Between 1890 and 1930, the U.S.
apple industry underwent a profound transformation. At the beginning of the period, apples were produced in a scattering of orchards through the Midwest and East, near consumers; commercial apples were sold in face to face transactions. At the end of the period, apples were grown commercially in a handful of orchards in the Midwest, the East, and, most importantly, in the Pacific states, and shipped to distant consumers. Commercial apple transactions became anonymous, taking place between buyers and sellers separated by long distances. By 1930, apple sales relied on federally legislated marketing institutions. Quality was specified by federal grading standard, and third party federal inspection services were available to verify quality prior to shipment or after delivery. Standard business practices were dictated by the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930, which clearly specified when buyers or seller could change contract terms, and the procedures they were required to follow when altering contracts.
An alternative interpretation is that government involvement in apple marketing was a response to contract-enforcement problems arising as a result of the emergence of the national apple industry. Selling a perishable commodity over long distances was inherently problematic. First, quality declined naturally during the transcontinental delivery. Second, both farmers and the railroad, through their actions during packing and shipment, could accelerate this natural deterioration. Together, these two complications made it possible for sellers to claim to have shipped high quality fruit and for buyers to claim that delivered quality was low regardless of actual quality. Verification of these claims was impossible. The inability to detect whether reports of low delivered quality resulted from a random act of nature, inattention, or fraud left room for rent-seeking activity and opportunistic behavior.
Although the desire to avoid the negative consequences of a bad reputation encourages sellers and buyers to behave honestly, it may be impossible to develop a reputation when there are many buyers and sellers in the market. In such cases, when informal institutions become difficult to sustain, government or industry institutions may emerge. Quality certification and industry-defined minimum-quality standards are both effective methods for transmitting quality information from sellers to buyers. (Contract Evolution and institutional Innovation: Marketing Pacific-Grown Apples from 1890 to 1930)
-- by 会员 蓝柏 (2013/3/9 12:15:07)
Between 1890 and 1930, the U.S.
apple industry underwent a profound transformation. At the beginning of the period, apples were produced in a scattering of orchards through the Midwest and East, near consumers; commercial apples were sold in face to face transactions. At the end of the period, apples were grown commercially in a handful of orchards in the Midwest, the East, and, most importantly, in the Pacific states, and shipped to distant consumers. Commercial apple transactions became anonymous, taking place between buyers and sellers separated by long distances. By 1930, apple sales relied on federally legislated marketing institutions. Quality was specified by federal grading standard, and third party federal inspection services were available to verify quality prior to shipment or after delivery. Standard business practices were dictated by the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930, which clearly specified when buyers or seller could change contract terms, and the procedures they were required to follow when altering contracts.
An alternative interpretation is that government involvement in apple marketing was a response to contract-enforcement problems arising as a result of the emergence of the national apple industry. Selling a perishable commodity over long distances was inherently problematic. First, quality declined naturally during the transcontinental delivery. Second, both farmers and the railroad, through their actions during packing and shipment, could accelerate this natural deterioration. Together, these two complications made it possible for sellers to claim to have shipped high quality fruit and for buyers to claim that delivered quality was low regardless of actual quality. Verification of these claims was impossible. The inability to detect whether reports of low delivered quality resulted from a random act of nature, inattention, or fraud left room for rent-seeking activity and opportunistic behavior.
Although the desire to avoid the negative consequences of a bad reputation encourages sellers and buyers to behave honestly, it may be impossible to develop a reputation when there are many buyers and sellers in the market. In such cases, when informal institutions become difficult to sustain, government or industry institutions may emerge. Quality certification and industry-defined minimum-quality standards are both effective methods for transmitting quality information from sellers to buyers. (Contract Evolution and institutional Innovation: Marketing Pacific-Grown Apples from 1890 to 1930)
-- by 会员 蓝柏 (2013/3/9 12:15:07)
就是这个... 这不是GWD 里的阅读么？ 反正觉得很熟悉....我三年前考过GMAT...这次考 没有看那么多 所以不记得了是不是GWD里的了
-- by 会员 cxp6334228 (2013/3/10 2:34:54)
aticipants 多会不能保证buyer 和seller 的reputation , 下面那个情况能说明这一点.