong, China, Joe Zhang introduced the situation of shadow bank in china.
Time 6: 9'35''
越障没怎么看懂，金融类文章一长就看着晕，明天重看

铁板吗啡

吗啡来了

呃，小词反应不过来，双重否定偶都要看半天，偶以后只能精读了。
03: 05
02: 58
02: 24
02: 36
02: 16


07: 29

kimwang53

谢谢sg~~


2.52
3.01
2.59
2.20
2.22

xuexue22cn

iwill be back

vicnan

00 35 44
02 21 83
02 17 86 看不懂
02 44 43
02 18 56
余下的一会人在看 = =

捉妖

占个位置

bejamin1111

Time 1， 3:17； Time 2，2:09； Time 3，1:52；
【1st passage】It is very dangerous for banks if they can't regulate the nonbank institutions ; Another financial crisis may happen.
warm up:1:55; time4, 1:38; time5, 1:53;
【2nd passage】How to matain the stability of the bank. Deposit can't be stable without insurance; shadow banks rely on short-term funding in the form of IOUs. IOUS resembles deposit in many ways.  placing legal limits on  firms could use short-term IOUs is one way to keep the bank system stable; But another professore argues that the key to stability is developing sound collateral to pledge against the IOUs.
warm up,2:07; obstacle, 5:44;
the history of Mr Zhang and his new book on shadow banking;
shadow banking in China makes the lending market vulnerable to financial crisis. formal deposit insurance should be introduced to regulate the market.
金融类的文章看得有点吃力不过也算是长姿势了。shadow banking,要西！

glorious41

快速占一个小杀姐的第二页首楼！O(∩_∩)O~



-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
今天出了个门，回来背完单词已经这么晚了，实在是困得不行。看了个一段speed就昏了，还是明早补作业吧。
嘤嘤嘤，复习期间请杜绝任何外交活动。



22-04
warm up:1'29/111
     the financial crisis raises criticism that government is not effective on their regulation
time1:3'50/368
     introduce operation of the traditional bank credit system and the shadow banking system
     lack of regulation causes some problems in shadow banking system
tiem2:5'08/386 第一遍好多生词，完全不懂，第二遍查了单词看还是昏昏的= =、 4'10
     introduce a problematic policy of bankruptcy (2 examples:  Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns) and the solution to it
time3:3'22/331
     the great influence of Lehman's collapse recalls the effective regulation
     but it is hard to perfect the regulatoty framework
warm up:3/305
     introduce two condition of bankruptcy:asset devalued and a frenzied run of bank
     the operation of banking system: IOUs play the same role as deposits
time4:2'20/315
     the way to solve the problem in tradtional banking:short-term at lower interest rates and longer-term at higher rates
     the way to solve the same problem in shadow banking:sell assests
     use two examples: Bear Stearn Cos. and Lehman Brothers to illustrate the potential risk under the solution
     ways to restrict the over-dependence of financial system:
     >>>legal limits on short-term funding
time5:2'47/284
     >>>equivalent of deposit insurance for IOUs
     >>>a tax on the shor-term funding
     >>>sound collateral to pledge againsit the IOUs
warm up:2'39/277
     the brief introduction of Jow Zhang and his new books of shadow banking
obstacle:12'14/1133
     chinese regulation of the rates and the evasion of it
     the increasing of WMP and the influence of WMPs

不是我不认真，真的是没觉得自己看到什么T T