ESB Case: Matching Dell, 1999
- How does Dell’s approach in the personal computer industry
differ from its main competitors?
- What accounts for the difference in performance between Dell and
its major competitors?
- How far is Dell’s position likely to be sustainable in the
future?
Background: Revenue of Dell rose from $3.5 bn in 1994 to $18.2
bn in 1998 while profits $149 mn to $1.5 bn. Stock price up by
5600%.
Dell Advantage: Economies of Scale – huge fixed cost of
distribution (500Mn /$20bn = 2.5%): direct sales force (100 Mn)
which focused on medium-large institution clients and web-base
services (50K pages). Dominated this sector. In 1994, margin of
Dell Direct was 5% while -3% of Dell retail.
Gateway had better mfg cost. If it follows Dell and gets 20% MKT
of Dell: 20% * 20bn = 4bn, distribution cost/sales = 500mn/4bn =
12.5%!
Inventory of save: Compaq 8% - Dell 2% = 6% * Interest Rate of
Cash (3%) = 0.18%
Operation Efficiency: direct sales, outsource on-site services,
rapid customized response, lean mfg process (36 hours), efficient
assembly, and close supplier relationship.
Dell’s map: Strategic Situation (Efficiency/cost-advantage in
Dist. vs Inefficiency in Mfg) + Op Efficiency à Strategic Decision
à Performance.
Compaq: Huge improvement on Op. Eff (200K à 600K) à Success à
Loss of Focus, Acquisition à HP takeover.
Reseller: Integration; Specialize; Fully support services; want
machine quality, price, generic machine. à So IBM/HP/Compaq work
better for resellers.
Performance Manipulation:
$20Bn Sales, OI $1.6bn, 8%
Reduce working Cap $6bn à $2bn by $4bn
Cost: 6% * 4bn = $240 Mn
Assuming off-set by higher supplier price elsewhere (Delay
Payment – reduce working Cap)
OI: $1.6 bn - $240Mn = $1.36 bn
Pre-Change ROIC = 1.6 bn/6bn = 26.7%
Post-Change ROIC = 1.36 bn/2bn = 63% without fundamental value
created!