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LZ真是太牛了,怎么找到原文的?用google吗?我觉得google收索很不好找到原文。多谢高手!! 以下是引用AlienX在2008-3-9 7:17:00的发言: RC有原文: Several auto makers have decided that improving customer satisfaction with service at dealerships would raise repurchase loyalty. They have lavished vast sums and considerable management attention on training and technical support programs—but detected no noticeable impact. What has been going wrong?
The OEMs’ efforts have certainly not been misdirected. Analysis of customer survey data reveals that satisfaction with service accounts for one-third of total customer satisfaction, and is predominantly driven by the ability to repair a vehicle correctly, on time, and at the first attempt. Average dealer performance against this target is 65 percent—meaning that one in three customers would need to go back for further repairs. "Best in class"(有題) performance, however, approaches 90 percent, so there is ample room for improvement.
A fix that failed
The traditional solution to this performance shortfall was to establish a policy of mandatory training to make technicians more effective. But extra training meant they spent less time at work. Exacerbated by flat-rate compensation that favored throughput rather than quality of service, pressure mounted at dealerships. The diagnostic stage of the repair process was often rushed, leading to failure to detect faults and thus defeating the object of the training.
In addition, rising training costs and forgone revenues ate into dealers’ profits, prompting them to reduce their investment in tools and equipment, thereby limiting technicians’ overall effectiveness.
OEM strategies concerning the use of advanced diagnostic equipment were also vitiated by unanticipated secondary effects. One extremely costly device designed to improve diagnostic accuracy had a very low usage rate, despite being considered technically superb. The reason for its neglect was the fifteen minutes or so that it took to set it up—time that pressured technicians felt they could ill afford to spend. Moreover, a lack of initial training produced low familiarity, reinforcing underutilization which in turn reinforced low familiarity.
One OEM decided that in order to improve performance, it needed to identify where bottlenecks were occurring, and why. It applied Business Dynamics to model the repair performance of an actual dealership. It tested a scenario involving several new initiatives it had devised to fix the service problem by enhancing training and building technical and diagnostic support. The modeled initiatives produced some improvements, but they were limited and short-lived.
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Disappointing results can be reversed by addressing the powerful secondary effects inherent in the system
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Analyzing the model revealed that these disappointing results could be reversed by addressing the powerful secondary effects inherent in the system. Incentives to diagnose the real underlying problem with a vehicle were weak, since pay structures encouraged technicians to complete jobs as quickly as possible. In addition, initial improvements in the service process tended to get caught up at existing bottlenecks, sometimes even making them worse. Service advisers became overloaded and less effective; increased retail demand, generated by better short-term performance, compounded time pressures and prompted technician shortcuts; and new technicians hired to meet demand diluted the average level of experience.
The analysis also showed that the OEM support initiatives brought least benefit to those who needed them the most—the low-performing dealers. The rate of improvement for these dealers was a mere 4 percentage points, whereas their high-performing counterparts achieved an 11-point leap. Thus the aspiration to improve "fix-it-right" performance to 85 to 90 percent was still way beyond reach (Exhibit 1).
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