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[阅读小分队] 【Native Speaker每日训练计划—92系列】【92-10】经管

发表于 2017-8-11 20:32:37 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式

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PART I: Speaker

The Financial Crisis, 10 Years On

August 9, 2017   |   Heard on Morning Edition

On Aug. 9, 2007, we witnessed the first tremor of a financial earthquake. Ailsa Chang talks with David Wessel of the Brookings Institution about the economy, 10 years later.

Source: NPR

[Rephrase 1: 4’20’’]

PART II: Speed

Ten years on, Where might the next crisis come from?
The debt has not gone away; the system has been kept afloat by very low interest rates

Aug 9th 2017   |   by Buttonwood
TEN years ago, BNP Paribas, a French bank, temporarily suspended dealings in three funds, citing “the complete evaporation of liquidity in certain market segments of the US securitisation market”. Many people treat this as the start of the credit crunch but one can trace it back to the need for Bear Stearns to rescue hedge funds that invested in mortgage-backed securities in June, or the signs of home loan defaults and failing mortgage lenders that emerged in late 2006. The subsequent tightening of credit and loss of confidence in the banking system eventually led to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, when the crisis reached its height in the autumn of 2008 (see picture).

The inevitable question on the occasion of such anniversaries is: could it happen again? Total debt has risen, rather than fallen, over the last decade, reaching $217trn or 327% of GDP, according to the Institute for International Finance. But the debt is differently distributed from 2007; more of it is owed by governments and more of it is owned by central banks. Since these banks have no incentive to hassle countries for repayment, the air of crisis has dissipated. Banks have more capital, making them more secure. And low interest rates have made servicing debt more affordable for both consumers and companies.

Nevertheless, we are nowhere near “normal” conditions; although America’s economy has been recovering for a long while and unemployment is low, the Federal Reserve is proceeding very cautiously with tighter rates. And the ECB, Bank of England and Bank of Japan have not even started on the process.
[263 words]

Given all this, where might the next crisis come from? Clearly, the two obvious possibilities are a sharp rise in defaults (causing lenders to lose confidence) or a signficant increase in interest rates (which would trigger the same process). Defaults can occur without a rate rise if the economy goes into recession. That could result from war with North Korea (apparently God has authorised President Trump to do this) or a less frightening but still significant trade dispute with China. It could result from internal Chinese debt problems since that is where recent debt growth has been concentrated. Or perhaps it will happen in the corporate bond markets, which are less liquid than they used to be, and could suffer a panic sell-off by investors in bond funds. Other possibilities include student debt or car-loan debt, where consumers may have become overstretched again.

The more likely possibility is a monetary policy mistake. When the Fed started to use quantitative easing, many people cited the “ketchup principle” for the inflation risk (“shake and shake the ketchup bottle, first a little, then a lot’ll”). The inflation never occurred but there is the risk that in the unwinding of policy, all will seem calm until the market suddenly breaks. Something similar happened in 1994 when the bond market was badly affected by an earlier round of Fed tightening. And the Fed is the most likely culprit, not just because it is first to tighten but because America’s monetary policy has ripple effects through the world, via the dollar and the American economy’s huge weight in global GDP. The next crisis may come from Washington.
[271 words]

Source: Economist

Withdrawal symptoms: The closing of American bank branches
Banks have shuttered over 10,000 since the financial crisis

Jul 27th 2017   | From Print Edition

WINDSOR, a community of 6,200 people two hours outside Albany in New York state, offers many of the amenities commonly found in a small town, including a bakery, a car-repair outfit and several restaurants. There is just one thing missing: a bank. The town’s only financial institution, First Niagara Bank, shut its doors in October.

Towns like Windsor are becoming ever more common in America. Since the financial crisis, banks have closed over 10,000 branches, an average of three a day. In the first half of 2017 alone, a net 869 brick-and-mortar entities shut their doors, according to S&P Global Market Intelligence, a research firm. Some fret that branch closures risk turning poorer neighbourhoods into “banking deserts”, cut off from current accounts, loans and other basic services.

Not long ago, the notion that Americans might lack sufficient access to bank tellers would have seemed absurd. In the years leading up to the crisis, bricks-and-mortar branches grew by about 200 each month. By 2009, according to the World Bank, America had 35 branches for every 100,000 adults, twice as many as Germany. Since then, however, ultra-low interest rates and thickets of new regulations have squeezed bank profits. They have responded by trimming branches from a peak of about 100,000 to roughly 90,000.
[211 words]

Bank bosses maintain that they are “optimising” their branch networks to fit changing customer habits. But the cuts have not been made evenly. Data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) show that the top fifth of all postal codes by household income lost around 3% of their branches between 2009 and 2016. During this period, the bottom fifth saw their branch numbers decline by 10%.

Community organisations worry that if branches continue to close in poor areas, many neighbourhoods could become reliant on payday lenders and cheque-cashing stores. In June the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis estimated that there are now more than 1,100 banking deserts—defined as census areas at least ten miles from a bank—in America. That figure could easily double if small community banks continue to close. In May the National Community Reinvestment Coalition, a non-profit group, published a report showing that the number of banking deserts in rural areas has increased by 86 since the crisis.

The situation may be less dire than it seems. An analysis of FDIC data by The Economist shows that banking deserts, using the Fed’s definition, are home to just 1.7% of the population. For most of the country, banks are still within easy reach—typically just two miles away. Nine out of ten Americans live within five miles of a bank; half live within one mile.
[229 words]

Even if banks remain accessible to most, branch closures can take a heavy toll. “The loss of a bank has a significant impact on communities,” says James Chessen of the American Bankers Association. The cost is greatest for small businesses, which often lack audited financial statements and other information that can be analysed remotely. “At the local community level, so much of that business is driven by relationships,” says Chris Vanderpool of S&P Global Market Intelligence. “The farther out you are, the harder it is to manage those relationships.” A study in 2014 by Hoai-Luu Nguyen, now at the University of California, Berkeley, estimates that when branches close, new small-business lending falls by 13% in the surrounding area. In low-income neighbourhoods, such lending contracts by nearly 40%.

Even if financial regulation loosens and interest rates rise, branches are likely to thin further. JLL, a property firm, reckons that by 2027 the number of bricks-and-mortar branches could have declined by another 20%. The risk of widespread banking deserts may be a mirage. But small-business lending could still suffer.
[177 words]
Source: Economist

PART III: Obstacle

Lessons from the credit crunch
US banks are notably less weak than Europe’s where stress tests have been unstressful

AUGUST 6, 2017    |    by John Plender

Ten years on from the credit crunch that marked the start of the greatest financial crisis in history, two important questions arise. After extensive remedial work, is the global financial system now fit for purpose? And are the advanced economies vulnerable to a further crisis of comparable magnitude?

With the US and UK economies showing continuing, if unexciting, growth and the eurozone finally enjoying a synchronised upturn, the banks appear no longer to be holding back recovery. In its recent monetary policy report, the Federal Reserve stated that vulnerabilities in the US financial system remained moderate. That view is echoed by central bankers in Europe and Japan. Yet the underlying picture is complicated.

The US banking system is notably less weak than its European counterpart. That is because American policymakers learnt from the earlier Japanese experience of boom and bust. Among the lessons were the importance of timely recognition of losses after the crisis, rigorous stress testing and the need for carefully judged strengthening of bank balance sheets, while maintaining a flow of credit to the real economy.

In the eurozone, by contrast, policymakers were reluctant to confront the challenge of the sovereign debt crisis head on. Stress tests have been unstressful and banks remain undercapitalised relative to the US. Southern Europe is dogged by non-performing loans. And banks across the eurozone maintain big holdings of their own governments’ debt.

That highlights one important sense in which the system is not fit for purpose. The risk-weighted Basel capital adequacy regime, despite post-crisis tweaking, is fundamentally flawed. Sovereign debt enjoys excessively favourable treatment so eurozone banks stuff their balance sheets with the IOUs of seriously over-indebted governments. A parallel problem in the English speaking countries is the excessively favourable treatment of mortgage debt, which encourages asset price bubbles and puts home ownership out of reach for young people.

As for threats to financial stability, there has been much regulatory reform since the collapse of Lehman Brothers bank in 2008. This was aimed at curbing excessive risk taking, reducing dependence on wholesale markets for funding and securing orderly resolution (unwinding) of failing banks. Macroprudential policies such as caps on loan to value ratios and countercyclical capital requirements have been introduced. Yet vulnerabilities remain.

One of the biggest, identified long ago by the Bank for International Settlements, the central bankers’ bank, is asymmetric monetary policy. Since Alan Greenspan’s tenure at the Fed, which ended in 2006, there has been a tendency for central banks to ease aggressively during busts while failing to lean against booms. This has led to a downward bias in interest rates and an upward bias in debt. Among leading countries, with the notable exception of Germany, government debt has spiralled since the crisis.

At today’s freakishly low interest rates, to which central banks have contributed through quantitative easing, this appears manageable. Yet it is also a debt trap from which it may be hard to escape without a bond market collapse, which would raise government borrowing costs while hitting the value of assets in bank balance sheets.

Equally problematic is that banks that are too big and too interconnected to fail have grown bigger through mergers and acquisitions since the crisis. Risks are opaque and concentrated, most notably in derivatives exposures. Many are simply too big to be manageable. JPMorgan Chase is widely regarded as the best managed international bank. But when a group of traders lost $6bn in 2012 in the so-called London Whale scandal it was clear that top management in New York had absolutely no clue as to what was going on.

Policymakers’ answer to the too big to fail problem is bank bail-ins, which aim to protect the taxpayer by making creditors bear the cost of restoring a failing bank to health. Yet some fear that they would be inadequate in a full-blown systemic crisis and that plans to co-ordinate cross-border resolution will prove problematic.

Even so, there seems little likelihood today of a crisis like the one that began 10 years ago because credit expansion has not reached bubble proportions. The risk is rather of an atypical crisis in which a bungled exit from central banks’ quantitative easing and an interest rate spike in the bond market exposes the fragility of an over-indebted system and prompts central banks to resume ultra-loose monetary policy.

How much of the resulting losses would fall on bank creditors or taxpayers is an open and ultimately political question.
[859 words]

Source: Financial Times


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发表于 2017-8-11 21:53:58 | 显示全部楼层
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发表于 2017-8-11 22:57:01 | 显示全部楼层
Lessons from the credit crunch
掌管 1        00:05:55.03        00:05:55.03

After the severe credit crunch ten years ago, two questions arised. Is the global financial system fit for purpose now? Are economies still vulnerable to further crisis?
Although both US and European economy show growth, the US economy is thought more robust than European. That is because US learned from Japan's experience while Europe is reluctant to confront the challenge of sovereign debt crisis.
One of the biggest vulnerability is the asymmetric monetary policy.
Another problem is that the banks are too big to fail, and it's hard to manage.
concentrated, most notably in derivatives exposures.
However, the risk is less likely than that of ten years ago.
发表于 2017-8-11 23:06:05 | 显示全部楼层
Day2 92
T3:1:44' Several possibilities that may cause next financial crisis.
T4:1:24' The decrease trend of banks.
T5:1:31' While the the phenomenon of banking deserts is evident, FDIC data suggests that this situation is less dire than it seems to be.
T6:1:17' Small business suffers a lot of the thinning bank situation.
发表于 2017-8-11 23:17:16 | 显示全部楼层
发表于 2017-8-11 23:44:33 | 显示全部楼层

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发表于 2017-8-12 00:08:58 | 显示全部楼层
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发表于 2017-8-12 01:35:37 | 显示全部楼层
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发表于 2017-8-12 01:49:56 | 显示全部楼层

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发表于 2017-8-12 05:58:05 | 显示全部楼层
T2 1:24
Are we going to have another credit crisis?

T3 1:24
Two possibilities: (1) increase in default caused by economy recession; (2) increase in interest rate caused by polity mistakes.

T4 0:48
Banks shut down in small towns - a trend.

T5 2:24
Most banks are closed in poor area but it may be ok due to low population.

T6 0:55
The impact on small business (driven by relationship).

T7 5:54
Two questions: (1) does the system fit for the purpose? (2) vulnerable?
U.S. bank is stronger than EUR banks after the crisis.
U.S. - (1) recognition of losses; (2) stress testing; (3) bank balance sheet; (4) flow of credit
EUR - (1) stress testing unstressful; (2)bank undercapitalized; (3) big holdings of government debt
Problems (for financial crisis 10 years ago: interest rate, policy, too big to fail)
However, today is different from financial crisis.
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