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沙发
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发表于 2014-3-14 21:51:52
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Part II: Speed
Japan and Abenomics
Once more with feeling
The Shinzo Abe shaking up Japan’s economy seems a different man from the one whose previous premiership was marked by nationalistic posturing. He isn’t.
May 18th 2013 | TOKYO
[Time 2]
IN “SOAPLAND”—Sopurando, a Tokyo red-light district—the price of a basic half-hour “massage” has recently gone up for the first time since 1990. Demand for the top-end, “highly technical” massage service, costing ¥60,000 ($600) a go, has also been soaring, according to Akira Ikoma, editor of My Journey, which covers the sex industry. He says it is all thanks to the surging stockmarket.
In Sopurando they are cheekily calling this reinvigoration “awanomics”, from awa, meaning bubble or lather. Elsewhere in Japan they call it Abenomics in honour of Shinzo Abe, elected prime minister in December 2012. Japan, Mr Abe declared as he took office, was back, and he lost not a moment in proving it. Having quickly assembled his cabinet, in January he announced a ¥10.3 trillion fiscal stimulus.
This was the first of three decisive steps. Mr Abe went on to launch what amounted to a hostile takeover of a central bank unwilling to undertake bold experiments in monetary policy, clearing out the bank’s staid leadership and installing as governor Haruhiko Kuroda, a former finance-ministry official who had been serving as head of the Asian Development Bank. Mr Kuroda had long called for a more activist approach to falling prices. Lastly, Mr Abe unambiguously committed himself to the sort of thoroughgoing structural reform that has eluded Japan’s politicians for years. He signalled his seriousness by saying that he wanted Japan to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an American-led effort to liberalise trade in the region. Membership would require big changes to some of Japan’s most protected industries.
[276 words]
[Time 3]
Three arrows of desire
Co-ordinated shifts in policy on such a scale would be striking in any country. They are staggering in the context of Japan, where a famously consensual style of doing things long ago ossified into political paralysis. The gentle people of a once powerful country stared weak-eyed at a future of apparently inexorable decline, shaken by natural disasters, slumping stockmarkets, falling prices, a shrinking population, and growing irrelevance—even scorn—abroad. Mr Abe’s dramatic rata-tat-tat of policy shifts has excited and enthused them. His approval ratings, like the stockmarket, are booming.
Mr Abe refers to his monetary, fiscal and growth strategies as his “three arrows”. The reference, understood by all, is to an old legend from Yamaguchi, the southern part of Honshu and the region from which Mr Abe hails. Yamaguchi’s leaders have played a big role at key moments in Japan’s history, notably in the overthrow of the Tokugawa shogunate in the mid-19th century, when imperial rule was restored and the country was launched on a breakneck rush to secure economic and military might. The legend has it that a lord asked his three sons to snap an arrow, which each of them duly did. He then produced three more arrows and told the boys to snap all three at once. None of them could. One arrow, the father said, can easily be broken. Three arrows together, like a bundle of birch rods, cannot. It was an exhortation to work together for the good of the clan.
Thus Mr Abe’s dramatic reforms are dressed in traditional garb. And the conjunction provides a key to understanding his project. In his brief and rather clueless first sojourn in the prime minister’s office six years ago, Mr Abe presented himself as a traditionalist and nationalist, one prey to the often disturbing historical obsessions of those who have never really come to terms with the defeat of their country in 1945 and the settlement subsequently imposed on it. Today’s Mr Abe presents himself as looking forward, not back. But he is still animated by thoughts of a Japan that was. His goal is at least in part a revenant of what he holds dear and lost: a Japan comfortable in its traditional values and bolstered by military prowess and the international respect he sees as his nation’s due.
[407 words]
[Time 4]
Well begun is half not done
The first of the three arrows to make a dramatic mark was the monetary one. In early April Mr Kuroda, under orders to adopt an inflation target of 2% as a way to rid the country of its 15-year bout of deflation, announced plans whereby the goal would be achieved within two years. His measures—doubling the monetary base through an unprecedented programme of quantitative easing—exceeded everyone’s expectations, and their daring was played up by Mr Abe’s advisers. They are convinced, and have convinced their boss, that getting Japan out of its deflationary funk is less about policy details than perception—in particular, about shaking people out of a deflationary mindset. The approach, one says, is a kind of “shock and awe”.
It has, in the short term, worked awfully well, at least for investors. From peak to trough, Japan’s stockmarket fell by four-fifths after the bubble burst in 1990. Now the stockmarket is up by over 70% in just the past six months (see chart 1)—that is, since the time that an election victory for Mr Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) started to seem likely. Mr Abe’s administration has talked down the yen, which has fallen from a high of ¥77 to the dollar last autumn to ¥101.8 this week. That has helped exporters and cheered the stockmarket further. For the first time in years, Japanese savers are playing the market. Mrs Watanabe, the archetypal small-time punter, is back.
Promoters of Abenomics say that changing perceptions will create a virtuous circle. Bigger company profits will engender wage rises, which will boost consumption, which will lead to renewed business investment, which will lead to profits. They will be overjoyed by preliminary figures, released on May 16th, showing an annualised GDP growth rate of 3.5% in the first quarter of 2013, though it is hard to see how policies only then being announced can take all that much of the credit. In truth, the transmission mechanisms that link monetary policy to economic outcomes remain fragile.
[359 words]
[Time 5]
The animal spirits returning to the stockmarket have helped create a wealth effect, thanks to which people feel better off. The slick, on-message selling of the new policies by ministers and their spin doctors has built consumer confidence, too. Retailers are posting their biggest gains in sales in nearly a decade. There is a palpable buzz in the after-work bars and restaurants of Tokyo. But it is essential to Mr Abe’s plans that the monetary and fiscal stimulus should boost aggregate demand and raise prices more broadly. Nominal GDP determines the level of tax revenues—and, astonishingly, persistent deflation has left it where it was 1991 (see chart 2). This has depressed tax revenues, a chief reason why the gross national debt has widened to about 240% of GDP. Revived revenues are desperately needed.
Yet if the Bank of Japan succeeds in ending deflation, a fresh problem could arise. The bank’s purchases of long-term government bonds and other assets through its programme of quantitative easing are designed to depress their yield, and thus to spur banks, companies and institutional investors into seeking higher returns elsewhere—either by investing in the real economy or by investing abroad (helpfully driving the yen down further). But success in raising inflation expectations could lead to investors, uncertain as to how far such success may go, demanding a higher risk premium for holding government bonds. The bond market has recently become a lot more volatile.
Whatever the bond market does, a boost to aggregate demand is not enough to solve Japan’s budgetary problems. Robert Feldman of Morgan Stanley MUFG, a financial-services company, highlights the stark fiscal picture. In the budget for the year that ended in March, and across central and local governments, total government spending on pensions, health care, nursing care and family benefits was ¥124.5 trillion, or 26.1% of GDP. But government revenue amounted to only ¥59.2 trillion, or 12.5% of GDP. Borrowing largely made up the difference. Stabilising Japan’s national debt, Mr Feldman judges, requires moving from a deficit before interest payments of 8% to a surplus of 3.2%. A doubling of the consumption tax, to 10%, is planned for 2014-15. But with a shrinking workforce having to support a growing number of elderly, the necessary swing is simply too big for any plausible mix of tax hikes and spending cuts to deal with.
[402 words]
[Time 6]
All change
So Japan desperately needs a sustained increase in the long-run rate of economic growth. Hence the third of Mr Abe’s arrows: sweeping reforms designed to invigorate the supply side of the economy. Mr Abe talks of ending the protection enjoyed by Japan’s farmers, doctors and pharmaceutical companies; breaking open the labour market’s rigidities; improving education; cutting through boundless regulation; opening utilities up to competition; encouraging innovation and spurring business investment.
In pursuit of these ends Mr Abe has re-energised the bureaucracy. He has set up committees where cabinet members sit beside bureaucrats, academics and business folk to come up with plans for the reform of the regulatory system, industrial competitiveness, scientific and technological innovation, and so on. Mr Abe himself chairs the most crucial committees, notably the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy. They will present proposals in June.
stepping up again
Farming has emerged as a priority. Some sectors are highly inefficient, with sky-high tariffs on rice and dairy products, a superabundance of elderly part-time farmers, and land laws limiting the size of farm plots. Joining the TPP will force big changes on the industry. Yoshimasa Hayashi, the farm minister, wants to consolidate land into bigger plots to make it attractive for young entrepreneurs to get into farming and market gardening, which will help food processing and restaurants, too.
In medical care, the government wants drugs to be more easily sold over the internet, and approved faster. (Mr Abe’s backers have made a parable out of this: had he had access sooner to a wonderdrug for his bowel disease, they say, he would not have suffered the breakdown which led him to resign in 2007.) Energy has its own particular urgency following the nuclear accident in March 2011 at Fukushima Dai-ichi plant, leading to the closure, if only for now, of nearly all Japan’s nuclear power stations. The government wants to encourage competition in supply and investment in renewable energy as well as in a national infrastructure for imports of natural gas.
The vim with which Mr Abe has loosed this third arrow is perhaps the biggest of all the surprises he has sprung since returning to power. His staunchest supporters, including his chief cabinet secretary, Yoshihide Suga, told him that committing to the TPP beforehand would endanger the LDP’s chances in July’s elections for the Diet’s upper house. The farm lobby is, after all, an important plank of the party’s support. Yet the prime minister insisted on doing it when he went to Washington in February. Delay, he thought, would show a want of leadership.
[447 words]
To be continued in Obstacle.
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