【每日阅读训练第四期——速度越障24系列】【24-18】经管

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大家好，周四经管~
今天的阅读一共三篇文章，分别是关于新兴经济体可能面临的危机，为什么各国热衷于申奥，以及中国的城镇化。Enjoy~

PART I: SPEAKER

Article 1:
Listen to a TED talk on The Puzzle of Motivation.


【REPHRASE 1】

【SPEECH: 18:36】


Source: TED
http://www.ted.com/talks/dan_pink_on_motivation.html

PART II: SPEED

Article 2: Are Emerging Economies Entering a Lost Decade?
By Anders Aslund Sep 11, 2013

【TIME 2】
Financial markets are signaling that several major emerging economies may be approaching crisis.

Morgan Stanley has named Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey and South Africa the “fragile five.” They share some common characteristics: All took in excessive short-term international financial inflows, which enticed them into accepting excessive current-account deficits for too long. High economic growth has made their governments complacent, even as rising exchange rates undermined their competitiveness. Now their growth rates and exchange rates are falling.

The catalyst, though not the actual cause, of the current market developments was the prospect of a rise in U.S. interest rates that began to take shape with Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke’s May 22 talk about “tapering” quantitative easing. Since then, the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield has surged by more than 100 basis points and continues to rise, even though the Fed hasn’t begun to reduce the pace of its securities purchases.

Bond yields of vulnerable emerging economies have risen faster. Investors had always known that the zero U.S. interest rates would eventually normalize. Given that the Fed inflation target is 2 percent, and a real 10-year bond yield of 3 percent used to be the average, it is reasonable to expect the bond yield to rise to about 5 percent.

Emerging economies are in trouble because the credit and commodity booms that brought high rates of economic growth are unsustainable. Many have received large volumes of fluid international capital. If their exchange rates fall rapidly, large volumes of money will float out and inflation may surge. If they defend their exchange rates with reserves, those will shrink fast. In either case, emerging economies may have to cope with the sudden end of international financing.
【TIME 2 ENDS – 283 WORDS】

【TIME 3】
Global Investment

The global investment ratio is bound to decline significantly as real interest rates rise. In recent years, China has accounted for a large share of global investment, and in 2009, fiscal stimulus pushed its investment ratio to an extreme level of 48 percent of gross domestic product, from an already high rate of 35 percent in 2000. That isn’t sustainable. The Chinese investment ratio is bound to fall by at least a 10th of GDP, which would reduce the global investment ratio, too.

Similar trends were visible at the beginning of Latin America’s lost decade, in the early 1980s. As then, the world is now approaching a downward turn of two long cycles, the 15- to 20-year long financial cycle and the even longer commodity cycle. Emerging markets benefited from both the credit and commodity cycles that have now peaked and begun a long-term decline of a decade or so.

The macroeconomic situation of today’s emerging economies is far better than it was in some of the Latin American countries in the 1980s. Argentina, Brazil and Peru had large budget deficits and pegged exchange rates, leading to hyperinflation and default. Today, major emerging economies have low inflation, limited budget deficits, mostly floating exchange rates and large international reserves. It’s worth recalling that the same was said about the U.S. andEurope before the recent recession.

Demand for commodities is bound to decline with less investment. In recent years, China has accounted for about 40 percent of global consumption of major commodities. The long commodity cycle peaked in 1980, and it reached a new peak in 2008. After the oil shock of the 1970s, oil prices were very high from 1973 until 1980. But from 1981 until 1986, they fell steadily as energy consumption declined.
We are in a similar situation today. Global commodity prices rose sharply from 2003 until 2008, and they maintained a high level until 2012 because of the very loose global monetary policy, which encouraged both investment and speculative positions in commodities.
【TIME 3 ENDS – 334 WORDS】

【TIME 4】
Energy Savings

After such a long period of high energy prices, greater energy savings are likely. Technological revolutions such as shale gas, tight oil, deep-sea drilling and liquefied natural gas production have generated a far greater supply effect than in the 1980s. This year, prices of almost all commodities have declined, and are likely to continue to fall for at least half a decade.

In the early 1980s, the world experienced similar critical trends: rising global interest rates (both nominal and real), declining investment ratios and lower commodity prices. Poorly managed emerging economies were battered then, and they are likely to be affected again.
Emerging economies with large current-account deficits, foreign indebtedness, budget deficits and public debts would be the first to suffer. The turmoil could then spread to large commodity exporters, such as Russia, Brazil and South Africa. China, by contrast, would benefit from lower commodity prices, but it appears overleveraged, with a huge bank credit that amounts to twice GDP.

Global trends don’t change very often, but when they do change, they do so sharply. From 2000 to 2012, emerging economies grew 5.9 percent a year on average; U.S. growth was 1.8 percent. This led many people to declare the victory of the emerging economies over the West. But the high levels of emerging-market growth were artificial, caused by the global credit boom (the Greenspan put) and then huge credit transfers from the West.

The pre-boom period, 1980-2000, may be more representative of a normal period. Then, the emerging economies grew an average of 3.7 percent a year, significantly faster than the U.S., at 3.2 percent a year. That meant increasing economic divergence, because the U.S. increased its advantage given the far lower staring level of the emerging economies.
【TIME 4 ENDS – 289 WORDS】

【TIME 5】
Financial Turbulence

As a consequence of these global developments, in the early 1980s, the U.S. experienced large currency inflows that drove up the trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate by 40 percent from 1980 to 1985, and lifted stock and bond prices. This is likely to happen again. Global economic growth will probably moderate with deleveraging and financial turbulence in the emerging economies, while the U.S. will proceed with a normal growth rate of 2.5 percent to 3.5 percent a year.

In Europe, the long recession has brought fiscal consolidation and substantial structural changes, such as labor market reforms. The continent is now returning to growth, which is likely to be accelerated by those tough reforms. For a decade or so, the West could take the global economic lead once again as it did in the 1980s.

Many emerging economies that ignored necessary structural reforms during the boom could experience low growth for a prolonged period. They have allowed state and crony capitalism to thrive, locking themselves into a middle-income trap. Those that carried out sound reforms -- Central and Eastern Europe, Chile, Mexico, Colombia and South Korea -- are likely to do well.

Eventually, after making enough mistakes, the struggling emerging economies will be forced to undertake the necessary reforms. In Latin America of the 1980s, this involved democratization, liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization and privatization, which took at least a decade. The next round of reform will be hard, too, but change is the only way forward.
【TIME 5 ENDS – 244 WORDS】
Source: Bloomberg
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-10/are-emerging-economies-entering-a-lost-decade-.html

Article 3: Why would anyone want to host the Olympics?
Sep 8th 2013 by T.W.

【WARM UP】
TO TRIUMPHANT shouts of “banzai!” it was announced on September 7th that Tokyo would host the 2020 Olympic games. The city fended off not-especially-stiff competition from Madrid, whose chances were damaged by Spain’s sickly economy, and Istanbul, whose image was tarnished when its police spent the summer practising for the 100-metre baton-charge. It was not the strongest field of candidate cities in Olympic history. But the contest demonstrated the lengths that countries will go to for the privilege of hosting the world’s biggest sporting bash. Shinzo Abe (pictured above, third from right), Mariano Rajoy and Recep Tayyip Erdogan all flew to Buenos Aires, where the International Olympic Committee (IOC) was voting, to make the official case for their respective countries. Tokyo had previously bid unsuccessfully for the 2016 games; Madrid had bid for both 2016 and 2012. Poor Istanbul has now been rejected five times. Why are cities so keen to host the Olympics?

On the face of it, throwing the world’s biggest party—and paying for it—is not especially appealing. The cost used to be fairly modest: London’s 1948 Olympics cost £732,268, or about £20m ($30m) in today’s money. Nowadays hosting the games is a different business. The 2008 Beijing games, the priciest ever, are reckoned to have cost about $40 billion. That is likely to be eclipsed next year by the Sochi winter games, which are on course to cost $50 billion. Tourism may help to offset the expense, but a spike in arrivals is not guaranteed: Beijing saw a drop in hotel bookings during its Olympic summer. And the chance to spruce up a city sometimes ends up creating eyesores instead. Some of Greece’s costly stadiums now look as run-down as the Parthenon (and have fewer visitors).
【291 WORDS】

【TIME 6】
The main reason cities want to host the Olympics is that, perhaps against the odds, they are wildly popular with the voters who foot the bill. The IOC found that public support for hosting the games was around 70% in Tokyo, 76% in Madrid and 83% in Istanbul. Londoners, sometimes a cynical bunch, were in favour of the 2012 games, in spite of dissent from some quarters (including this newspaper, which recommended leaving it to Paris). At the end of last year, with the crowds departed, eight out of ten said it was worth the extraordinary cost, even as cuts to public services began to bite. Popularity aside, Olympic bids often have other agendas. The Beijing games were intended to show off China’s spending and organisational power. London’s games were a means of bringing back to life a poor part of the capital at a speed that defied normal budgets and planning regulations. Tokyo hopes the 2020 games can gee up Japan’s lacklustre economy.

It is a high-risk game. Rio’s hosting of the 2016 games had strong local support during the bidding process, but has since become a focus of those protesting against government waste (they also rage against the World Cup, which Brazil will host next year). Politicians can be left looking ridiculous, or worse: Mexico’s 1968 Olympics are remembered as much for the massacre of student protesters ten days before the games as for the sporting events themselves. Even if it goes well, the seven-year gap between bidding for the games and staging them means that the politicians who shepherd the bid through are seldom around when the fun begins. The Labour government and Labour mayor of London who helped to win the bid for Britain were long gone by 2012. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is no longer Brazil’s president (though some wonder if he might just try to make a comeback). Shinzo Abe faces no term limits as Japan’s prime minister, so could, in theory, still be around to open the Tokyo games in 2020. More likely, though, someone else will be there to take the credit—or the blame.
【TIME 6 ENDS – 354 WORDS】
Source: The Economist
http://www.economist.com/node/21586139

PART III: OBSTACLE

Article 4: China Needs Beijing to Be Even Bigger
By Yukon Huang Sep 10, 2013

【PARAPHRASE 7】
One of the most critical and controversial economic debates in China today revolves around how the country should urbanize. Already, more Chinese live in cities than on the land, a proportion that is expected to rise to 70 percent by 2030.

Proponents of further urbanization are hoping that Premier Li Keqiang will announce reforms this fall that will make it easier for migrants to move to cities and receive the same rights as locals. This, they believe, will unlock the productivity gains needed to sustain growth over the coming decades. They’re right about the need for more city dwellers -- but not about the need for more cities.

Like many things in China, urbanization policy is driven by the central government, which has sought to discourage growth of the largest cities and instead promote smaller, often entirely new ones. On the surface, this makes sense: If Beijing and Shanghai -- which already host a combined 43 million people -- were to grow even bigger, they could sink under the weight of social and environmental decay, not to mention wasted expenditures.

China is already in a class by itself in accounting for 30 of the 50 largest cities in east Asia. It boasts half a dozen megacities with populations of more than 10 million and 25 “large” cities exceeding 4 million. In fact, though, the only way China will achieve its desired productivity gains is if its leaders allow cities to evolve more organically in response to market forces. They need to let cities like Beijing get bigger.

Agglomeration Benefits

The pressure for cities to grow comes from the combination of rural poverty -- which pushes migrants to seek out better-paying jobs -- and the power of “agglomeration economies.” These are the benefits gained by the concentration of companies and workers. The resulting economies of scale and network effects drive down costs and lead to specialization.

Yet China’s planners continue to see urbanization in terms of developing new cities and facilitating the flow of people into the smaller ones. Incentives for this to happen are reinforced by limited local-level financing options. Provincial governments have relied on the conversion of rural land to urban use to fund their obligations. They have strong incentives to encourage property appreciation and industrialization to strengthen their revenue base. At its worst, this has led to the creation of scores of “ghost” cities based on the mistaken view that once built, residents will naturally come.

Even in megacities like Beijing and Shanghai, incorporating suburban land is more appealing than making rational use of the core, which is replete with dilapidated low-rise buildings from the pre-reform era. As a result, urbanization has ended up dispersing people and activities rather than increasing density. Over the past several decades, China’s urban population has expanded by 2.5 times, but urban land area has increased eightfold.

Instead of actively trying to spread out growth to small new cities, China’s planners should embrace the agglomeration economies, which militate for larger metropolises. As land and wage costs escalate, some industries will eventually gravitate to medium-size cities, but services will continue to drive expansion in the larger ones. Smart people like to mix with other smart people, and globalization has amplified their financial returns. Beijing and Shanghai have continued to grow because of buoyant higher-value services, even as their manufacturing bases have shrunk. All this explains why in China, productivity in urban areas is more than three times that in rural areas.

But aren’t China’s megacities already too big to be sustainable? As a matter of fact, some urban specialists have concluded that even China’s biggest cities may be too small. They cite “Zipf’s law,” one of the great curiosities of urban research. The law, which is surprisingly accurate for many countries, claims that the biggest city in a country should be about twice the size of the second-biggest, three times the size of the third-biggest, and so forth. On this basis, China’s largest cities appear too small.

Mushrooming Cities

Certainly, there are negative consequences as cities mushroom in size. For companies, the rising costs of land and labor reduce the advantages of big cities; for workers, congestion and higher living expenses reduce their appeal. If Beijing handles its urbanization the wrong way, its citizens will join other Asian countries whose largest cities are caught in a net of pollution, clogged streets and underemployed poor.

These risks, however, have less to do with city size than with misguided urban-management policies. Beijing’s core, for example, is not being appropriately developed: Vast parcels of land sit underutilized, while affordable housing is pushed too far out from where the jobs are. A fascination with ring roads impedes traffic flow. The result is excessively long commutes with more traffic-related pollution than is necessary and a costlier provision of social services because of the higher capital costs of serving a dispersed population. These are all costs that could be avoided by taking a more rational, density-oriented approach to urban planning.

What China needs Li to implement this fall is a more efficient urbanization process -- one in which cities are allowed to evolve organically in response to changing conditions. This will require a financing system that provides the right incentives; social services and residency policies that facilitate rather than restrict labor mobility; land-use guidelines that promote more concentrated rather than dispersed development; and transport systems that encourage a more efficient location of activity.

This would probably lead to larger and denser but more environmentally friendly and livable cities. If China gets it right, its biggest cities will then generate the productivity gains needed for the economy to grow at 7 percent or more for the rest of this decade.
【OBSTACLE ENDS – 949 WORDS】
Source: Bloomberg
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-09/china-needs-beijing-to-be-even-bigger.html