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大家好,周四经管。今天的speaker是英音,锻炼一下哈!
PART I: SPEAKER Article 1:
Listen to a TED talk on How food shapes our cities.
【REPHRASE 1】
【SPEECH: 15:40】
Source: TED
http://www.ted.com/talks/carolyn_steel_how_food_shapes_our_cities.html
PART II: SPEED
ARTICLE 2: Will You Still Love Me When I’m 164?
Google's plan to extend our life span will change love, work, and just about every aspect of society
By Sonia Arrison Sept. 18, 2013
【TIME 2】
Most married people have spoken the words “until death do us part,” usually expecting to enjoy a wonderful half a century or so with their beloved. But if humans could live to 150 years, as many scientists now think might be possible, the world will be a very different place, and it won’t just mean more time with one’s spouse. There is also a greater possibility of switching partners.
In her 79 fabulous years, actress Elizabeth Taylor was married eight times to seven husbands. If she had lived a longer and healthier life, that number might have been even higher. While it’s true Taylor was an anomaly, it turns out that as more time becomes available, mating behaviors do begin to shift. In 1950, the average age at first marriage was 23 for men and 20 for women. Today, with longer life expectancies, average age at first marriage is 28 for men and 26 for women. Those numbers will likely climb higher as women gain more control over their fertility with reproductive technologies such as IVF, egg freezing, and ovary and embryo transplants. The ability to have children at much later ages means that it will be possible for siblings to be separated by many decades. A woman might have one child when she is 22 and another when she is 62, and the relationship between those siblings might be less like traditional siblings and more like that between an uncle and nephew.
【TIME 2 ENDS –243 WORDS】
【TIME 3】
Dynamics will change in the workplace too. It’s possible to imagine a scenario where a 25-year-old is put on the same corporate team as a healthy 100-year-old. The cultural difference between the two workers may be stark, which means that the ability to co-operate with diverse groups of people will be a highly sought after when hiring new employees.
As people work longer and spend money longer, the economy will grow. Health begets wealth, and according to University of Chicago economists Kevin Murphy and Robert Topel, gains in life expectancy over the last decade (30 years) are worth over $1.2 million to the current population. They also found that “from 1970 to 2000, gains in life expectancy added about $3.2 trillion per year to national wealth.” While these numbers are staggering, what might be more important is the issue of longevity gains as a competitive advantage.
In a paper titled “The Health and Wealth of Nations,” Harvard economist David Bloom and Queen’s University economist David Canning explain that, based on the available research, if there are “two countries that are identical in all respects, except that one has a five-year advantage in life expectancy,” then the “real income per capita in the healthier country will grow 0.3–0.5% per year faster than in its less healthy counterpart.” These percentages might look small, but they are actually quite significant, since it is known that between 1965 and 1990 countries experienced an average per capita income growth of 2% per year, and Bloom and Canning’s numbers are based on only a five-year longevity advantage. If a country had a 30 or 50-year advantage then having a longer-lived population could generate enormous differences in economic prosperity.
Some may worry about a population explosion if lifespans extend. While that’s a reasonable reaction, the trends on population growth currently point in the other direction. Another objection to longer lives is that somehow it will make life less noble or rich. The opposite is true. Being able to spend more time with friends and family, innovating, career building, exploring, learning, and helping others would increase the richness of our lives. The goal is more healthy time, which will lead to greater wealth and prospects for happiness. That is one of the noblest causes of all.
【TIME 3 ENDS – 379 WORDS】
Source: TIME
http://ideas.time.com/2013/09/18/will-you-still-love-me-when-im-164/#ixzz2fL6KK83q
Article 3:How to Deter Misbehavior by Bankers
By the Editors Sep 15, 2013
【TIME 4】
Six U.S. agencies, a congressional committee and four state regulators, not to mentionCanada, three European countries and the European Commission, are investigating JPMorgan Chase & Co. The bank’s litigation expenses hit $1 billion in the first half of this year, and the bank says its legal losses could reach $6.8 billion.
So shareholders are furious, right? Nope. JPMorgan’s shares have risen 35 percent in the past year, more than twice the 17 percent increase in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index. Part of the reason has to be that $6.8 billion isn’t much for a bank that’s on track to make $23 billion this year.
Which leads to two questions: Five years after the global economy was sucker-punched by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., has the U.S. done enough to prevent financial companies from breaking the law? If not, what else can it do to deter misconduct -- and motivate shareholders to demand changes?
For years, the Justice Department has been reluctant to punish large corporations for fear of driving them out of business. (Remember Arthur Andersen LLP?) The department has instead relied on so-called deferred prosecutions, which usually involve signed promises not to misbehave and the acceptance of on-site monitors to check on compliance.
The Securities and Exchange Commission’s view has been that hitting public companies with large penalties only hurts shareholders. When companies are willing to settle allegations of wrongdoing, the SEC’s default position has been to let them do so without admitting guilt.
This approach doesn’t protect investors or the economy. Instead, it contributes to market dysfunction by allowing companies to treat litigation as just a cost of doing business.
Shareholders, moreover, have little incentive to provide market discipline because they, too, benefit if companies can earn bigger profits by crossing legal lines with impunity. If hefty penalties damped earnings, shareholders would suffer -- and might then have reason to hold banks to account.
【TIME 4 ENDS – 319 WORDS】
【TIME 5】
At JPMorgan specifically, shareholders can freely ignore the possibility that the U.S.’s largest bank -- with $2.4 trillion in assets, it’s about the size of France’s economy -- may simply be too big to manage. It recently hired 3,000 people just to deal with compliance and controls.
The good news is that regulators and prosecutors have the tools they need, including the securities laws and various other statutes against fraud and conspiracy, to discourage miscreants. Plus, there is the anti-racketeering statute, which allows prosecutors to seek triple penalties if a company keeps violating the same laws.
SEC Chairman Mary Jo White, a former prosecutor, can demand only civil reparations, yet she holds a trump card: She can refuse to let JPMorgan settle cases without admitting or denying guilt. Then private litigants can piggyback off any SEC settlement, adding to the penalties.
Prosecutors are not always correct, of course: JPMorgan units involved in such diverse businesses as electric-power trading and consumer credit-card services may not have engaged in all the bad practices they are accused of. Nor should the bank be tarred with the misconduct of former employees of Bear Stearns & Co. and Washington Mutual Corp., which JPMorgan bought at the U.S.’s behest in 2008 and must defend now.
At the same time, it’s not fair to say that prosecutors are retaliating for the bank’s criticism of federal regulators. The sheriffs aren’t overreaching; they’re merely late. If, in judiciously applying the law, the government sends a clear message that no bank gets a pass, then the financial system will be stronger -- and more trustworthy -- for everyone.
【TIME 5 ENDS –268 WORDS】
Source: Bloomberg
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-15/how-to-deter-misbehavior-by-bankers.html
Article 4: Why is Twitter’s IPO so unusual?
Sep 17th 2013, by M.G.
【WARM UP】
TWITTER has built a business that lets people spray information around fast. But when it came to its initial public offering (IPO), the micro-blogging service sent out just one tweet on September 12th informing the world it had filed the required IPO papers confidentially with America’s Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Then there was silence. How has Twitter been able to keep its IPO filing under wraps? And what does this mean for investors?
Companies are typically required to publish information about themselves immediately after they submit their initial IPO documents to the SEC. But Twitter has taken advantage of a provision in America’s Jumpstart Our Business Start-ups Act—or JOBS Act for short—that allows "emerging growth companies" to kick off the IPO process confidentially. They must publish the IPO data no later than three weeks before they embark on investor roadshows to tout shares. The act defines emerging growth firms as ones with less than $1 billion of annual revenue. By giving some companies the option of filing for an IPO in secret, the JOBS Act, which became law in April 2012, aims to encourage more flotations. According to the SEC, by the end of June 2013 roughly 250 companies in America had filed IPO documents confidentially.
【209 WORDS】
【TIME 6】
This approach appeals to Twitter for several reasons. The firm hopes that by keeping its financial performance under wraps for a while, and then heading swiftly to a listing, it can avoid the kind of hype that surrounded Facebook’s IPO in 2012. Twitter can also address any concerns the SEC has about its submission in private—though it must reveal its correspondence with the regulator when it finally publishes its IPO documents. It is hoping to avoid the fate of Groupon, which revealed details of its finances as soon as it filed for an IPO in 2011. Some of the firm's accounting policies were publicly questioned by the SEC, which unnerved investors. There are other advantages too. If it wants to, Twitter need only publish two years of audited financial statements rather than the typical three and it can leave out some details about executive pay that are usually required. An emerging growth company does not have to disclose it has filed to go public, though some like Twitter prefer to do so.
Critics say it is a mistake to let prominent firms such as Twitter and Manchester United, an English football club that listed on the New York Stock Exchange last year, keep their filings secret for a while. This encourages wild speculation about their finances, distracting employees and muddying the market. The JOBS Act also lets emerging growth firms talk to big investors privately to gauge the appetite for their shares, a practice that is usually forbidden. That leaves small punters at a distinct disadvantage and explains calls to reduce the $1 billion revenue cut-off point for emerging growth firms. Last year one disgruntled investor suggested that the JOBS Act should be renamed the Jumpstart Our Bilking of Suckers Act.
【TIME 6 ENDS – 292 WORDS】
Source: The Economist
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/09/economist-explains-6
PART III: OBSTACLE Article 5: Capital punishment
Forcing banks to hold more capital may not always be wise
Sep 14th 2013 |From the print edition
【PARAPHRASE 7】
IN THE five years since Lehman Brothers failed, proposals to make the financial system safer have proliferated. One of the few on which there is widespread agreement is that banks should be less leveraged—in other words, that they should fund themselves more with equity and less with debt. This means a given loss would be less likely to render a bank insolvent. But a new paper casts leverage in a far more flattering light: it is necessary to meet the public’s demand for money-like assets.
This perspective is largely missing from the debate on just how much extra equity banks should hold. Bankers argue that equity is dearer than debt. Requiring them to issue more of it forces them to charge more on loans, hurting economic growth. Rubbish, critics respond. As Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller noted in 1958, other things being equal, the value of an enterprise does not depend on its mix of debt and equity. If a bank issues more equity, it will be less likely to go bankrupt. Its equity should be safer as a result, and therefore cheaper. Forcing banks to reduce their leverage also has the advantage of neutralising the subsidies that banks receive—deposit insurance and the implicit promise that any bank deemed too big to fail will be bailed out.
Less bank leverage is not unambiguously good, however. Banks are useful not just because they make loans but also because they issue debt in a form that is extremely handy to the people that fund them. Like money, bank deposits are highly liquid, a store of value, convenient for settling transactions, and require no due diligence. The price of this convenience is that households get less interest on their deposits than on bonds, a spread known as the “liquidity premium”.
In a new paper Harry DeAngelo of the University of Southern California and René Stulz of Ohio State University show that this premium means that banks, unlike other firms, are not indifferent to leverage, as the Modigliani-Merton theorem suggests. Mr DeAngelo and Mr Stulz show that it is better for banks to be highly levered even without frictions like deposit insurance and implicit guarantees. Banks would still choose to be levered because the liquidity premium lets them borrow cheaply.
Their model can explain a historical curiosity. Banks’ capital ratios have fallen steadily over the past two centuries. This has often been attributed to the introduction of deposit insurance and the role of lenders of last resort, which reduced the cost of bank debt. But in America’s case much of the drop in borrowing costs came before the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913 and the introduction of federal deposit insurance in 1933. An alternative explanation is that as banking became more competitive, lenders were forced to offer better terms to depositors, narrowing the liquidity premium. The model of Messrs DeAngelo and Stulz shows that as the liquidity premium shrinks, banks must crank up their leverage to compensate.
If leverage meets the demand of borrowers for a safe, money-like investment, forcing banks to reduce their leverage may have nasty side-effects. Imagine a bank that, instead of issuing $9 in deposits and $1 in equity, issues $8 in deposits and $2 in equity. One option is for the public to hold $1 less in deposits and $1 more in equity, thereby assuming more risk than it would prefer. More likely, “shadow banks” (institutions that act like banks but are not regulated like them) would step in to meet the public’s unmet demand for money-like assets. As shadow banks take over some of the banks’ responsibility for producing money-like assets, the financial system becomes more fragile.
Another paper by Gary Gorton, Stefan Lewellen and Andrew Metrick, all of Yale University, finds that although the volume of financial assets in America has grown dramatically since 1952, the proportion they consider safe has remained at around 33%. But the mix of these safe assets has shifted from government debt and bank deposits towards “quasi-safe” shadow-banking debt: commercial paper, “repo” loans and money-market funds.
Even before the crisis, restrictions on leverage played a part in this shift. Banks sought to conserve their capital by moving mortgage-backed securities to off-balance-sheet vehicles, financed with short-term paper. Investment banks financed their mortgage holdings with repo loans. Investors treated these IOUs as money, giving little thought to the collateral they received. When the mortgage market collapsed, what investors thought were riskless, liquid assets turned out to be risky and illiquid.
Five years since Reserve Primary, too
The push for lower leverage since the crisis has yet to spawn similar side-effects because banks have been chasing deposits to replace wholesale funding. But in time, more equity could constrain banks’ capacity to supply people with money-like assets, pushing them into the arms of shadow banks. Hence regulators’ continued worries about money-market funds. Such funds try to maintain a constant $1 per share net asset value, which encourages investors to treat them as cash. Technically, though, they are equity investments: funds can pay out less than a dollar. That’s what the Reserve Primary Fund did when its holdings of Lehman paper went bad, sparking a broader run on money-market funds.
The European Commission has proposed compelling money funds to have a predefined capital buffer. America’s Securities and Exchange Commission is calling on funds either to float their share prices or limit withdrawals during times of stress. Both want investors to stop treating investments in money-market funds as money. A laudable goal, but one with its own downside: investors may head off in search of another money-like asset in another penumbral corner of the system.
【OBSTACLE ENDS – 941 WORDS】
Source: The Economist
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21586283-forcing-banks-hold-more-capital-may-not-always-be-wise-capital-punishment
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