在深圳读MBA，报考北大光华还是汇丰？还有别的选择吗？

nauticus1234

汇丰专注金融，光华经济，营销，金融各方面比较全面。任教老师和北京都一样

星星点灯2010

nauticus1234 发表于 2013-5-27 10:53
汇丰专注金融，光华经济，营销，金融各方面比较全面。任教老师和北京都一样 ...

是吗？ 这是两个不同的学院，如果任教老师和北京都一样，干嘛汇丰还号称自己有自己的全职老师？

grossman

汇丰有谁再国外名校拿到终身教授的？不要张嘴瞎说。说出名字来！光华的刘俏是港大的终身副教授，金李有牛津的终身，USC也考虑过给蔡洪斌终身。海闻，樊刚都是水货。不是一个量级的

grossman

樊刚在国外旁听过几门课，海闻拿到加大戴维斯分校博士，再福特路易斯（1000名开外的学校）做教授. 蔡洪滨拿得是斯坦福（#1）的博士，在UCLA（top 10)做教授，这就是差距。这些信息网上都有，不懂不要装懂

grossman

光华的张颖也是UT Austin 的终身。当然金李是半职，张颖也没辞掉美国职位

nauticus1234

星星点灯2010 发表于 2013-5-27 18:50
是吗？ 这是两个不同的学院，如果任教老师和北京都一样，干嘛汇丰还号称自己有自己的全职老师？ ...

不好意思，我没说清楚，光华深圳班和北京班的老师一样。汇丰自己独立一套体系。

smallseven

如果有香港居住证的话，今年10月复旦MBA在香港开一个普通话授课班级，可以关注
http://www.fdsm.fudan.edu.cn/fdmba/xgb.aspx

grossman

蔡洪滨，

Capital budgeting and compensation with asymmetric information and moral hazard

AE Bernardo, H Cai, J Luo - Journal of Financial Economics, 2001 - Elsevier

We consider optimal capital allocation and managerial compensation mechanisms for
decentralized firms when division managers have an incentive to misrepresent project
quality and to minimize privately costly but value-enhancing effort. We show that in the  ...

被引用次数：162 相关文章 所有 23 个版本 引用

Does competition for capital discipline governments? Decentralization, globalization, and public policy

H Cai, D Treisman - The American Economic Review, 2005 - JSTOR

Does competition to attract mobile capital discipline governments? Two bodies of literature
contend that it does. The first sees such discipline as harmful. Scholars argue that the fear of
capital outflows restricts governments from providing welfare services, environmental  ...

被引用次数：202 相关文章 所有 24 个版本 引用

Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information

State corroding federalism

H Cai, D Treisman - Journal of Public Economics, 2004 - Elsevier

Competition among local governments in a decentralized political system is often thought to
discipline lazy or corrupt officials, improving public good provision and increasing welfare.
Some scholars note possible distortions due to spillovers or a 'race-to-the-bottom', but  ...

被引用次数：196 相关文章 所有 17 个版本 引用

grossman

刘俏



Corporate governance and market valuation in China

CE Bai, Q Liu, J Lu, FM Song, J Zhang - Journal of Comparative Economics, 2004 - Elsevier

... The contractual nature of the firm and the principal-agent problem highlighted by Berle and Means
led to the development of the agency approach to corporate finance. ... Finally, financial transparency
and adequate information disclosure are crucial in developing countries. ...

被引用次数：400 相关文章 所有 37 个版本 引用
更多

Corporate governance and earnings management in the Chinese listed companies: A tunneling perspective

Q Liu, ZJ Lu - Journal of Corporate Finance, 2007 - Elsevier

This paper examines the relation between earnings management and corporate
governance in China by introducing a tunneling perspective. We document systematic
differences in earnings management across the universe of China's listed companies  ...

被引用次数：130 相关文章 所有 10 个版本 引用

Corporate governance in China: Current practices, economic effects and institutional determinants

Q Liu - CESifo Economic Studies, 2006 - CESifo Group

... Qiao Liu is affiliated to School of Economics and Finance, University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam,
Hong Kong, e-mail: qliu{at}hku.hk. Next Section. Abstract. This article provides a preliminary survey
of the burgeoning literature on the Chinese listed firms' corporate governance. ...

被引用次数：108 相关文章 所有 22 个版本 引用

grossman

金李



< i> R</i>< sup> 2</sup> around the world: New theory and new tests

L Jin, SC Myers - Journal of Financial Economics, 2006 - Elsevier

Morck, Yeung and Yu show that R2 is higher in countries with less developed financial
systems and poorer corporate governance. We show how control rights and information
affect the division of risk bearing between managers and investors. Lack of transparency  ...

被引用次数：450 相关文章 所有 14 个版本 引用



118.96.136.228 中的 [PDF]


CEO compensation, diversification, and incentives

L Jin - Journal of Financial Economics, 2002 - Elsevier

This paper examines the relation between chief executive officers'(CEOs') incentive levels
and their firms' risk characteristics. I show theoretically that, when CEOs cannot trade the
market portfolio, optimal incentive level decreases with firm's nonsystematic risk but is  ...

被引用次数：343 相关文章 所有 20 个版本 引用

Capital gains tax overhang and price pressure

L Jin - The Journal of Finance, 2006 - Wiley Online Library

... Capital Gains Tax Overhang and Price Pressure. LI JIN *. ... JIN, L. (2006), Capital Gains Tax
Overhang and Price Pressure. ... I also benefited from talks with David Granger and Melvyn Gonzalez
at Thomson Financial that enabled me to better understand the CDA/Spectrum data. ...

被引用次数：89 相关文章 所有 15 个版本 引用