一篇rc！！求助一句话不理解

lihaolan

What it means to “explain” something in science often comes down to the application of mathematics. Some thinkers hold that mathematics is a kind of language—a systematic contrivance of signs， the criteria for the authority of which are internal coherence， elegance， and depth. The application of such a highly artificial system to the physical world， they claim， results in the creation of a kind of statement about the world. Accordingly， what matters in the sciences is finding a mathematical concept that attempts， as other language does， to accurately describe the functioning of some aspect of the world.　　At the center of the issue of scientific knowledge can thus be found questions about the relationship between language and what it refers to. A discussion about the role played by language in the pursuit of knowledge has been going on among linguists for several decades. The debate centers around whether language corresponds in some essential way to objects and behaviors， making knowledge a solid and reliable commodity; or， on the other hand， whether the relationship between language and things is purely a matter of agreed-upon conventions， making knowledge tenuous， relative， and inexact.
　　Lately the latter theory has been gaining wider acceptance. According to linguists who support this theory， the way language is used varies depending upon changes in accepted practices and theories among those who work in particular discipline. These linguists argue that， in the pursuit of knowledge， a statement is true only when there are no promising alternatives that might lead one to question it. Certainly this characterization would seem to be applicable to the sciences. In science， a mathematical statement may be taken to account for every aspect of a phenomenon it is applied to， but， some would argue， there is nothing inherent in mathematical language that guarantees such a correspondence. Under this view， acceptance of a mathematical statement by the scientific community—by virtue of the statement’s predictive power or methodological efficiency—transforms what is basically an analogy or metaphor into an explanation of the physical process in question， to be held as true until another， more compelling analogy takes its place.
　　In pursuing the implications of this theory， linguists have reached the point at which they must ask： If words or sentences do not correspond in an essential way to life or to our ideas about life， then just what are they capable of telling us about the world？ In science and mathematics， then， it would seem equally necessary to ask： If models of electrolytes or E=mc2， say， do not correspond essentially to the physical world， then just what functions do they perform in the acquisition of scientific knowledge？ But this question has yet to be significantly addressed in the sciences.

这句话“The debate centers around whether language corresponds in some essential way to objects and behaviors， making knowledge a solid and reliable commodity; or， on the other hand， whether the relationship between language and things is purely a matter of agreed-upon conventions， making knowledge tenuous， relative， and inexact.”第二段最后一句怎么理解谢谢！！！！第三段接第二段不理解，他说更加接受后者，但是后者不是用whether引导！！！那是接受是 还是 不是

simonshen

全文我懒得看了，就你问的这句话我给大致翻一下：
这场辩论围绕着这样两个问题展开，其一就是语言是否在某些关键的方面与实物与行为一一对应，由此使得知识成为一种固化而可靠的商品；或者从另一角度来看，是否语言和事物之间的关系纯粹是人们约定俗成的习惯，由此知识便是微妙、相对并且不甚精确的。
你的问题我不是很理解，你说的第二段是这个句子里的第二段还是全文的第二段？

lihaolan

这个句子和下面一段的开头怎么衔接的！！

lihaolan

我理解的也是这个意思“其一就是语言是否在某些关键的方面与实物与行为一一对应，由此使得知识成为一种固化而可靠的商品；或者从另一角度来看，是否语言和事物之间的关系纯粹是人们约定俗成的习惯，由此知识便是微妙、相对并且不甚精确的。”但是第三段说支持后者，那么后者是一个疑问句啊“是否语言和事物之间的关系纯粹是人们约定俗成的习惯，由此知识便是微妙、相对并且不甚精确的”如果回答是那么就是可变的，如果不是那么就是不可变。那么第三段支持的是什么？

simonshen

这个因为他是一个辩论，所以两个理论都用“whether”起头，但是实际上他提出的就是那两个理论，你可以就看成是肯定句式。所以“Lately the latter theory ”指的就是第二种理论（即语言是约定俗成的习惯）。

lihaolan

谢谢！！！明白了！