The argument that a computerized onboard warning system will virtually solve the problem of midair collisions is not sufficiently convincing as it ignores certain critical assumptions.
First, the argument assumes that each aircraft will be equipped with a transponder. This is true for commercial aircraft operating under FAR Parts 121 or 135. However, transponders are not necessarily required for private, experimental and agricultural aircraft operating in VFR conditions or outside of controlled airspace (FAR Part 91). While a computer onboard warning system might work for two commercial airlines in an imminent collision, but would not work if at least one the aircraft was not using its transponder.
Second, the argument ignores the findings published by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) indicating most midair collisions occur near airports, where planes are operating in a congested airspace, close to the ground, and often in takeoff or landing configuration. A computerized onboard warning system would have to adjust its sensitivity for the additional targets and filter appropriately. If it reported false negatives, pilots would eventually disregard its suggestions, reducing the device's potential effectiveness. Two examples where(aircraft would legitimately be at the same altitude, possibly heading towards each other are taxiing or maneuvering in the traffic pattern.
Finally, the argument assumes the technology will make the correct
recommendation. For example, suppose two aircraft, equipped with the computerized onboard warning system, are believed on a collision course. Now suppose there are mountains to the right of one of the aircraft. If the default "best" behavior was to steer each aircraft to the right, there is a strong possibility one might fly into a mountain.
In summary, the argument is not completely sound. The information provided about the computerized onboard warning system does not support the conclusion that it will virtually solve the problem of midair plane collisions because it fails to consider the assumptions raised.
The argument might have been strenghtened by qualifying its use to operations above 10,000 feet where transponders are required for everyone, discuss its adjusted sensitivity factor, or indicate the computerized onboard warning system would be linked into an onboard global positioning system (GPS) with terrain and obstruction data.
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