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Hi~ 各位队友们，周日文史哲来了~
今天终于把之前拖了2周的哲学主题推出来了，the philosophy of right，主要围绕的是黑格尔---德国古典唯心主义集大成者---的相关理论。
速度有两篇文章，time1来自wikipedia关于黑格尔的"Elements of the Philosophy of Right"的介绍（也是我认为这次作业最好理解的部分了...）； time2-time5来自黑格尔的原著"Philosophy of Right"中introduction的部分内容，原著中1 ,2,3...16各个要点黑格尔还附注了note与addition，不过考虑到篇幅，我只节选了每个要点，感兴趣的童鞋可以再看看之后的详细解释哈~(原著我放在附件里了哈~)
最后，越障是来自一篇对黑格尔Philosophy of Right的评论。
这次的作业难度相对前几次会难很多，希望大家能理解，哲学毕竟是哲学...
废话少说，上作业！
割割割....
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Article 1(Check the title later)
Introduction of Elements of the Philosophy of Right
[TIME1]
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Elements of the Philosophy of Right (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts) was published in 1820, though the book's original title page dates it to 1821. This work is Hegel's most mature statement of his legal, moral, social and political philosophy and is an expansion upon concepts only briefly dealt with in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, published in 1817 (and again in 1827 and 1830). Law provides for Hegel the cornerstone of the modern state. As such, he criticized Karl Ludwig von Haller's The Restoration of the Science of the State, in which the latter claimed that law was superficial, because natural law and the "right of the most powerful" was sufficient (§258). The absence of law characterized for Hegel despotism, whether monarchist or ochlocracist (§278).
The Philosophy of Right (as it is usually called) begins with a discussion of the concept of the free will and argues that the free will can only realize itself in the complicated social context of property rights and relations, contracts, moral commitments, family life, the economy, the legal system, and the polity. A person is not truly free, in other words, unless he is a participant in all of these different aspects of the life of the state.
The bulk of the book is devoted to discussing Hegel's three spheres of versions of 'right,' each one larger than the preceding ones and encompassing them. The first 'sphere' is abstract right, in which Hegel discusses the idea of 'non-interference' as a way of respecting others. He deems this insufficient and moves onto the second sphere, morality. Under this, Hegel proposes that humans reflect their own subjectivity of others in order to respect them. The third sphere, ethical life, is Hegel's integration of individual subjective feelings and universal notions of right. Under ethical life, Hegel then launches into a lengthy discussion about family, civil society, and the state.
Hegel also argues that the state itself is subsumed under the higher totality of world history, in which individual states arise, conflict with each other, and eventually fall. The course of history is apparently toward the ever-increasing actualization of freedom; each successive historical epoch corrects certain failures of the earlier ones. At the end of his Lectures on the Philosophy of History, Hegel leaves open the possibility that history has yet to accomplish certain tasks related to the inner organization of the state.
[Words: 401]
Source: Wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elements_of_the_Philosophy_of_Right
Article 2(Check the title later)
Philosophy of Right
G. W. F. Hegel
Introduction. [TIME2]
1. The philosophic science of right has as its object the idea of right, i.e., the conception of right and the realization of the conception.
2. The science of right is a part of philosophy. Hence it must develop the idea, which is the reason of an object, out of the conception. It is the same thing to say that it must regard the peculiar internal development of the thing itself. Since it is a part it has a definite beginning, which is the result and truth of what goes before, and this, that goes before, constitutes its so- called proof. Hence the origin of the conception of right falls outside of the science of right. The deduction of the conception is presupposed in this treatise, and is to be considered as already given.
3. Right is positive in general (a) in its form, since it has validity in a state; and this established authority is the principle for the knowledge of right. Hence we have the positive science of right. (b) On the side of content this right receives a positive element (a) through the particular character of a nation, the stage of its historical development, and the interconnection of all the relations which are necessitated by nature: (b)through the necessity that a system of legalized right must contain the application of the universal conception to objects and cases whose qualities are given externally. Such an application is not the speculative thought or the development of the conception, but a subsumption made by the understanding: (g) through the ultimate nature of a decision which has become a reality.
4. The territory of right is in general the spiritual, and its more definite place and origin is the will, which is free. Thus freedom constitutes the substance and essential character of the will, and the system of right is the kingdom of actualized freedom. It is the world of spirit which is produced out of itself, and is a second nature.
[317]
[TIME3]
5. The will contains (a) the element of pure indeterminateness, i.e., the pure doubling of the I back in thought upon itself. In this process every limit or content, present though it be directly by way of nature, a sin want, appetite or impulse, or given in any specific way, is dissolved. Thus we have the limitless infinitude of absolute abstraction, or universality, the pure thought of itself.
6. (b) The I is also the transition from blank indefiniteness to the distinct and definite establishment of a definite content and object, whether this content be given by nature or produced out of the conception of spirit. Through this establishment of itself as a definite thing the I becomes a reality. This is the absolute element of the finitude or specialization of the I.
7. (g) The will is the unity of these two elements. It is particularity turned back within itself and thus led back to universality; it is individuality; it is the self-direction of the I. Thus at one and the same time it establishes itself as its own negation, that is to say, as definite and limited, and it also abides by itself, in its self-identity and universality, and in this position remains purely self-enclosed.— The I determines itself in so far as it is the reference of negativity to itself; and yet in this self reference it is indifferent to its own definite character. This it knows a sits own, that is, as an ideal or a mere possibility, by which it is not bound, but rather exists in it merely because it establishes itself there.—This is the freedom of the will, constituting its conception or substantive reality. It is its gravity, as it were, just as gravity is the substantive reality of a body.
8. If we define this particularizing (b §6) further, we reach a distinction in the forms of the will, (a) In so far as the definite character of the will consists in the formal opposition of the subjective to the objective or external direct existence, we have the formal will as a self consciousness; which finds an outer world before it. The process by which individuality turns back in its definiteness into itself, is the translation of the subjective end, through the intervention of an activity and a means, into objectivity. In the absolute spirit, in which all definite character is thoroughly its own and true (“Encyclop.” §363), consciousness is only one side, namely, the manifestation or appearance of the will, a phase which does not require detailed consideration here.
[410]
[TIME4]
9 (b). In so far as the definite phases of will are its own peculiar property or its particularization turned back into itself, they are content. This content, as content of the will, is for it, by virtue of the form given in (a), an end, which exists on its inner or subjective side as the imaginative will, but by the operation of the activity, which converts the subjective into the objective, it is realized, completed end.
10. The content or determinate phase of will is in the first instance direct or immediate. Then the will is free only in itself or for us, i.e., it is the will in its conception. Only when it has itself as an object is it also for itself, and its implicit freedom becomes realized.
11. The will, which is at first only implicitly free, is the direct or natural will. The distinctive phases, which the self-determining conception sets up in the will, appear in the direct will, as a directly present content. They are impulses, appetites, inclinations, by which the will finds itself determined by nature. Now this content, with all its attendant phases, proceeds from the rationality of the will, and is therefore implicitly rational; but let loose in its immediate directness it has not as yet the form of rationality. The content is indeed for me and my own, but the form and the content are yet different. The will is thus in itself finite.
12. The system of this content, as it occurs directly in the will, exists only as a multitude or multiplicity of impulses, every one of which is mine in a general way along with others, but is at the same time universal and undetermined, having many objects and ways of satisfaction. The will, by giving itself in this two-fold indefiniteness the form of individuality (§7), resolves, and only as resolving is it actual.
[304]
[TIME5]
13. By resolution will fixes itself as the will of a definite individual, and as thereby distinguishing itself” from another. However apart from this finite character which it has as consciousness (§8), the immediate will is in virtue of the distinction between its form and its content formal. Hence its resolution as such is abstract, and its content is not yet the content and work of its freedom.
14. The finite will, which has merely from the standpoint of form doubled itself back upon itself, and has become the infinite and self-secluded I (§5), stands above its content of different impulses and also above the several ways by which they are realized and satisfied. At the same time, as it is only formally infinite, it is confined to this very content as the decisive feature of its nature and external actuality, although it is undetermined and not confined to one content rather than another(§§6, 11). As to the return of the I into itself such a will is only a possible will, which may or may not be mine, and the I is only the possibility of deputing itself to this or that object. Hence amongst these definite phases, which in this light are for the I external, the will chooses.
15. Freedom of the will is in this view of it caprice, in which are contained both a reflection, which is free and abstracted from everything, and a dependence upon a content or matter either internally or externally provided. Since the content is in itself or implicitly necessary as an end, and in opposition to this reflection is a definite possibility, caprice, when it is will, is in its nature contingent.
16. What is resolved upon and chosen (§14) the will may again give up (§5). Yet, even with the possibility of transcending any other content which it may substitute, and of proceeding in this way ad infinitum, the will does not advance beyond finitude, because every content in turn is different from the form and is finite. The opposite aspect, namely indeterminateness, irresolution or abstraction, is also one-sided.
[327]
Part 2 Obstacle
Article 3(Check the title later)
Hegel’s Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading of the Philosophy of Right
INTRODUCTION
[TIME6]
I. The reception of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right
It is perhaps ironic that the Anglo-American reception of G. W. F. Hegel’s the Philosophy of Right first published in 1821 has developed along its own dialectical path. In essence, Hegel’s dialectic unfolds in the following way: we begin with an initial standpoint, we then next move towards a consideration of its opposite standpoint, and then we arrive at a middle position between these initial two extremes. The ensuing reception of the Philosophy of Right curiously follows a similar tale of moving from one position to its opposite, only to settle at a middle position between the two earlier extremes .The first great debate on the Philosophy of Right was over its political sympathies. From its first appearance, it had been charged with endorsing a dangerous conservatism bordering on totalitarianism and fascism. For example, Karl Popper described Hegel as ‘the father of modern historicism and totalitarianism’. Hegel’s defenders later argued not only that these charges were untrue; but that, in fact, Hegel’s views are consistent with liberalism.4The debate on whether Hegel’s political philosophy is either conservative or liberal is now over. Today, the overwhelming majority of commentators accept that Hegel’s views are best viewed as politically moderate, in between the extremes of conservatism and liberalism.5Thus, the history of the first debate is a movement from one standpoint to its opposite, only to settle at a middle position between the two earlier extremes.
The second great debate on the Philosophy of Right is over its relationship to metaphysics. Commentators have divided themselves into opposing camps: the ‘metaphysical’ approach to the study of Hegel’s work and the ‘non-metaphysical’ approach to Hegel’s work. We might easily be misled from the start into thinking this debate centers on whether there is (or is not)metaphysics to be found in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. In fact, this is virtually nowhere in doubt. All commentators on both sides accept the Philosophy of Right contains a metaphysical account. Instead, the debate has developed into an argument over how strongly metaphysical (and, in particular, how Platonist) Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is, in fact. Of course, ‘metaphysics’ may represent many different things. In the most basic of terms, metaphysical existence is something that exists, but not in a physical form. Thus, items such as ‘human rights’ are metaphysical entities. The right to life may be said to be ‘real’ and substantiated into laws. However, rights are not physical objects like books containing statutes or a pet cat at one’s feet. It is quite clear that a metaphysics of this variety is at play in the Philosophy of Right. From its opening pages, Hegel tells us that the text is primarily concerned with ‘the concept of right and its actualization’ (PR, §1). Hegel presents us with a metaphysical picture of right insofar as his argument is not merely that ‘right’ exists, but that we can understand its existence in different degrees of existing. Thus, we can speak of some forms of right being more real than others. This view of right links with a wider account of freedom: we can speak of freedom having more or less existence just as we can right (see PR, §1A). We will examine this picture far more closely in chapter one. However, it is helpful to note from the start that Hegel’s views are metaphysical at least in this most basic sense.
The difference then between metaphysical and non-metaphysical readings is as follows. Metaphysical readings of Hegel’s work tend to highlight both Hegel’s insistence that some states can be considered more ‘true’ or ‘actual’ than others, as well as the priority and special place of religion in Hegel’s account.11 Non-metaphysical readings of Hegel’s work argue that we can understand Hegel’s views on ‘actuality’ and ‘actualization’ as less strong metaphysical conceptions (often described as an ‘ontology’ and not a ‘metaphysics’) and focus on one single work by Hegel—such as the Philosophy of Right—to the exclusion of Hegel’s additional writings.
This second debate has moved from one position (i.e., the metaphysical reading) to its‘opposite’ (i.e., the non-metaphysical reading). The argument of this book is that this debate can be transformed in settling on a middle position between the two: a perspective that can bring out the best in both approaches. This position is the ‘systematic’ reading of Hegel’s work. In this book, I will be offering a systematic reading of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.
II. The systematic reading of Hegel’s work
The fact that non-metaphysical approaches tend to centre on a particular work—such as the Philosophy of Right—to the exclusion of Hegel’s others writings casts light on where the true difference lies between the non-metaphysical and metaphysical approaches. Namely, the debate between the non-metaphysical and metaphysical approaches is not that only the metaphysical approach accepts some degree of metaphysics in Hegel’s work. Both approaches accept this fact. It is then not a question of if Hegel’s work is metaphysical, but how metaphysical his work is, in fact. It is not a question of whether or not metaphysics can be found, but how much there is to be found. Thus, at the heart of this debate is not metaphysics, but a distinctive vantage point to the reading of Hegel’s work. The nonmetaphysical reading is, therefore, not a reading that denies metaphysics; but, rather, it is a reading that denies an explanatory role for Hegel’s system. Therefore, the non-metaphysical approach is best understood as a non-systematic reading of Hegel’s work. A non-systematic reading of Hegel’s work views a given piece of Hegel’s writing apart from Hegel’s larger philosophical system. Systematic readings of Hegel’s corpus view Hegel’s writings within the context of his larger system.
In order to clarify this crucial point, it is important to note some general features of Hegel’s system and its alleged relationship with his Philosophy of Right. Hegel’s system is presented in full within his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline. The Encyclopaedia is composed in three parts: Logic, Philosophy of Nature, and Philosophy of Spirit. Hegel clearly states that his Philosophy of Right is an elaboration of ‘Objective Spirit[des objective Geist]’ within the last part of the system, the Philosophy of Spirit.14 Thus, the Philosophy of Right is a part of his system of philosophy and meant to be understood as such. For example, Hegel says that the Philosophy of Right:
is a more extensive, and in particular a more systematic, exposition of the same basic concepts which, in relation to this part of philosophy, are already contained in a previous work designed to accompany my lectures, namely my Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (PR, p. 9).
As a part of the larger system of philosophy, Hegel is also quite clear that the Philosophy of Right should be understood within the context of the larger system and, in particular, its foundation in his conception of logic. He says: ‘it will readily be noticed that the work as a whole, like the development [Ausbildung] of its parts, is based on the logical spirit. It is also chiefly from this point of view that I would wish this treatise to be understood and judged’(PR, p. 10 (translation modified)). Nor is this view surprising. In the preface to his system, Hegel first announces that ‘my view ... can only be justified by the exposition of the system itself’ (PS, pp. 9-10). Any part of the system is meant to be understood within the context of the larger system. This is as true for the Philosophy of Right as it is for all other parts of Hegel’s system.
[words: 1266]
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发表于 2013-8-18 22:08:33
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