【越障1-15】
Local Political Uncertainty, Family Control, andInvestment Behavior An influential strand of research has investigatedthe implications of political uncertainty for macroeconomic outcomes such ascapital flows, investment, and gross domestic product (e.g., Alesina andPerotti (1996), Baker and Bloom (2013), Barro (1991), and Hermes and Lensink(2001)). Building on the idea that uncertainty increases the option value ofwaiting and thus makes companies more cautious in their investment behavior(e.g., Bernanke (1983), Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen (2007)), scholars aredirecting their attention to the relationship between aggregate uncertainty andfirm-level outcomes (e.g., Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016), Guiso and Parigi(1999), Gulen and Ion (2016), and Pastor and Veronesi (2013)).1 Recent works in this research domain (e.g., Jens(2017), Julio and Yook (2012), (2016)) focus on political elections as aspecific driver of uncertainty and show that firms exhibit a significantdecline in fixed investment during election periods, especially when theyoperate in less stable countries and carry out activities more connected withthe public sector. Despite this rich evidence, the governance characteristicsthat immunize companies against political risk remain largely unexplored. Wecontribute to this literature by studying how family ownership affectsinvestment behavior during periods of local political uncertainty. Due to theirprevalence around the world (e.g., Faccio and Lang (2002), Morck, Wolfenzon,and Yeung (2005)), family firms have received wide attention recently. Thescholarly debate on this topic has been characterized by a tension between thenegatives and positives of family ownership, ranging from the risk of nepotismand entrenchment to the benefits of specialized assets and congruence betweenownership and control. We believe that focusing on family firms may bring novelinsights to the debate on corporate investment and political uncertainty. Inparticular, our thesis is that family ownership can provide significant agency-and resource-based advantages that help the company overcome investment inertiain periods of heightened uncertainty. From an agency perspective, it has beenlong noted that family firms tend to benefit from longer investment horizons andbetter alignments between owners’ and executives’ investment preferences (e.g.,Anderson and Reeb (2003), Hsu, Huang, Massa, and Zhang (2015), and Villalongaand Amit (2010)). Building on these arguments, we posit that having investmentpreferences consistently aligned toward the long run can alleviate problems ofmanagerial myopia during uncertain times, thus making family firms better ablethan their nonfamily counterparts to weather time-contingent politicaluncertainty. From a resource perspective, family firms have beenshown to possess a superior ability to deal with the political system, whicharises from their extensive network of family and business relationships(Bunkanwanicha, Fan, and Wiwattanakantang (2013), Faccio and Parsley (2009),and Fisman (2001)) and their credibility in sustaining implicit contractingwith politicians (Bertrand and Schoar 2006). These features can be valuable inovercoming political uncertainty. Indeed, existing works have argued that politicalcapital brings about preferential political treatment (e.g., Goldman, Rocholl,and So (2013), Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006)) and alleviates thenegative effects of political uncertainty by giving firms more information onthe legislative process (Ovtchinnikov, Reza, and Wu (2015), Wellman (2017)).2Taken together, these results provide further suggestion that the investmentbehavior of family firms should be more resilient than that of nonfamily firmsin times of heightened political uncertainty. We conduct the analysis on a richdata set from Italy that comprises 12,459 firms spanning from 2000 to 2014.Going beyond existing works on national elections, our analysis focuses on theelection of local governments (at the regional level), which activelycontribute to some of the most important areas of public spending (e.g., healthcare and local policies) with significant implications for firm activities.Local politics indeed represents a major arena of interactions betweenbusinesses and politicians (e.g., Amore and Bennedsen (2013), Cingano andPinotti (2013)), especially for the myriad of small and medium-sized firms withgeographically concentrated operations. Our empirical approach has severaladvantages. First, we can exploit that regions do not all hold elections in thesame year; this staggered election scheduling allows us to build a difference-in-differencesmodel in which firms in nonelection regions serve as counterfactuals to firmsin regions that are holding regional elections. Second, we benefit from thetiming of elections being mostly fixed and exogenous to current firm outcomes.Third, by exploring variations in investment across firms with differentownership structures within regions, we reduce the concern that our results arecontaminated by business-cycle conditions, which should be common to allcompanies in a given region. Fourth, by focusing the analysis on a singlecountry, we mitigate the concerns about omitted-factor bias that typicallyarise in cross-country regressions (e.g., due to differences in politicalinstitutions, legal systems, and/or types and levels of regulation). We start by documenting two key results. Althoughregional election years induce on average a significant reduction in investment(amounting to 25% in our baseline specification), family firms revert thisinvestment decline and experience a negligible change in investment. In otherwords, family firms appear better able to maintain their investment activityduring local elections. Importantly, these findings hold when controlling foran extensive host of variables related to corporate characteristics, macroeconomicperformance, aggregate policy uncertainty, leading economic indicators, andsentiment. We proceed to show that local political uncertainty induces a muchlarger decline in the investment of firms operating in industries closelyaligned with the public sector and thus more intimately linked to politics(e.g., due to public procurement contracts or regulatory actions). For firmsoperating in such industries, regional elections induce a relevant decline ininvestment. Yet, consistent with our main results, we find that family firmsare able to neutralize this effect. As expected, we also find that our resultsare more pronounced for firms that have a more local scope of operations. Next,we document economically greater investment during election years, as comparedwith that of nonfamily firms, for family businesses in which the family membersare widely represented in board and top-executive positions. This resultreinforces our intuition that family control mitigates the reluctance to investduring periods of election-specific uncertainty by improving agency alignmentin investment decisions and extending the company’s investment horizon.
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