大全80-----2

Most large corporations in the United States were once run by individual capitalists who owned enough stock to dominate the board of directors (board of directors: 董事会) and dictate company policy. Because putting such large amounts of stock on the market would only depress its value, they could not sell out (sell out: v.卖完, 出卖, 背叛) for a quick profit and instead had to concentrate on improving the long-term productivity of their companies. Today, with few exceptions, the stock of large United States corporations is held by large institutions—pension funds, for example—and because these institutions are prohibited by antitrust laws from owning a majority of a company’s stock and from actively influencing a company’s decision-making, they can enhance their wealth only by buying and selling stock in anticipation of fluctuations in its value. A minority shareholder is necessarily a short term trader. As a result, United States productivity is unlikely to improve unless shareholders and the managers of the companies in which they invest are encouraged to enhance long-term productivity (and hence long-term profitability), rather than simply to maximize short-term profits.

Since the return of the old-style capitalist is unlikely, today’s short-term traders must be remade into tomorrow’s long-term capitalistic investors. The legal limits that now prevent financial institutions from acquiring a dominant shareholding position in a corporation should be removed, and such institutions (省略了SHOULD BE) encouraged to take a more active role in the operations of the companies in which they invest. In addition, any institution that holds twenty percent or more of a company’s stock should be forced to give the public one day’s notice of the intent to sell those shares. Unless the announced sale could be explained to the public on grounds other than anticipated future losses, the value of the stock would plummet and, like the old-time capitalists, major investors could cut their losses only by helping to restore their companies’ productivity. Such measures would force financial institutions to become capitalists whose success depends not on trading shares at the propitious moment, but on increasing the productivity of the companies in which they invest.

(A) They make the corporation’s operational management decisions.

(B) They are not allowed to own more than fifty percent of the corporation’s stock.

(C) They cannot make quick profits by selling their stock in the corporation.

(D) They are more interested in profits than in productivity.（D）

(E) They cannot sell any of their stock in the corporation without giving the public advance notice.

这题答案是D,想请问C为什么错了,先谢了

我认为这题目大全的答案错了，应该选C。

原文跟原题OG-11（紫）里面有，是92题。贴一下OG的解释

Inference

An inference is drawn from stated information．To answer this question，look at what the passage says about individual capitalists who owned enough stock to dominate the board of directors and dictate company policy．The logical inference from this information is that these individual capitalists were majority stockholders；they are the only majority shareholders discussed in the passage．Lines 6-8 indicate that these capitalists could not sell out for a quick profit and instead had to concentrate on．．．1ong-term productivity．

A   While majority shareholders might dictate company policy(1ine 4)，there is no suggestion that they would make operational decisions．

B  The passage does discuss current limitations on minority shareholders，but there is no discussion of limitations on majority shareholders．

C  Correct．Lines 2-6 show that individual capitalists，and thus majority shareholders，cannot make quick profits because putting such large amounts of stock on the market would only depress its value．

D  In fines 6-8．The author argues exactly the opposite of this point．

E  Majority shareholders may sell as much stock as they want；the only constraint they face is the economic one of quickly depressing the share price．

The correct answer is C．