ChaseDream
搜索
12345下一页
返回列表 发新帖
查看: 6667|回复: 47
打印 上一主题 下一主题

[阅读小分队] 【每日阅读训练第四期——速度越障20系列】【20-17】经管

[复制链接]
跳转到指定楼层
楼主
发表于 2013-6-20 22:22:20 | 只看该作者 回帖奖励 |倒序浏览 |阅读模式
大家好呀~~周四经管时间~~
在猴哥“声情并茂”的“阅读小分队纲领性文章”之后发帖,LZ赶脚压力好大!TT。不过今天的作业还是传统型的咯~
速度部分的文章都来自Bloomberg的Opinion,TIME 1和TIME 2分别来自一篇文章(不过文章本身很长,LZ只是选取了其中一部分…LZ实在是太贪心,哪篇文章都喜欢 放不下,就索性都帖上来了…TT),TIME 3/4/5 来自一篇文章。越障是TIME上一篇关于中国(specifically户口)的评论。
今天的文章都是评论性的,所以呢,我们学习他们的论证,但也要批判着读~~就是这样啦!(其中Article 2原文后面 关于市场机制到底如何有几十条讨论,很有意思,大家感兴趣可以通过一些方法去看看~)

翠花,上作业!


【PART I: SPEED】
Article 1: Who Created the IPhone, Apple or the Government?
By Mark Buchanan Jun 20, 2013
[INTRODUCTION]
Albert Einstein famously held the view that “imagination is more important than knowledge.” What we think we know can limit what we see as possible. The greatest thinkers challenge what everyone believes to be obvious. They allow us to see the world anew.
We may be primed for another lesson, this time in economics. It has been “obvious” to most people over the past 30 years that the creative dynamism of the free market, the energy of private individuals pursuing their own dreams, is the best driver of economic innovation. The global economy carries the indelible imprint of the brilliant visionaries who created companies such as Microsoft Corp., Apple Inc. and Google Inc. Innovation is a private affair, best left free of the typically sluggish and wasteful interference of government.
What seems so obvious might also be completely wrong. This is the point that economist Mariana Mazzucato makes in her recent book, “The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Private vs. Public Sector Myths.”
Think of the Internet, biotechnology, electronics, photonics, materials science and nanotechnology -- all the crucial technologies of our age. Go back further to oil, rail, the airlines and nuclear energy. None of these would be as developed as they are, and some would hardly exist, without the founding vision and directed action of government agencies.
[216 WORDS]

【TIME 1】
Long-Term Vision
Consider the Internet and the World Wide Web, energized by competition among behemoths such as Google and Facebook Inc. and countless garage-style startups such as Clarity and Avaaz. This frontier of market freedom was brought into existence by government pursuing a long-term vision that no company would have attempted. People at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency had the imagination to support a consortium of universities and research firms to build a network of computers able to exchange information, and undertook the sustained effort required to make it happen.
What about Google? The genius and inspiration of the company’s founders, Sergey Brin andLarry Page, played a big role in making it happen. So did funding from the U.S. National Science Foundation, which let the two computer scientists develop the algorithm that so transformed Web search and propelled the company ahead. Forward-thinking leaders at the foundation offered funding in precisely this area because they thought it would pave the way to a world of new technologies.
Even Apple, normally viewed as the singular creation of the lone genius of Steve Jobs, owes much to government. Mazzucato points out that Apple received crucial finance in its early years from the U.S. government’s small-business investment program. Every one of the most important technologies in Apple’s smart products, including the iPhone and iPad, were developed elsewhere and largely thanks to state funding.
The picture is similar throughout the economy. Of the roughly 100 most important innovations from 1971 to 2006, as identified by R&D Magazine, almost 90 percent depended heavily on federal research support, according to Mazzucato. And whatever big pharmaceutical companies might say about the risks they take and amounts they spend to develop new drugs, most of the really innovative discoveries the past few decades have come from publicly funded laboratories.
The point isn’t that Jobs wasn’t a genius, or that the energy and creativity of the private sector aren’t necessary. It’s that governments have had a huge and widely unappreciated influence on our economic well-being. They can often achieve things the private sector cannot, creating new technologies and entirely new markets.
It’s a point that John Maynard Keynes made long ago: “The important thing for Government,” he observed, “is not to do things which individuals are doing already, and to do them a little better or a little worse; but to do those things which at present are not done at all.”
【TIME 1 ENDS – 401 WORDS】

[THE REST]
White Elephants
Governments do have flaws. They are prone to pursue white-elephant projects and to suffer from stifling bureaucracy. These are problems to battle against, while benefiting from the best things government can do.
Mazzucato warns that the perception of government impotence in innovation can be self-fulfilling. Uncertainty in policy is a recipe for failure. Government is most effective when it acts with confidence, as evidenced in places such as China and Brazil, which have successfully developed technologies for the anticipated “green revolution” with the help of state aid.
As long as we remain under the spell of myths and don’t recognize the potential for visionary government action to help lead society forward -- as it has in the past -- we are likely to suffer. Viewed correctly, government should be an invaluable partner of the private sector, one that is willing and able to take the crucial risks that business won’t.
[150 WORDS]
Source: Bloomberg
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-19/who-created-the-iphone-apple-or-the-government-.html


Article 2: What to Do When the Invisible Hand Stops Working
By Mark Buchanan Jun 6, 2013
[INTRODUCTION]
Economists rave about the power of the market to deploy productive resources better than any central planner possibly could. A mysterious process, which Adam Smith called the “invisible hand,” guides countless individuals with conflicting aims to somehow coordinate into a remarkably effective economic organization. Usually.
But as the British economist John Maynard Keynes famously argued, markets can also fall into dysfunction. A crisis can set off a downward spiral: Spending declines, companies fail, people lose jobs, spending declines further. Much of the wonderful coordination disappears, as if the invisible hand were injured.
None of this is controversial. But if you ask how best to cure an afflicted economy, you get vicious and sometimes hysterical argument, typically polarized along political lines. Should markets be left alone, because the invisible hand is self-healing and intervention can only make matters worse? Or does an economy, like a real living thing, sometimes need direct medical (or governmental) intervention?
Resolving the debate is difficult, largely because we know surprisingly little about how the invisible hand actually achieves such precise economic coordination. Even more surprising, few economists over the past 30 years have been focusing on this area of ignorance.
[194 WORDS]

【TIME 2】
Perfect Rationality
If that sounds hard to believe, consider the “state-of-the-art” mathematical models currently used by economists. They ditch all the complexity of the real economy in favor of a peculiar scheme in which one ideal household and one ideal firm meet and optimize their behavior with perfect rationality. Adam Smith would be mystified -- I think even horrified. Such “rational expectations” models can be tweaked to back up just about any story you like, so it is little wonder that the vicious arguments over policy persist.
Happily, there is hope. A few economists have been trying to go deeper by exploring the actual coordinating mechanisms of the invisible hand, how they emerge and also how they can break down.
One notable example is a line of research initiated about a decade ago by Robert Clower and Peter Howitt. They noted that useful economic coordination comes about over time as people interact, discovering where to find the goods they like as well as the companies they trust and find useful. Businesses get started after people learn about one another’s needs and wants. In other words, there’s a necessary and usually messy growth history behind the familiar structures -- firms, shops, and other intermediaries -- that provide the coordination for a functioning economy.
To get a sense of how the process works, Clower and Howitt set up a computer simulation. They let lots of virtual people interact with one another, following fairly simple rules to trade among themselves while seeking their desired goods. People finding many potential trading partners for certain goods could choose to set up a specialist firm trading that good, profiting while also making it easier for others to find that good. Over time, a vast web of useful firms covering all goods emerged, without any central planning, to solve the coordination problem of getting goods to the people who wanted them. Something else happened, too: One of the goods in the economy came to be valued universally by all as a convenient medium of exchange. The market discovered money all on its own.
Unlike traditional economic models, Clower and Howitt’s way of looking at an economy respects Adam Smith’s core heroic insight: that coordination emerges in a wholly natural way, from the interactions of ordinary people (For more on this fascinating research, see my blog). It can also offer insight into practical policy matters, including those that so interested Keynes.
【TIME 2 ENDS – 401 WORDS】

[THE REST]
Valuable Infrastructure
In recent work with Quamrul Ashraf and Boris Gershman, for example, Howitt finds an important effect of financial crises that rational-expectations models miss: the hard-to-reverse failure of firms. The disappearance of firms destroys valuable coordinating infrastructure, making economic life more challenging for others. As other firms lose key sources of income, supplies and customers, they might also go bankrupt, furthering the destruction.
Afterward, the recovery of an economy won’t be only a matter of restoring confidence, letting prices and wages adjust, or keeping interest rates low. Recovery requires the time-consuming rebirth of entire networks of firms. Although the research doesn’t model that process explicitly, it’s pretty clear that government action could easily help, by providing individuals with unemployment benefits until they find a new job, or by intervening to keep crucial firms alive (remember the U.S. automaker bailouts of 2009).
The work of Howitt and colleagues is only a beginning, but a huge step in the right direction. The unfortunate reality is that most economic theory today still rests on analyses of extremely intelligent people acting in unrealistic situations. We need to explore the way people of ordinary intelligence manage in the face of an incredibly complex world. Until we can really understand the coordination mechanisms that help us do it, policy making will remain a dark art.
[218 WORDS]
Source: Bloomberg
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-05/what-to-do-when-the-invisible-hand-stops-working.html



Article 3: Who Killed Equality?
By Ezra Klein Jun 20, 2013
[INTRODUCTION]
There are two main schools of thought on income inequality: The fatalists, who contend that rising inequality is the ineluctable result of a changing economy, and the redistributionists, who blame a skewed tax system and lethargic government. Perhaps it’s time to consider a third.
The fatalist case rests on technology: As we replace human toil with networked computers and tireless robots, those who own the technology or learn to master it benefit, and those whose jobs are displaced by technology suffer. The ease with which we outsource jobs, ship goods and videoconference to China helps people who own companies but hurts those whose jobs are shipped out. The winner-take-all economy is a boon to people who can market themselves or their product globally and a bust for those who can’t.
Of course, this creates a less equal world, the fatalists say. A private equity manager can goose profits at one company by outsourcing the call center and at another by automating production. The new economy is perfectly organized to make this manager richer. Meanwhile, the 52-year-old machinist who was fired isn’t trained in the latest technology, can’t compete with the low wages of a Malaysian 19-year-old and is stuck on the outskirts of Reno, Nevada, with an upside-down mortgage. Everything in the new economy is working to make him poorer. Inequality is simply the space between those two lives.
Precisely as this analysis would predict, income inequality has skyrocketed since 1979. Median income for high-school educated men has fallen by 31 percent. Meanwhile, the top 1 percent has seen its pay rocket up 130 percent. And that’s before taxes even enter the picture.
[273 WORDS]

【TIME 3】
One Conclusion
Fatalists conclude that government hasn’t caused inequality -- taxes and social services haven’t changed all that much -- so government action raising taxes or increasing infrastructure spending, for example, won’t fix it either. The only possible remedy is more education and training for workers, which will take decades. Shame, isn’t it?
The redistributionists agree with much of this analysis. But they think the fatalists understate both how much the government has contributed to inequality by cutting taxes on the rich and not investing in the poor, and how much good it could still do. In a new paper for the Economic Policy Institute, Andrew Fieldhouse makes the most optimistic version of this case.
The effective tax rates for the very rich -- that is, the tax rates they actually pay -- have fallen precipitously since the 1970s. “The effective tax rate for the top hundredth of a percentile (i.e., tax filers in the 99.99-percent-and-above range by income) has fallen by more than half, from 71.4 percent in 1960 to 34.7 percent in 2004.” So as the rich have gotten richer, the share of income they pay in taxes has declined.
The twist in Fieldhouse’s argument is his identification of a secondary effect by which tax cuts have goosed incomes at the top while holding them down at the bottom. He cites research suggesting that the high tax rates paid by the rich in the mid-20th century gave them little reason to spend time and energy trying to get even richer. If a big raise would be accompanied by a big tax bill, why bother fighting for a raise?
Thus, declining tax rates unleashed the desire of the wealthy to seek a bigger piece of the pie. As it turned out, they had quite a lot of power to get themselves a better deal. They had political power in Washington and state capitals, of course, but also power in the workplace. Since 1979, chief executive officer pay has gone from 29 times what the average worker is paid to 228 times what the average worker is paid. Much of that increase is zero-sum: Income that once might have gone to workers is now diverted to the C-suite, because executives have more bargaining power. And with private-sector unions wasting away, that power increases every day.
【TIME 3 ENDS – 383 WORDS】

【TIME 4】
Mitigation Theory
Consequently, Fieldhouse concludes that higher taxes on the rich may do more to curb inequality than many realize. First, higher taxes would reduce inequality directly through redistribution. Second, they would lessen it indirectly by discouraging the rich from making great efforts to become even richer. If Fieldhouse is right, then the fatalists are wrong: Pretax inequality can be mitigated by tax policy.
There’s something to this, but ultimately I think Fieldhouse gives the tax code too much credit. Changes he attributed to the tax code are really rooted in political culture. Taxes on the wealthy didn’t lower themselves, after all. Wealthy Americans fought to bring them down. And now that they’ve grown used to those low taxes and high incomes, they will fight to keep them.
Toward the end of the 2012 presidential campaign, Mitt Romney’s candidacy was powered in part by a plutocratic revolt against Democratic plans to let the top marginal rate revert to 39.6 percent. The wealthy wouldn’t meet a truly sharp increase in the top income tax rate with a shrug and a renewed disinterest in their wages. If anything, it would increase their class solidarity and political mobilization.
Yet the fatalist and redistributionist camps also give the government too little credit -- and too little blame -- for inequality. Both cleanly divide the issue in half: On one side is the way the economy distributes income, on the other the way the government redistributes it. But this misses the space between: the way the government itself changes the economy.
This drives Dean Baker crazy. “Federal government spending averages roughly 20 percent of GDP,” the dyspeptic Washington economist writes in “The End of Loser Liberalism: Making Markets Progressive.” And that’s just the beginning. “Adding in state and local government spending gets us a bit over 30 percent. This means that all levels of government spending account for less than one-third of the economy. If this is the exclusive realm for political debate, and we ignore the way in which the government structures the larger economy, then we have given up two-thirds of the game,” he writes.
【TIME 4 ENDS – 350 WORDS】

【TIME 5】
Wider Appeal
It’s a shame that Baker frames his book as advice for progressives because his argument should also appeal to conservatives. Who the government taxes and how it spends that money, Baker argues, doesn’t begin to describe the myriad ways in which the government shapes the economy. The Federal Reserve’s decision to prioritize low inflation over full employment, for example, is a government intervention of staggering importance, even if it’s rarely presented that way. The same goes for the Treasury Department’s management of the dollar. The duration of patents matters enormously, as do the licensing requirements for high-wage jobs, the regulation of corporate boards and even rules on how much cash banks must keep on hand.
Baker basically agrees with the fatalists who believe the economy has changed in ways that have exacerbated inequality, and he even agrees that changes to the tax code won’t suffice to remedy it. Where he parts with both fatalists and redistributionists is in his belief that government policies have hastened those divisive economic changes, and that a different set of government interventions has the potential to counteract them, creating a more equal economy.
Baker’s insight is bracing, though his book doesn’t follow through on it as comprehensively as I’d like. Still, it suggests the right starting point for a smarter debate over what has caused inequality and what can be done about it. Washington argues a great deal over taxes and spending, and far less over the way government sets the rules for the economy and for those who benefit most from it.
“This is sort of like playing football without knowing that the way to score points is to get the ball into the other team’s end zone,” Baker writes. “It’s hard to win when you don’t know how the game is played.”
【TIME 5 ENDS –299 WORDS】
Source: Bloomberg
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-19/who-killed-equality-.html




【PART II: OBSTACLE】
Article 4: China’s Chicken-and-Egg Problem: What Comes First, Wealth or Freedom?
By Rana ForooharJune 19, 2013

There are many questionable bits of conventional wisdom about China, but one of the most persistent is this: The Middle Kingdom must get rich before it becomes free. The notion is that as China develops into a middle-class nation, it will eventually come to adopt various aspects of Western-style liberal democracy, including better and more transparent governance, a stronger and more independent judiciary system, and a broader array of protected civil rights. But as I have been traveling in China for the last two weeks, I’ve heard an interesting twist on the conventional wisdom: That if China is to become richer, it needs to become freer – and soon.
The argument centers around two factors. First, China is already a middle-income nation. Per capita income in China is now above $5,000 per year, and many coastal areas are double that (Shanghai and Beijing are above $17,000). This is a range that’s often defined as an international middle class (keep in mind that the cost of living in China is far below what it is in the US). Indeed, many Chinese are far wealthier: There are over one million millionaires in China, and many Chinese can afford all the trappings of Western yuppies. Cities like Shanghai, Beijing, Wuhan, and Chengdu are full of upscale children’s boutiques, teeth whitening clinics, bustling Starbucks selling lattes at U.S. prices, and pricy Kaplan-style test prep centers designed to get Chinese teens into American and British boarding schools.
At the same time, China’s economy is changing. It’s less and less about cheap exports, and more about complex manufacturing, nascent services, and real estate. According to Andy Rothman, a highly respected macroeconomist at Shanghai-based CLSA bank, a sclerotic state-owned sector means that private enterprises now represent nearly 100% of new job creation in China. And private enterprises require more robust contract law to survive. “You’ve got an economy that’s increasingly driven by enterprise, intellectual property, and real estate, and yet you have no rule of law,” says Rothman, referring to the fact that the judiciary system is ineffectual and rulings tend to be erratic. As the economy slows, as it is now and will continue to do as China moves up the economic food chain, the risk of legal conflicts grows. State data shows that between 2008 and 2012, civil, commercial, and maritime lawsuits involving foreign parties, often in dispute over things like intellectual property, rose by 57%.
Even when contracts are defended, penalties are minor. John Ford, general manager of Wuhan based Diamond Power, a boiler parts company that is a Chinese subsidiary of an American firm, told me that although his company contends with numerous local copycats, they haven’t brought a suit because they are nearly impossible to win, and the cash payoff is “chicken feed.” The local government in Wuhan wants Diamond to make more advanced equipment there, but Ford says his parent company is “wary” about IP theft. “China needs a better system to deal with this,” says Rothman, or investment will be dampened. Experts from places like the World Bank and the Shanghai Institute for International Affairs agree. Ideally, the Communist Party would be subservient to the country’s legal system, something that the Chinese constitution actually calls for. But, say Rothman and others, you probably won’t see that kind of shift in the next ten years, a drag that will continue to be a headwind to China’s economic rebalancing.
What you may see much sooner is civil rights reform, or more particularly reform of China’s “hukou” system that divides citizens into two unequal classes – rural dwellers, and urban ones. Since the 1950s, China has prevented rural people who migrate to the cities for work to receive social benefits like healthcare, pensions, and education. They can only receive such benefits if they go back to their villages – and the social services on offer in the countryside are a fraction of those enjoyed in the city. Migrants also have no urban legal rights; they can’t send their children to local schools; they make a fraction of what legal residents do; and can’t buy property in cities, which represents 60% of all Chinese individual wealth. As the World Bank 2030 report on China recently observed, the hukou system has created huge inequities—financial, social, and educational—between legal urban dwellers, and the 230 million unofficial migrants who now make up 17% of the urban population.
Earlier this month, the Chinese ministry of public security announced that it was working on new guidelines for hukou reform. The impetus for change is both political and economic. For the first time in the history of modern China, there’s an underclass of illegal city dwellers (one the size of Indonesia) that are not doing better year to year – and this presents a huge social stability problem for the government. “When you have a group of people who are trapped in poverty, that’s not a good thing in a democracy; but in an autocracy, it’s a recipe for really bad stuff,” says Rothman. Indeed, the Chinese Communist Party leadership was quite unsettled by the Arab Spring, which has become an impetus for moving ahead with hukou reform now, according to Chinese foreign policy experts. The plan is to slowly roll out new benefits and legal status for some migrants, city by city. But Rothman believes that once things start the process will move quickly, as migrants around China realize what’s happening in other cities and the government is forced to move to prevent mass relocation.
The cost for reforming hukou with a starting group of 20 million migrants would be about $320 billion (roughly $16,000 per worker, with costs split in thirds between the government, companies, and workers). But Gan Li, the Chinese economist who directs the state’s household income survey, says that increased government and employer transfers would bolster Chinese urban income by 29%, which would boost consumption and help create the kind of consumer society China needs to grow. Indeed, millions of people would suddenly be able to buy property and begin buying consumer goods for those homes. (Rural residents and migrants spend only 45% of what legal urban residents do on durable goods.)
Hukou reform would also help increase the size and quality of the Chinese workforce—migrant workers typically have several years less schooling and are less productive than legal contract workers. A survey of multinational companies recently found that while going from temporary migrant workers to contracted legal ones upped costs by 4.5%, output per worker rose by 27%.
Of course, the economic benefits of such legal reforms can snowball in unexpected ways. Hukou reform shines a spotlight on China’s overall property rights system, in which all land is owned by the state. When the state decides to take that land for development, rural residents are often paid far less than market value. Lawyers in Tsinghua University law school in Beijing say that land dispute cases are on the increase, putting pressure on the Party to move to a truly market oriented system of property ownership – a step that some economists believe could unlock over a trillion dollars of wealth in the Chinese economy.
For the Middle Kingdom, freedom itself may bring a Big Bang of prosperity – but only if the Party is resilient enough to evolve. Loosening its grip enough to create true rule of law in China will be the chief challenge — and economic opportunity — for the Chinese government in the coming decades.
【OBSTACLE ENDS – 1239 WORDS】
Source: TIME
http://business.time.com/2013/06/19/chinas-chicken-and-egg-problem-what-comes-first-wealth-or-freedom/#ixzz2WkHahGjo

今天的内容比较多,如果不计时部分也有读呢,大家就已经完成了4000+ words的阅读量啦!快奖励自己一个猴头!

本帖子中包含更多资源

您需要 登录 才可以下载或查看,没有帐号?立即注册

x
收藏收藏 收藏收藏
沙发
 楼主| 发表于 2013-6-20 22:22:21 | 只看该作者

WORD LIST

【PART I】
1.        indelible  英[ɪn'delɪb(ə)l] 美[ɪn'dɛləbl]  adj. 难忘的;擦不掉的
2.        visionary  英['vɪʒ(ə)n(ə)rɪ] 美['vɪʒənɛri]  adj. 梦想的;幻影的  n. 空想家;梦想者;有眼力的人
3.        sluggish  英['slʌgɪʃ] 美['slʌɡɪʃ]  adj. 萧条的;迟钝的;行动迟缓的;懒惰的  n. 市况呆滞;市势疲弱
4.        photonics[fo'tɑnɪks]  n. 光电;光子学
5.        behemoth  英[bɪ'hiːmɒθ; 'biːhɪ,məʊθ] 美[bɪ'himɔθ]  n. 巨兽;河马  adj. 巨大的;高大的
6.        consortium  英[kən'sɔːtɪəm] 美[kən'sɔrtɪəm]  n. 财团;联合;合伙
7.        propel  英[prə'pel] 美[prə'pɛl]  vt. 推进;驱使;激励;驱策
8.        stifling  英['staɪf(ə)lɪŋ; 'staɪflɪŋ] 美['staɪflɪŋ]  adj. 令人窒息的;沉闷的  v. 使窒息;粉碎(stifle的现在分词)
9.        impotence  英['ɪmpətəns] 美['ɪmpətəns]  n. [泌尿][中医] 阳萎;虚弱;无效
10.        rave  英[reɪv] 美[rev]  n. 咆哮;胡言乱语;热烈赞美  vi. 咆哮;胡言乱语;狂骂  vt. 咆哮;语无伦次地说  adj. 赞扬的
11.        hysterical  英[hɪ'sterɪk(ə)l] 美[hɪ'stɛrɪkl]  adj. 歇斯底里的;异常兴奋的
12.        ditch  英[dɪtʃ] 美[dɪtʃ]  vt. 在…上掘沟;把…开入沟里;丢弃  vi. 开沟;掘沟  n. 沟渠;壕沟
13.        tweak  英[twiːk] 美[twik]  n. 扭;拧;焦急  vt. 扭;用力拉;开足马力
14.        fatalist['feitəlist]  n. 宿命论者
15.        ineluctable  英[,ɪnɪ'lʌktəb(ə)l] 美[,ɪnɪ'lʌktəbl]  adj. 不可避免的;无法逃避的
16.        skew  英[skjuː] 美[skju]  n. 斜交;歪斜  adj. 斜交的;歪斜的
17.        lethargic  英[lɪ'θɑːdʒɪk] adj. 昏睡的;无生气的;冷漠的
18.        boon  英[buːn] 美[bʊn]  n. 恩惠;福利;利益  adj. 愉快的;慷慨的
19.        goose  英[guːs] 美[ɡus]  n. 鹅;鹅肉;傻瓜;雌鹅  vt. 突然加大油门;嘘骂
20.        C-suite 公司管理层,最高管理层
21.        mitigation  英[mɪtɪ'geɪʃ(ə)n] 美[,mɪtɪ'ɡeʃən]  n. 减轻;缓和;平静
22.        plutocratic[plʊtə'krætɪk]  adj. 富豪的;财阀的;有钱有势的
23.        revert  英[rɪ'vɜːt] 美[rɪ'vɝt]  vi. 回复;重提;返祖遗传;归还  vt. 使回复原状  n. 恢复原状者
24.        dyspeptic  英[dɪs'peptɪk] 美  adj. 消化不良的;患胃病的;胃弱的  n. 消化不良者
25.        myriad  英['mɪrɪəd] 美  adj. 无数的;种种的  n. 无数,极大数量;无数的人或物
26.        bracing  英['breɪsɪŋ] 美['bresɪŋ]  n. 支撑;支柱;背带  adj. 令人振奋的;凉爽的  v. 绷紧,顶住(brace的现在分词形式)

【PART II】
1.        boutique  英[buː'tiːk] 美[bu'tik]  n. 精品店;专卖流行衣服的小商店  adj. 精品屋的;小规模专售精品的
2.        bustle  英['bʌs(ə)l] 美['bʌsl]  vi. 喧闹;忙乱;充满  vt. 使忙碌;催促  n. 喧闹;活跃;裙撑;热闹的活动
3.        nascent  英['næs(ə)nt; 'neɪ-] 美['næsnt]  adj. 初期的;开始存在的,发生中的
4.        sclerotic  英[sklɪə'rɒtɪk; sklə-] 美[sklɪ'rɑtɪk]  adj. 硬化的,僵硬的;巩膜的  n. [解剖] 巩膜;硬化剂
5.        erratic  英[ɪ'rætɪk] 美[ɪ'rætɪk]  adj. 不稳定的;古怪的  n. 漂泊无定的人;古怪的人
6.        wary  英['weərɪ] 美['wɛri]  adj. 谨慎的;机警的;惟恐的;考虑周到的
7.        dampen  英['dæmp(ə)n] 美['dæmpən]  vt. 抑制;使…沮丧;使…潮湿  vi. 潮湿;丧气
8.        subservient  英[səb'sɜːvɪənt] 美  adj. 屈从的;奉承的;有用的;有帮助的
9.        impetus  英['ɪmpɪtəs] 美['ɪmpɪtəs]  n. 动力;促进;冲力
10.        resilient  英[rɪ'zɪlɪənt] 美[rɪ'zɪlɪənt]  adj. 弹回的,有弹力的

板凳
发表于 2013-6-20 22:31:12 | 只看该作者
好巧~~最近要断网消失一段时间,大家加油~~sg辛苦了
地板
发表于 2013-6-20 22:39:23 | 只看该作者
谢谢小杀妹呀~~
内容很充实,很丰富耶~~
奖励一个猴头,,然后继续补作业~~

2'43
3'04
2'40
2'44
2'28

6-9'24
The gist of this passage is about some promising and possible transitions and twists China would make to guarantee a much better and smoother future development when it gradually becomes a middle-class kingdom.
At first, the author mentions the recent and higher average incomes and proceeds per people in China than before, in addition with the very stellar figures of some coastal large cities, say, Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. Plus, the author also mentions current prosperity in some Chinese cities to exemplify the China's well-being.
Then, the writer describes one of the changes needed bitterly by foreign investors, which is the formation and execution of stringent policy on protection of the intellictual fruit. However, according the author, this kind of measure seems to require a long time to accomplish and abttain. Moreover, the author presents the possible and feasible changes concerning China's "free policy", which is to rescind and abolish the hukou system gradually. In the following and main part of the article, the author delineates the outcome or the damage of hukou policy, the advantage and edge concerning the breakdown of hukou policy, and the possible side-effect of its breakdown.

5#
发表于 2013-6-20 22:42:20 | 只看该作者
速度:
1.1'49''
2.2'06''
3.1'58''
4.1'36''
5.1'23''
越障:5'18''

读完了,奖励自己一个,等考完试要恢复写回忆。
6#
发表于 2013-6-20 22:43:48 | 只看该作者
首页留爪印〜
7#
发表于 2013-6-20 23:30:01 | 只看该作者
留名留名
1'55"
2'05"
1'50"
1'45"
1'25"

6'10"
8#
发表于 2013-6-20 23:42:04 | 只看该作者
楼主辛苦〜

_________________________________
Speed
01:02
02:15
00:51
01:07
02:03
01:09
01:30
01:58
02:00
01:40

Obstacle
06:33
Main idea: Freedom to China's economy
Attitude:   Positive
Structure:
              1) Argument
                  ---If China is to become richer, it needs to become freer.
              2) Current situation
                  ---China is already a middle-income nation, and its economy is changing(civil right reform).
              3) Back to the argument
                  ---What can be concluded from Hukou reform: Freedom may bring a Big Bang of prosperity.
9#
发表于 2013-6-21 00:34:59 | 只看该作者
最后的首页!!!

最后一个计时按成了清空!!!明天再读一遍吧,泪……
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1'15''
2'27''
53''
1'29''
2'41''
1'36''

7'42''
10#
发表于 2013-6-21 07:30:06 | 只看该作者
坚持坚持,一定要坚持

T1-2’45
Government wasn’t sluggish and wasteful that interfere the innovation, and contributed a lot to the development of new technologies and the establishment of companies.

T2-2’25
Describe the actual mechanism of invisible hand, how it emerges and also how it can break down

T3-2’10
Fatalists conclude government didn’t cause inequity while redistributionist think them understate how much government         contributed to inequity by cutting tax.

T4-2’39
Author think fieldhouse gave the tax code of government too much credit while fatalists and redistributionist gave too little.

T5-2’26
Baker basically agrees that the economy has changed in ways that exacerbated inequity.

OB-7’03
China could be a middle class country, richer than now, if it is freer. The author explains why China has easy access to be rich, and give the example of hukou to dictate the situation of China and what should be done.
您需要登录后才可以回帖 登录 | 立即注册

Mark一下! 看一下! 顶楼主! 感谢分享! 快速回复:

手机版|ChaseDream|GMT+8, 2024-4-23 17:09
京公网安备11010202008513号 京ICP证101109号 京ICP备12012021号

ChaseDream 论坛

© 2003-2023 ChaseDream.com. All Rights Reserved.

返回顶部