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标题: 23号上午考完放狗, [打印本页]

作者: 潇潇呢 时间: 2019-8-23 23:21
标题: 23号上午考完放狗,
作文：
一个manager of fitness gym 给boss写信，说一个调查表明人们喜欢organic food，所以应该再national chain of organic food company move in 这个城市之前，expand目前的gym 来加一个organic food section.

阅读：
1. 有一个6月11库里面的merger：我昨天看大家的机经发现和6.11的库阅读很相似，就瞅了一眼，看到了这篇有印象，但是没记住

，考场上第一篇就是这个，花了很长时间，不会做。
大概是说两个merger的方式，一个是diversify merger （和其他行业兼并）一个是horizontal merger（行业内兼并），大家可以去看看611的库，里面回忆的挺全，内容完全一样。

2.其他的完全想不起来了

数学：
1. 有一个答案是根号7的，前面有狗狗回忆。
2. 我数学第一题感觉很难，现在也没想到，大概意思是：我第一题看了5 6 分钟没做出来选项有 2 3 4 5 6 这个样子，见图片

3. 现在是9：00，多久之后时针分针重合 540/11
4. 如图
忘了想起来再补充吧

作者: 椰鹿0420 时间: 2019-8-23 23:41
感谢分享！

作者: Jessiewww 时间: 2019-8-23 23:47
感谢分享！

作者: bifuyuyu 时间: 2019-8-23 23:51
构筑这篇悦读diversification的，我也碰到了。事先没有看到JJ，难过

作者: Aaron_liang 时间: 2019-8-24 09:36
x^x+y^(x+y)=864

除了试数，有方法吗？

作者: Aaron_liang 时间: 2019-8-24 09:45
没有规律这题是看30那项？

作者: billyisfragile! 时间: 2019-8-24 10:52
JOURNAL ARTICLE
Did Tough Antitrust Enforcement Cause the Diversification of American Corporations?
John G. Matsusaka
The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Vol. 31, No. 2 (Jun., 1996), pp. 283-294
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the University of Washington School of Business Administration
DOI: 10.2307/2331183
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2331183
Page Count: 12

A central question in ﬁnancial economics remains unresolved: What caused the rise and decline of corporate diversiﬁcation during the last four decades? Even though a number of plausible explanations have been advanced, there is little more than anecdotal support for or against any of them.

One of the most venerable and enduring of these explanations is the “antitrust hypothesis.” According to this explanation, ﬁrms diversiﬁed in the 1960s because antitrust authorities prevented them from expanding in their home industries. When antitrust policy became less stringent in the 1980s, ﬁrms were able to expand horizontally, leading them to de-diversify and refocus on their core business. Stigler (1966) was perhaps the ﬁrst to present evidence on the antitrust hypothesis, concluding that, “[t]he 1950 Merger Act has had a strongly adverse effect on horizontal mergers by large companies.” More recently, Shleifer and Vishny ((1991), p. 50) speculated that

The most likely reason for diversiﬁcation [in the 1960s] was the antitrust policy that, after the Celler-Kefauver Act passed in 1950, turned ﬁercely against mergers between ﬁrms in the same industry. Unable to acquire businesses related to their own, ﬂush with cash, and facing a favorable market for equity issues, acquirers bought companies outside their industries.

The view that antitrust contributed substantially to corporate diversiﬁcation also enjoys abundant anecdotal support.1 But it has its share of skeptics, including Scherer (1980) and Comment and Jarrell (1995), who note that diversiﬁcation appears to be common in countries with signiﬁcantly different antitrust policies than the United States.

The purpose of this paper is to make an empirical assessment of the antitrust hypothesis. Antitrust enforcement in the 19605 focused on how a merger would affect market concentration. Consequently, large horizontal mergers were more likely to have been challenged than small horizontal mergers. Diversifying mergers, in contrast, were unlikely to have been challenged regardless of size. If the antitrust hypothesis is correct, then, acquisition-minded ﬁrms avoided large horizontal acquisitions, and either i) substituted into small horizontal acquisitions and mergers with ﬁrms of any size in unrelated industries, or ii) dropped out of the merger market altogether. In either case, there should have been a relatively high fraction of diversiﬁcation acquisitions among large mergers and a relatively low fraction among small mergers during the conglomerate merger wave of the 1960s and 1970s. This implication does not ﬁnd support in a sample of 549 mergers by NYSE ﬁrms during 1968: diversiﬁcation was no more common among large mergers than small mergers. The ﬁnding is robust to a number of different measures of diversiﬁcation, and also holds for samples of mergers during 1971 and 1974.

In addition to the statistical evidence, I examine diversiﬁcation patterns in the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and France in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Although none of these countries had legal restrictions on horizontal growth comparable to those in the United States, they also experienced diversiﬁcation waves. This corroborates the negative view of the antitrust hypothesis that emerges from the American data. It seems too much to conclude that antitrust played no role whatsoever—surely it was a factor in some decisions—but the evidence suggests that the primary cause of corporate diversiﬁcation lies elsewhere.

International Evidence

A second reason to be skeptical about the antitrust hypothesis is that increasing corporate diversiﬁcation has been a feature of most Western economies in the postwar years even though tough legal restrictions on horizontal growth were unique to the United States.

In Britain, competition policy was governed by the 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act, intended to discourage cartels. A 1965 act gave the government the power to control certain mergers when they were against the “public interest.” These restrictions were rarely applied as the government was more interested in encouraging horizontal combinations than discouraging them (OECD (1974)). Despite this favorable environment for horizontal mergers, the United Kingdom also experienced a diversiﬁcation merger wave in the 1960s and early 1970s. The peak was in 1965 measured by numbers, and 1971 measured by value of transactions (OECD ( 1974)). The number of takeovers that involved entry into new industries rose from 9.3 percent in 1949—1953 to 38.8 percent in 1954—1958, and 46.6 percent in 1969—1973 (Goudie and Meeks (1982)). British ﬁrms diversiﬁed internally as well. In 1950, 23 of the 100 largest British ﬁrms were diversiﬁed; by 1970, 54 of the top 100 were diversiﬁed (Chandler (1990)). A number of conglomerates even arose in the early 1970s, most notably BTR, the Hanson Trust, GEC, and Tarmac.

Mergers in Canada were governed by the Combines Investigation Act, which prohibited mergers that lessened competition “to the detriment ...of the public”(Section 2). The few court judgements that had been issued by the middle of the 1970s took a narrow view of what constituted illegal mergers, essentially only those that would have created a “virtual monopoly” (OECD (1974)). Even so, by the early 1970s, diversiﬁcation had become the primary type of Canadian merger. Only 43 percent of Canadian mergers were horizontal in 1971—1973 and only 30 percent in 1977—1979 (Baldwin and Gorecki (1990)).

作者: 1122121 时间: 2019-8-24 14:05

Aaron_liang 发表于 2019-8-24 09:36
x^x+y^(x+y)=864

除了试数，有方法吗？

按照楼主算出来的答案，中间那个应该是乘号不是加号，所以分解质因数应该就可以了

作者: 炸鸡就行了 时间: 2019-8-24 15:40
7个AX+B相乘的那道题怎么做呀~

作者: seal末野 时间: 2019-8-25 00:04

炸鸡就行了发表于 2019-8-24 15:40
7个AX+B相乘的那道题怎么做呀~

我觉得是用排列组合，各次项的系数相等

作者: 炸鸡就行了 时间: 2019-8-25 09:40

seal末野发表于 2019-8-25 00:04
我觉得是用排列组合，各次项的系数相等

好的~谢谢你，我找到答案啦，好像选不能被30整除的

作者: cool！ 时间: 2019-8-25 12:05

炸鸡就行了发表于 2019-8-25 09:40
好的~谢谢你，我找到答案啦，好像选不能被30整除的

求分享思路答案

作者: Greenplaid 时间: 2019-8-25 15:17

cool！发表于 2019-8-25 12:05
求分享思路答案

可以这样想哦
比如说 (ax+b)(cx+d)(ex+f) 展开以后得出来的常数项应该是bdf （b/d/f是bdf的因数）
所以题目里面所有(ax+b)里面的b都应该是展开来最后一个常数项的因数所以b一定要是30的因数

作者: Qzlqz 时间: 2019-8-25 16:54

Greenplaid 发表于 2019-8-25 15:17
可以这样想哦
比如说 (ax+b)(cx+d)(ex+f) 展开以后得出来的常数项应该是bdf （b/d/f是bdf的因数）
所以 ...

好方法~

作者: recklesspy 时间: 2019-8-25 22:34

Greenplaid 发表于 2019-8-25 15:17
可以这样想哦
比如说 (ax+b)(cx+d)(ex+f) 展开以后得出来的常数项应该是bdf （b/d/f是bdf的因数）
所以 ...

所以b一定是整数吗？除了 2 3 5 其余都只能是1了
因为有七个b呢

作者: Aaron_liang 时间: 2019-8-26 14:00
求问sc考了什么？

作者: seal末野 时间: 2019-8-26 23:52

炸鸡就行了发表于 2019-8-25 09:40
好的~谢谢你，我找到答案啦，好像选不能被30整除的

是滴是滴，我看成是七个一样的式子相乘了，谢谢楼主

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