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今天的 SPEAKER 部分主题为 Why we shouldn't trust markets with our civic life,演讲人 Michael Sandel 是哈佛大学热门网络公开课 Justice: What Is The Right Thing To Do (公平与正义)的主讲。由于这篇演讲是最近更新的,LZ 还没有在网上找到音频链接,所以现在只有自己转换的 MP3,可能要麻烦大家下载以后才能听。给大家添麻烦了,真的很抱歉,BOW
SPEED 速度部分的两篇文章都是关于 Fiscal Crisis / Debt-Ceiling 的,如果大家想先了解一下 Debt-Ceiling 具体是怎么回事,可以先参考这个页面上的介绍 http://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/the-debt-ceiling/;OBSTACLE 越障是关于上海自贸区的相关讨论。 Enjoy!
PART I: SPEAKER
Listen to a TED Talk on
Why we shouldn't trust markets with our civic life.
【REPHRASE 1】
【SPEECH - 14:37】
Source: TED
http://www.ted.com/talks/michael_sandel_why_we_shouldn_t_trust_markets_with_our_civic_life.html
PART II: SPEED
Article 2: Debt-Ceiling Standoff Threatens America’s Global Leadership
Even talk of a U.S. default is bad for the world economy and America’s standing within it
By Michael Schuman Oct. 08, 2013
【TIME 2】
There is always a lot of proud boasting in Washington about “American exceptionalism” — the idea that the U.S. was created for some higher purpose, to bring democracy and prosperity to a needy world. Perhaps in no way is the U.S. more “exceptional” than in its role in the global economy. The dollar remains the unrivaled No. 1 currency in the world and the basis for international trade. Everything from oil to corn is priced in the greenback. The U.S. economy is still the world’s largest by far, and what happens within it has an outsize impact on the rest of the world. U.S. government bonds are the bedrock of global investment, perceived in every corner of the globe as an unmatched store of wealth.
All that is being threatened by the embarrassing arm wrestling in Washington over the debt ceiling. The U.S. Treasury Department has warned that if Congress doesn’t raise the ceiling on U.S. government debt by Oct. 17, its coffers will be dangerously low, potentially leading to a default on the country’s $16.7 trillion of debt. Such a dire consequence has done little to move Republican Congressmen, who are refusing to raise the ceiling without concessions from the White House on budget cuts and other issues. “The nation’s credit is at risk because of the Administration’s refusal to sit down and have a conversation,” Republican House Speaker John Boehner said on Sunday. When asked if that meant the U.S. was headed for default, Boehner said: “That’s the path we’re on.”
Policymakers have not minced words when describing the consequences of a U.S. default. “As reckless as a government shutdown is, as many people as are being hurt by a government shutdown, an economic shutdown that results from default would be dramatically worse,” President Barack Obama said in a recent speech. “The government shutdown is bad enough, but failure to raise the debt ceiling would be far worse, and could very seriously damage not only the U.S. economy, but the entire global economy,”warned IMF managing director Christine Lagarde. The U.S. Treasury was even blunter, predicting a default would spark another global financial crisis. “A default would be unprecedented and has the potential to be catastrophic,” it said in a recent report. “The negative spillovers could reverberate around the world, and there might be a financial crisis and recession that could echo the events of 2008 or worse.”
【TIME 2 ENDS – 398 WORDS】
【TIME 3】
Just rhetoric? Not at all. In fact, these statements might be underestimating the consequences. Remember a couple of years ago the turmoil that resulted from fears that tiny Greece would default? Well, imagine the impact a default by the U.S. — an economy more than 66 times larger — would have. All of those Treasury bonds held around the world would quickly lose their value, wiping out a huge chunk of global wealth. The banks and funds that hold these bonds would take an instantaneous hit to their health, possibly destabilizing financial markets worldwide. The dollar would likely plummet in value as investors lose faith in U.S. assets. No wonder the world is getting nervous. An official in China, the world’s largest foreign holder of Treasuries (with almost $1.3 trillion of them) warned that “the clock is ticking” and pressed Washington to “ensure the safety of the Chinese investments.”
The cost to the U.S. would be greater than even this. A default would forever undermine global confidence in the ability and willingness of the U.S. to provide global economic leadership. That would hasten the decline of America’s status as the world’s “exceptional” nation. Policymakers and bankers around the world would be forced to look for other sources of economic stability. That would bolster the standing of China in global finance and commerce, and that of the dysfunctional euro. Even if Congress eventually raises the debt ceiling and avoids default, as many investors still believe, damage is being done. The mere fact that some senior politicians in Washington are willing to flirt with default over domestic political squabbles raises doubts around the world about America’s commitment to its global responsibilities and tarnishes the reputation of the U.S. as a global leader.
Back to Boehner. There is no doubt that the U.S. needs to set itself on a path to long-term fiscal strength. But blackmailing the White House with international economic conflagration and the deterioration of American global power is not the way to get it. In a speech, Boehner once asked, “If America won’t lead the way, who will?” If he truly believes in American exceptionalism — like he says he does — then he and his colleagues have to start acting like it.
【TIME 3 ENDS – 369 WORDS】
Source: TIME
http://business.time.com/2013/10/08/debt-ceiling-standoff-threatens-americas-global-leadership/#ixzz2hFpIyW80
Article 3: When Wealth Disappears
By STEPHEN D. KING
Published: October 6, 2013
【TIME 4】
AS bad as things in Washington are — the federal government shutdown since Tuesday, the slim but real potential for a debt default, a political system that seems increasingly ungovernable — they are going to get much worse, for the United States and other advanced economies, in the years ahead.
From the end of World War II to the brief interlude of prosperity after the cold war, politicians could console themselves with the thought that rapid economic growth would eventually rescue them from short-term fiscal transgressions. The miracle of rising living standards encouraged rich countries increasingly to live beyond their means, happy in the belief that healthy returns on their real estate and investment portfolios would let them pay off debts, educate their children and pay for their medical care and retirement. This was, it seemed, the postwar generations’ collective destiny.
But the numbers no longer add up. Even before the Great Recession, rich countries were seeing their tax revenues weaken, social expenditures rise, government debts accumulate and creditors fret thanks to lower economic growth rates.
We are reaching end times for Western affluence. Between 2000 and 2007, ahead of the Great Recession, the United States economy grew at a meager average of about 2.4 percent a year — a full percentage point below the 3.4 percent average of the 1980s and 1990s. From 2007 to 2012, annual growth amounted to just 0.8 percent. In Europe, as is well known, the situation is even worse. Both sides of the North Atlantic have already succumbed to a Japan-style “lost decade.”
Surely this is only an extended cyclical dip, some policy makers say. Champions of stimulus assert that another huge round of public spending or monetary easing — maybe even a commitment to higher inflation and government borrowing — will jump-start the engine. Proponents of austerity argue that only indiscriminate deficit reduction, accompanied by reforming entitlement programs and slashing regulations, will unleash the “animal spirits” necessary for a private-sector renaissance.
【TIME 4 ENDS – 323 WORDS】
【TIME 5】
Both sides are wrong. It’s now abundantly clear that forecasters have been too optimistic, boldly projecting rates of growth that have failed to transpire.
The White House and Congress, unable to reach agreement in the face of a fiscal black hole, have turned over the economic repair job to the Federal Reserve, which has bought trillions of dollars in securities to keep interest rates low. That has propped up the stock market but left many working Americans no better off. Growth remains lackluster.
The end of the golden age cannot be explained by some technological reversal. From iPad apps to shale gas, technology continues to advance. The underlying reason for the stagnation is that a half-century of remarkable one-off developments in the industrialized world will not be repeated.
First was the unleashing of global trade, after a period of protectionism and isolationism between the world wars, enabling manufacturing to take off across Western Europe, North America and East Asia. A boom that great is unlikely to be repeated in advanced economies.
Second, financial innovations that first appeared in the 1920s, notably consumer credit, spread in the postwar decades. Post-crisis, the pace of such borrowing is muted, and likely to stay that way.
Third, social safety nets became widespread, reducing the need for households to save for unforeseen emergencies. Those nets are fraying now, meaning that consumers will have to save more for ever longer periods of retirement.
Fourth, reduced discrimination flooded the labor market with the pent-up human capital of women. Women now make up a majority of the American labor force; that proportion can rise only a little bit more, if at all.
Finally, the quality of education improved: in 1950, only 15 percent of American men and 4 percent of American women between ages 20 and 24 were enrolled in college. The proportions for both sexes are now over 30 percent, but with graduates no longer guaranteed substantial wage increases, the costs of education may come to outweigh the benefits.
These five factors induced, if not complacency, an assumption that economies could expand forever.
【TIME 5 ENDS – 346 WORDS】
【TIME 6】
Adam Smith discerned this back in 1776 in his “Wealth of Nations”: “It is in the progressive state, while the society is advancing to the further acquisition, rather than when it has acquired its full complement of riches, that the condition of the labouring poor, of the great body of the people, seems to be the happiest and the most comfortable. It is hard in the stationary, and miserable in the declining state.”
The decades before the French Revolution saw an extraordinary increase in living standards (alongside a huge increase in government debt). But in the late 1780s, bad weather led to failed harvests and much higher food prices. Rising expectations could no longer be met. We all know what happened next.
When the money runs out, a rising state, which Smith described as “cheerful,” gives way to a declining, “melancholy” one: promises can no longer be met, mistrust spreads and markets malfunction. Today, that’s particularly true for societies where income inequality is high and where the current generation has, in effect, borrowed from future ones.
In the face of stagnation, reform is essential. The euro zone is unlikely to survive without the creation of a legitimate fiscal and banking union to match the growing political union. But even if that happens, Southern Europe’s sky-high debts will be largely indigestible. Will Angela Merkel’s Germany accept a one-off debt restructuring that would impose losses on Northern European creditors and taxpayers but preserve the euro zone? The alternatives — disorderly defaults, higher inflation, a breakup of the common currency, the dismantling of the postwar political project — seem worse.
In the United States, which ostensibly has the right institutions (if not the political will) to deal with its economic problems, a potentially explosive fiscal situation could be resolved through scurrilous means, but only by threatening global financial and economic instability. Interest rates can be held lower than the inflation rate, as the Fed has done. Or the government could devalue the dollar, thereby hitting Asian and Arab creditors. Such “default by stealth,” however, might threaten a crisis of confidence in the dollar, wiping away the purchasing-power benefits Americans get from the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency.
【TIME 6 ENDS – 364 WORDS】
【TIME 7】
Not knowing who, ultimately, will lose as a consequence of our past excesses helps explain America’s current strife. This is not an argument for immediate and painful austerity, which isn’t working in Europe. It is, instead, a plea for economic honesty, to recognize that promises made during good times can no longer be easily kept.
That means a higher retirement age, more immigration to increase the working-age population, less borrowing from abroad, less reliance on monetary policy that creates unsustainable financial bubbles, a new social compact that doesn’t cannibalize the young to feed the boomers, a tougher stance toward banks, a further opening of world trade and, over the medium term, a commitment to sustained deficit reduction.
In his “Future of an Illusion,” Sigmund Freud argued that the faithful clung to God’s existence in the absence of evidence because the alternative — an empty void — was so much worse. Modern beliefs about economic prospects are not so different. Policy makers simply pray for a strong recovery. They opt for the illusion because the reality is too bleak to bear. But as the current fiscal crisis demonstrates, facing the pain will not be easy. And the waking up from our collective illusions has barely begun.
【TIME 7 ENDS – 203 WORDS】
Source: New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/opinion/when-wealth-disappears.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss
PART III: OBSTACLE
Article 4: The next Shenzhen?
A new enterprise zone could spark wider market reforms—but only if bureaucrats ease their grip
Oct 5th 2013 | SHANGHAI |From the print edition
【PARAPHRASE 8】
FOR weeks, businessmen have speculated wildly about the Shanghai Free Trade Zone (SFTZ). This showpiece policy is meant to kickstart a broader reform agenda, due to be presented after a big party meeting in November. Despite its name, it is more of a special enterprise zone on the outskirts of China’s commercial capital (see map). The prime minister, Li Keqiang, has personally championed the pilot.
At last, on September 29th, the zone was launched. Leaders called it a landmark moment, similar to the creation of the Shenzhen special economic zone near Hong Kong more than three decades ago that ushered in reforms and spectacular growth. At a press conference, officials used the word “innovation” 43 times.
Despite the gush, the launch was a let-down. Hardly any senior government figures turned up. The scheme will not include several hoped-for reforms: access to the uncensored internet, cuts in corporate tax and permission for foreign auctioneers to sell antiquities. More troubling is that few details were given at all. “Show me the beef!” exclaims Joerg Wuttke, a former head of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in Beijing. He had been enthusiastic, but he now fears officials have grown timid.
Such concerns were hardly allayed when the authorities released a “negative list” of sectors in which foreigners cannot invest in the zone. In theory, a short list—banning guns, drugs and pornography perhaps—would be investor-friendly. In fact, the SFTZ’s negative list contains over 1,000 banned areas. Local officials insist it will be pared down, but one foreign lawyer grumbles that Chinese officials are simply “addicted to control.” Given these uncertainties, it is reasonable to ask whether the ballyhooed SFTZ can really become the next Shenzhen. The surprising answer from many experts is a cautious maybe.
Be patient, grasshopper
“Do not be fooled by the early caution,” says Chen Bo of the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, who has advised the government on the SFTZ. “We remain very ambitious.” Mr Chen believes internal and external factors are forcing a change in China’s economic model.
At home, soaring wages and an ageing workforce are pushing China towards the “middle-income trap”. Abroad, rivals are rushing into regional free-trade deals, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, that will pry economies open. “China is feeling pressure to up its competitive game,” says Kenneth Jarrett, head of the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai.
To keep up, argue many analysts, China must liberalise. As manufacturing is already competitive, that means opening up the inefficient, cosseted services sector—especially finance. This is where the SFTZ comes in. Services have risen from just half of Shanghai’s GDP in 2003 to 62% this year (in Hong Kong, they make up 90%).
By letting experienced local officials experiment with deeper reforms in services inside a tightly sealed zone, cautious types hope risks—for example, arising from yuan convertibility—can be contained. Louis Kuijs of RBS, an investment bank, argues that, when it comes to controlling hot money, the pilot works “only if there is a very tight border between the zone and the rest of China”. On this view, only those reforms that work well in the zone will be rolled out, carefully and slowly, elsewhere.
Nonsense, say those hoping for leakage. They argue that the whole point of the zone is to spark broader liberalisation that has been stalled for a decade. May Yan of Barclays investment bank says that, if liberalisation inside the zone is not allowed to affect the rest of the economy, “the SFTZ will be merely like Qianhai [a special zone near Hong Kong], where there is not much happening”. Such critics want to see reforms move quickly from the SFTZ to other zones and the rest of China.
Many observers, however, seem willing to give the pilot zone time to blossom. Perhaps this is because they think the zone is irreversibly linked to plans for national economic liberalisation. After all, though widely known as the SFTZ, the zone’s legal name is the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone. Some liken Mr Li’s support for the SFTZ to his predecessors’ push for entry into the WTO in 2001, a symbol of modernisation that galvanised political support for economic reform.
And despite the lack of details, the SFTZ guidelines promise to liberalise some important sectors. Officials have outlined six areas where industries will be opened during the next three years (see table).
It’s right, directionally speaking
Some three dozen firms have been given permission to enter. That is meant to be an early show of confidence (though sceptics ask how they applied, since the rules have not been made public). Most are domestic ones, but Citibank, an American banking giant, is among them. Andrew Au, its China boss, accepts his firm has “no information” about how the zone will regulate banks, but says it is going in because “directionally it is the right place for the country to go”. He notes that the Shenzhen reforms also did not offer many details at the start.
Citibank plans to open a sub-branch in the zone to handle trade financing and cash management for clients (“Our telephones are ringing off their hooks,” claims Mr Au). But he thinks even bigger opportunities will come when yuan convertibility and interest-rate liberalisation—the two biggest reforms promised—come in.
Simon Pearson, a China-based business analyst, believes another opportunity lies in simplifying and speeding up imports. It now takes up to a month for goods to clear customs, so retailers hold plenty of “safety stocks”. As it is costly to re-export, that stock is then stuck. If the SFTZ cuts red tape, he thinks not only that firms could save money through lower stocks but also that Shanghai might compete with Hong Kong and Singapore to be a regional fulfilment hub for Asian retail markets.
The biggest advance the SFTZ could bring, argues Mr Jarrett, is “predictability of regulation”. He observes that the implementation of rules in China varies across time and geography, creating tremendous uncertainty. Echoing other observers, he hopes that the management committee now being put together for the SFTZ will help co-ordinate the actions of regulatory bodies so that the new pilot is administered in a transparent and predictable fashion. Doing this means squabbling bureaucrats and regulators ending their addiction to control. China’s next stage of development may depend on it.
【OBSTACLE ENDS – 1059 WORDS】
Source: The Economics
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21587237-new-enterprise-zone-could-spark-wider-market-reformsbut-only-if-bureaucrats-ease-their-grip
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