- UID
- 670995
- 在线时间
- 小时
- 注册时间
- 2011-9-11
- 最后登录
- 1970-1-1
- 主题
- 帖子
- 性别
- 保密
|
After the Second World War, unionism in theJapanese auto industry was company-based, with separate unions in each autocompany. Most company unions played noindependent role in bargaining shop-floor issues or pressing autoworkers'grievances. In a 1981survey, for example, fewer than 1 percent of workers said they sought unionassistance for work-related problems, while 43 percent said they turned tomanagement instead. There was little todistinguish the two in any case: most union officers were foremen ormiddle-level managers, and the union's role was primarily one of passivesupport for company goals. Conflictoccasionally disrupted this cooperative relationship--one company union'sopposition to the productivity campaigns of the early 1980s has been cited assuch a case. In 1986, however, a caucusled by the Foreman's Association forced the union's leadership out of officeand returned the union's policy to one of passive cooperation. In the United States
, the potential forsuch company unionism grew after 1979, but it had difficulty taking hold in theauto industry, where a single union represented workers from all companies,particularly since federal law prohibited foremen from joining or leadingindustrial unions.
TheJapanese model was often invoked as one in which authority decentralized to theshop floor empowered production workers to make key decisions. What these claims failed to recognize wasthat the actual delegation of authority was to the foreman, not theworkers. The foreman exerciseddiscretion over job assignments, training, transfers, and promotions; workerinitiative was limited to suggestions that fine-tuned a management-controlledproduction process. Rather than beingproactive, Japanese workers were forced to be reactive, the range of theirresponsibilities being far wider than their span of control. For example, the founder of one productionsystem, Taichi Ohno, routinely gave department managers only 90 percent of theresources needed for production. As soonas workers could meet production goals without working overtime, 10 percent ofremaining resources would be removed. Because the "OH! NO!" system continually pushed the productionprocess to the verge of breakdown in an effort to find the minimum resourcerequirement, critics described it as "management by stress."
第一段前半部分还能看懂，大概说日本工会其实没有啥作用，但是后半部分，In 1986, however, a caucus led by the Foreman's Association forced the union's leadership out of office and returned the union's policy to one of passive cooperation. In the United States
, the potential for such company unionism grew after 1979, but it had difficulty taking hold in the auto industry, where a single union represented workers from all companies, particularly since federal law prohibited foremen from joining or leading industrial unions.但是到了举例子说美国工会的这部分没有读懂是要表达什么。而且第二段有说了foreman做决策是有效率的，那第二段跟第一段的关系又是什么呢？这篇文章想要表达一个什么主旨呢？
先谢过~！！！！ |
|
京公网安备11010202008513号 京ICP证101109号 京ICP备12012021号
发表于 2012-4-5 19:44:23
收藏
收藏
