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本次练习的最后我附加了一篇阅读——How to Let Your Purpose Find You，此文的思路不是很符合GMAT，但是我觉得仍然是一篇值得一看的文章。所以有时间、有兴趣的童鞋可以读一下！
最后祝大家阅读愉快~~
【速度】
【速度一】
Too Many People of Color Feel Uncomfortable at Work
by Sylvia Ann Hewlett
"The corporation for me is a theater, and I try to remember to stay in character."
That's the blunt response from one African-American executive to a dilemma that dogs many people of color in American workplaces: Even as multicultural fluency is increasingly prized in today's global business environment, the very people who represent that diversity feel shut out.
People of color too often feel that they have to hide their true selves at work, according to "Vaulting the Color Bar: How Sponsorship Levers Multicultural Professionals into Leadership," a new research report from the Center for Talent Innovation. More than 35% of African-Americans and Hispanics, as well as 45% of Asians, say they "need to compromise their authenticity" to conform to their company's standards of demeanor or style. Forty percent of African-Americans — and a third of people of color overall — feel like outsiders in their corporate culture, compared with 26% of Caucasians.
"Companies have been good at creating a workforce that looks different," says Andrés Tapia, author of The Inclusion Paradox. But, he adds, "they've fallen short when it comes to understanding how to develop a corporate culture where all employees feel included, respected, comfortable, and able to do their best work."
Fewer than a third of Asian-Americans feel very comfortable being themselves at work, according to earlier research from the CTI. An Indian vice president at a multinational pharmaceutical firm recounts being told by her boss that her Anglo-Indian accent was "too stuffy." She, like many others interviewed in our studies, avoids referring to Hindu holidays, discussing cultural mores with coworkers, or wearing anything that might be perceived as too ethnic. "You lead a dual life, you absolutely do," said another Indian senior manager. "There is an inhibition. You just don't want to talk about it. And I'd never dream of wearing a sari to work."
【字数306】
【速度二】
African-American men and women struggle with the conundrum of how to be assertive without courting the historic stereotype of the "angry black." "My style is direct," says one senior executive. "In the back of your mind, you wonder and worry whether you're perceived as being demanding and confrontational." Notes a focus group participant, "You start to be less of who you are. You start tiptoeing." As a result, career-oriented black women often suffer from what Ella Bell, a professor at the Tuck School of Business who studies race, gender, and social class in organizations, calls "bicultural stress" related to the need to hide their real selves at the office.
Overall, people of color are 37% more likely than whites to feel that they need to compromise their authenticity at work in order to conform to conventional standards of executive presence. "You're like a chameleon, constantly changing the way you are," observes an African-American network TV manager.
When people of color feel that they have to mask a rich cultural heritage or other aspects of difference, CTI research shows they are apt to feel isolated at work, and mistrustful of and less loyal to employers. That, in turn, leads to disengagement and a greater likelihood of leaving.
One remedy: Sponsorship can turn the uncertainties and insecurities of difference into the confidence and vision of career success. With sponsorship, according to CTI data, protégés of color are 65% more likely than those without a sponsor to be satisfied with their rate of advancement. Having this advocate in the workplace enables them to feel more comfortable being themselves and do their best work. Knowing that someone has their back dampens the distrust and discomfort that ultimately leads to a multicultural brain drain. As a result, protégés are nearly 60% less likely to plan to quit within a year.
As the country diversifies, companies need to realize that just having a diverse set of talent isn't enough. If your employees aren't comfortable at work, everyone suffers. Isn't it time to celebrate people of color for what they are, rather than stifle their valuable gifts.
【字数350】
【速度三】
Why Price Match Guarantees Can Be Bad For Consumers
by Rafi Mohammed
[attachimg=580,215]108782[/attachimg]
Last week, Target did the once unthinkable. In addition to matching prices of local brick and mortar stores, it announced this holiday season it would also match prices of any product sold by major Internet retailers including Amazon.com, BestBuy.com, Walmart.com, and Toysrus.com.
While many stores pledge to match prices of local brick and mortar stores — consumers have to bring in a local competitor's advertisement as proof — until now matching Internet prices has been taboo. After all, physical store retailers have higher costs and their mantra has been "buy from us because we offer more benefits," including the ability to see/touch products, receive advice from knowledgeable sales people, and enjoy products instantly. But now some physical retailers are saying "the heck with it": despite their own cost disadvantages and despite offer a better shopping experience, they are aggressively courting customers with lowest price pledges. Best Buy is also matching prices — but only on appliances and electronics.
So price matching policies are good for consumers, right? Not necessarily. Consider the following three reasons:
They may reduce competition: Economists and antitrust authorities have long been concerned that price matching policies may actually reduce the incentives of stores to lower prices. If retailers know that lowering prices (to sell more of a product as well as spur additional purchases) will be matched by rivals, there's less upside to discounting — what's the point if consumers will simply go to their favorite store and request a price match?
They provide a false sense of security: Academics Maria Arbatskaya, Morten Hviid, and Greg Shaffer published a paper in the International Journal of Industrial Organization titled "On the Use of Low-Price Guarantees to Discourage Price Cutting" that empirically investigates price matching. The authors collected data on tire prices from Sunday newspapers. They found that 86% of retailers that offered to match any price — advertised or not — did not offer the lowest price. Interestingly though, 75% of retailers that offered to match only advertised prices actually offered the lowest prices.
【字数331】
【速度四】
They penalize inattentive shoppers: Under price matching guarantees, consumers who play the game (by aggressively comparing prices before buying) will win, but those who don't will pay more. With the significant extra operating costs borne by brick and mortar retailers, how will they make up margins lost from matching Internet prices? Physical stores will become more dependent on implementing differential pricing (the strategy of charging different prices for the same product to different customers) to keep their bottom lines in check. To do this, they will likely increase prices.
Price sensitive customers — those who credibly identify themselves by conducting pre-shopping research and entering stores armed with fistfuls of printouts proving lower prices offered by rivals — will reap excellent deals. However, those who purchase on the faith that they are getting a "reasonable price" will get the short stick — they'll pay more. Realistically, how many of us are going to show up with price match evidence for the majority of our brick and mortar purchases?
So what do you think? Is price matching good for consumers? Will price matching increase or decrease discounting this holiday season? What do you think are the long term implications of the willingness of brick and mortar stores to match Internet retailer prices?
【字数207】
【速度五】
The Global Banking Leaders of the Future
by Richard Lumb
The global banking industry faces two opposing truths. On one hand, regardless of current economic concerns, emerging markets are where long-term growth opportunities lie. On the other, the crisis in the euro zone has forced banks to rethink their investments in numerous markets, if not retreat from them altogether. The result is a chasm of opportunity — a vacuum ready to be filled by banks from both the emerging and developed worlds.
Largely free of the debt and de-leveraging that have undermined growth in the West, emerging economies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America remain among the few areas experiencing relatively good growth. Even amidst the euro crisis, the World Bank expects developing economies to grow at a rate nearly four times that of the developed world over the next year.
While European banks were among the first to move into emerging markets, the euro zone crisis has led many to recoil or switch course. Recent headlines have been foreboding, highlighting concerns that the retrenchment could leave the most promising engines of global economic growth sputtering. Indeed, Bank for International Settlements (BIS) figures for the last quarter of 2011 showed that cross-border lending to emerging economies had declined by $75 billion — its steepest fall since the Lehman collapse.
And yet three months later the same report showed a reversal: cross-border lending to emerging economies in the first quarter of 2012 increased by $86 billion. Lending from Europe remained flat, and the gap was filled from elsewhere — largely Asian offshore centers and the U.K.
【字数252】
【剩余部分】
Filling the Gap
A combination of healthy Western banks and the players operating in and around emerging markets are targeting opportunity beyond the euro zone crisis. Their movements could potentially create a new class of global banking leaders for the next decade. Which are the likeliest to seize the opportunity?
Japanese banks
In some respects, the retrenchment by European banks bears similarities to the plight of Japanese institutions in the 1990s, when the contraction of the nation's domestic economy undercut its international banking giants. As the Japanese retreated home, European and other Western banks moved onto the global stage. Now the situation has reversed. Several of Japan's major banks, which have a surplus of deposits, are again expanding internationally and buying up loan portfolios from Western banks. Key players include Sumitomo Mitsui, Mitsubishi UFJ, and Mizuho.
Emerging market players
The banking vacuum might be filled from within, as the European retreat provides unprecedented opportunity for emerging market banks looking to form regional hubs and replace outbound international institutions. Take Russia's Sberbank: Last year it agreed to buy the operations of Austria's Volksbank in eight Eastern European countries for about $800 million. Likewise, BTG Pactual in Brazil has been clear about its intent to become the largest investment bank in emerging markets by the end of the decade. It recently bought Bolsa y Renta, a Columbian securities firm, and paid $600 million for Celfin Capital, a Chilean firm. In the East, Chinese banks and players like Singapore's DBS Bank and Malaysia's CIMB Bank are opening overseas branches and making more and more regional acquisitions.
Forward-looking Western banks
A handful of mature Western institutions are reinventing themselves as global players. Aside from the well-known players that have long profited from emerging markets (BBVA, HSBC, Santander, Standard Chartered), new names are emerging. For example, Wells Fargo plans to expand into 20 new markets, including China, Hong Kong, India, South Korea, and Singapore. JP Morgan has reported plans to assert itself throughout Asia, Latin America, and Africa to capture $1 billion in annual pre-tax profit over five years. Barclays has bold plans for investment and expansion in Africa.
These banks face a common challenge, too: Customers in emerging markets have proven especially fickle. Accenture research shows that bank customers in these economies are twice as likely as those in mature markets to switch to another bank for new products.
The winners of this global challenge must minimize churn and excel at customer retention. To do so, they will need to acquire genuine local-market knowledge and exhibit a disciplined approach to acquisitions. This might also be accomplished through joint ventures with trusted local brands. Ensuring customer support through cutting-edge systems and IT will be critical, as will the ability to tap online, mobile, social, and analytic innovations. Institutions that successfully fill the vacuum to capture future growth in emerging markets will join a new class of global banking leaders.
【字数484】
【越障】
Can time-varying risk of rare disasters explain aggregate stock market volatility?
Jessica A. Wachter
The magnitude of the expected excess return on stocks relative to bonds (the equity premium) constitutes one of the major puzzles in financial economics. As Mehra and Prescott (1985) show, the fluctuations observed in the consumption growth rate over U.S. history predict an equity premium that is far too small, assuming reasonable levels of risk aversion. One proposed explanation is that the return on equities is high to compensate investors for the risk of a rare disaster (Rietz (1988)). An open question has therefore been whether the risk is sufficiently high, and the rare disaster sufficiently severe, to quantitatively explain the equity premium. Recently, however, Barro (2006) shows that it is possible to explain the equity premium using such a model when the probability of a rare disaster is calibrated to international data on large economic declines.
While the models of Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006) advance our understanding of the equity premium, they fall short in other respects. Most importantly, these models predict that the volatility of stock market returns equals the volatility of dividends. Numerous studies have shown, however, that this is not the case. In fact, there is excess stock market volatility; the volatility of stock returns far exceeds that of dividends (e.g. Shiller (1981), LeRoy and Porter (1981), Keim and Stambaugh (1986), Campbell and Shiller (1988), Cochrane (1992), Hodrick (1992)). While the models of Barro and Rietz address the equity premium puzzle, they do not address this volatility puzzle.
In the original model of Barro (2006), agents have power utility and the endowment process is subject to large and relatively rare consumption declines (disasters). This paper proposes two modifications. First, rather than being constant, the probability of a disaster is stochastic and varies over time. Second, the representative agent, rather than having power utility preferences, has recursive preferences. I show that such a model can generate volatility of stock returns close to that in the data at reasonable values of the underlying parameters. Moreover, the model implies reasonable values for the mean and volatility of the government bills.
Both time-varying disaster probabilities and recursive preferences are necessary to fit the model to the data. The role of time-varying disaster probabilities is clear, the role of recursive preferences perhaps less so. Recursive preferences, introduced by Kreps and Porteus (1978) and Epstein and Zin (1989) retain the appealing scale-invariance of power utility, but allow for separation between the willingness to take on risk and the willingness to substitute over time. Power utility requires that these are driven by the same parameter, leading to the counterfactual prediction that a high price-dividend ratios predicts a high excess return. Increasing the agent's willingness to substitute over time reduces the effect of the disaster probability on the riskfree rate. With recursive preferences, this can be accomplished without simultaneously reducing the agent's risk aversion.
The model in this paper allows for time-varying disaster probabilities and recursive utility with unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). The assumption that the EIS is equal to 1 allows the model to be solved in closed form up to an indefinite integral. A time-varying disaster probability is modeled by allowing the intensity for jumps to follow a square-root process (Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985)). The solution for the model reveals that allowing the probability of a disaster to vary not only implies a time-varying equity premium, it also increases the level of the equity premium. The dynamic nature of the model therefore leads the equity premium to be higher than what static considerations alone would predict.
This model can quantitatively match high equity volatility and the predictability of excess stock returns by the price-dividend ratio. Generating long-run predictability of excess stock returns without generating counterfactual long-run predictability in consumption or dividend growth is a central challenge for general equilibrium models of the stock market. This model meets the challenge: while stock returns are predictable, consumption and dividend growth are only predictable ex post if a disaster actually occurs. Because disasters occur rarely, the amount of consumption predictability is quite low, just as in the data. A second challenge for models of this type is to generate volatility in stock returns without counterfactual volatility in the government bill rate. This model meets this challenge as well. The model is capable of matching the low volatility of the government bill rate because of two competing effects.
When the risk of a disaster is high, rates of return fall because of precautionary savings. However, the probability of government default (either outright or through inflation) rises. Investors therefore require greater compensation to hold government bills.
As I describe above, adding dynamics to the rare disaster framework allows for a number of new insights. Note however, that the dynamics in this paper are relatively simple. A single state variable (the probability of a rare disaster) drives all of the results in the model. This is parsimonious, but also unrealistic: it implies, for instance, that the price-dividend ratio and the riskfree rate are perfectly negatively correlated. It also implies a degree of co-movement among assets that would not hold in the data. In Section 2.4, I suggest ways in which this weakness might be overcome while still maintaining tractability.
Several recent papers also address the potential of rare disasters to explain the aggregate stock market. Gabaix (2008a) assumes power utility for the representative agent, while also assuming the economy is driven by a linearity-generating process (see Gabaix (2008b)) that combines time-variation in the probability of a rare disaster with time-variation in the degree to which dividends respond to a disaster. This set of assumptions allows him to derive closed-form solutions for equity prices as well as prices for other assets. In Gabaix's numerical calibration, only the degree to which dividends respond to the disaster varies over time. Therefore the economic mechanism driving stock market volatility in Gabaix's model is quite different than the one considered here. Barro (2009) and Martin (2008) propose models with a constant disaster probability and recursive utility. In contrast, the model considered here focuses on the case of time-varying disaster probabilities. Longsta and Piazzesi (2004) propose a model in which consumption, and the ratio between consumption and the dividend are hit by contemporaneous downward jumps; the ratio between consumption and dividends then reverts back to a long-run mean. They assume a constant jump probability and power utility. In contemporaneous independent work, Gourio (2008b) specifies a model in which the probability of a disaster varies between two discrete values. He solves this model numerically assuming recursive preferences. A related approach is taken by Veronesi (2004), who assumes that the drift of dividends follows a Markov switching process, with a small probability of falling into a low state. While the physical probability of a low state is constant, the representative investor's subjective probability is time-varying due to learning. Veronesi assumes exponential utility; this allows for the inclusion of learning but makes it difficult to assess the magnitude of the excess volatility generated through this mechanism.
In this paper, the conditional distribution of consumption growth becomes highly non-normal when a disaster is relatively likely. Thus the paper also relates to a literature that examines the e
ects of non-normalities on risk premia. Harvey and Siddique (2000) and Dittmar (2002) examine the role of higher-order moments on the cross-section; unlike the present paper they take the market return as a given. Similarly to the present paper, Weitzman (2007) constructs an endowment economy with non-normal consumption growth. His model differs from the present one in that he assumes independent and identically distributed consumption growth (with a Bayesian agent learning about the unknown variance), and he focuses on explaining the equity premium.
Finally, this paper draws on a literature that derives asset pricing results assuming endowment processes that include jumps, with a focus on option pricing (an early reference is Naik and Lee (1990)). Liu, Pan, and Wang (2005) consider an endowment process in which jumps occur with a constant intensity; their focus is on uncertainty aversion but they also consider recursive utility. My model departs from theirs in that the probability of a jump varies over time. Drechsler and Yaron (2011) show that a model with jumps in the volatility of the consumption growth process can explain the behavior of implied volatility and its relation to excess returns. Eraker and Shaliastovich (2008) also model jumps in the volatility of consumption growth; they focus on fitting the implied volatility curve. Both papers assume of EIS greater than one and derive approximate analytical and numerical solutions. Santa-Clara and Yan (2006) consider time-varying jump intensities, but restrict attention to a model with power utility and implications for options. In contrast, the model considered here focuses on recursive utility and implications for the aggregate market.
【字数1456】
【拓展阅读】
How to Let Your Purpose Find You
by Umair Haque
[attachimg=580,215]108783[/attachimg]
Here's a question. Why are you (really) here?
Aloha: If there's a single lament-slash-question I get most often — and most pointedly — lately, it goes something like this: "Listen, Deepak Kafka. I've read your stuff about living a meaningful life; I've followed your advice; I've even spent long evenings at dive bars, just like you recommend. But what the blazes do I do with mine? I've searched high and low, looked far wide, listened long and loud, but I still can't find anything even vaguely resembling my purpose."
Let me offer you, then, my top four admittedly idiosyncratic — yet hopefully pragmatic — tips.
Be uncool enough to love. Purpose is a kind of love; it bridges the gap between the individual and the world. Yet, at every turn, in our brain-dead cult of the glacial machine, we're discouraged from even using the word love — unless, of course, when it serves the consumerist purpose of selling diamonds or cheeseburgers or SUVs. So we substitute lower-quality ingredients for it, talking about "passion" or "dreams" or "bucket lists." Yet, just as a McBurger is more of a food-like product than real food, so McLove just gives us the sensation of emotional fullness without the lasting nourishment of sustenance.
Real love, today, is outmoded, passé; it just isn't cool. Love your work? Love your neighborhood? Love your life? Love humanity? Love yourself? See, I just made you roll your eyes with the coolly detached irony of the mustachioed hipster overlord.
In our overly numb culture of icy cool, when we do feel something, we so often feel the opposite of love: hate, anger, fear, and envy. And those can give you drive. But drive isn't purpose — drive is a fury to be slaked, an ambition to be achieved. Purpose is love, not just little-l love, but Big Love, the grand affair that defines a life — first between you and your better, fuller, truer, worthier self; and then between your that self and the world. And the longer you spend, insulated in the armor of ironic detachment, icy cool in your igloo — the longer you're on something like a permanent vacation in the lifeless arctic wastelands of the empty tundras of the human soul.
Head into your heartbreak zone. This is how you find your way out of the frozen arctic wastelands. It's a cliché to say: get out of your "comfort zone". Most of us, having attempted that, end up in a no kind of no-man’s'-land of the human spirit; maybe not the arctic badlands, but surely not the lush valleys of accomplishment; an ennui-laden purgatory where we're neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied — just as aimless as before. So head past your discomfort zone — right on into the burning tropical isles of heartbreak. Now, by that, I don't mean: dump the love of your life. I do mean: immerse yourself in stuff that makes you hurt, ache — that maybe even makes your heart break a little bit (or a lot). You're feeling the stirrings of empathy — and purpose, Big Love, needs Big Empathy like the river flows to the sea.
When I got to college, it took me about a month to grow weary of the ninth circle of McDecadence I seemed to have fallen into. So I did the last thing on earth everyone, including me, might have expected my 17 year old self — replete with green Mohawk and giant combat boots — to do: I volunteered at a hospital for kids with life-threatening neurological illnesses, who were facing the prospect of possibly lethal brain surgery. I thought I'd have a few chats with people who needed to talk to someone, and it would be interesting, maybe even fun. Man, was I wrong. It was harrowing, grievous, haunting. I cried like a baby, alone in the basement, after every session for the first two months. But it wasn't soul-crushing: it was the opposite. It evoked in me the desire to begin tackling problems that mattered. If, today, I have a Big Love for what I do it's because I ventured just out of my comfort zone, but straight into that zone of heartbreak; for it's in heartbreak, and only in heartbreak, that we discover not just the grace and power of love, but that our own limitless capacity for it finally, suddenly unfurls.
Most us don't just hide our heartbreak — worse, we hide from heartbreak. And so we end up something like mute and mapless orphans in the human world; unable to speak the language of mattering; our vocabulary of life itself forever stunted.
Follow the NASCAR Principle. My friend James is a very "successful" banker — but every day at work leaves him number and (by his own admission) dumber than the last. My friend Steve, on the other hand, spent his twenties and much of his thirties in one failed venture after another — today, finally, he's at the helm of a start-up that leaves him not just comfortable, or even "happy" — but abidingly, almost overwhelmingly, fulfilled.
Yet, most of us, I'd bet, see purpose like James did — and does: something akin to driving the perfect Formula One race. In this view, purpose is found by driving laps cleaner, closer to the textbook Platonic ideal, than the next contender — and so achieving a faster time. Hey, presto: race won! (It's assuredly not a contact sport: touch another car, and you're both likely to literally crash and burn.) But in truth, the creation of purpose is less the construction of the Platonic ideal of the perfect life, and more like NASCAR: a bruising contest of wills, cussedly defiant, often inelegant, and usually impertinent.
You take your knocks, and your knocks make you. So the question is: what are you going to make a dent in — that's worthwhile enough to make a dent in you?
Here are some eminently worthwhile answers — if your goal is little-l love: your "job", your "grades", your "career". Here are some tougher answers, that Big Love demands: humanity, history, society, the world. Love is the process of being transformed by transformation; of a kind of reciprocity in transformation; where the subject makes the object wholer, fuller, truer, and so too, in the discovery of the fuller, truer, wholer self, the object makes the subject. It is for this reason that, when we are electrified by love, the world around us seems bigger, brighter, better — because, in truth, it is.
Purpose, then, is the hunger you and I have for transformation to transform us; not merely to endow us with a sense of exhilaration, gratification, or pleasure, but to bring us closer to completion, fulfillment, wholeness; not merely the appetite for the possession of McStuff, but the hunger to be possessed by a sense of meaning.
Aim for forests, not fireworks. Live Little-l love is fireworks. It sparks, sizzles, flares — and fizzles. Big Love? It's the quiet, mighty unfurling of the seed into the towering Redwood. It deepens, roots itself, reaches branches to the sky. A purpose is as dynamic — and as powerful — as all that. So don't make the mistake of thinking that having "found" your purpose, all that's left to do is execute the subroutines of an intricate, cold program of predestination; purpose is a process, not a state; an ever-unfinished accomplishment, not an algorithm. And so all the above must be not a set of steps you take to a plateau of purpose, once — but a ladder that one keeps ever-ascending.
Finding your purpose is not a phase of life — but a way of living.
I can't find your purpose for you. You probably can't find your purpose for you. Your purpose will — just maybe — find you. Like every kind of Big Love, it's not in your control. It strikes, finally, suddenly, when least expected, with the full fury of a hurricane. Or it gathers around you, building slowly, like snow melting into spring. But the more it's painstakingly stalked and carefully hunted, cajoled and wheedled, coaxed and lured with toy-store charms and cheap tricks — the more it just seems to rumble on off into the dusty horizon.
If, that is, you're dumb, naïve, innocent, and vulnerable enough to let it.
Perhaps too many of us shop around for a sense of the way we shop around Muzak-filled big box stores, picking one, then another generic box off the sagging beige tube-lit shelf. We try law school (blue box), a geo-mobile-social gaming start-up (green box), i-banking (yellow box), or anyone of a hundred underpaying socially responsible nonprofits (red box). But finding a purpose is not like shopping. The unforgiving truth us: it's a little more like boot camp. It hurts, it's hard, but you can emerge fitter, tougher, better. Want purpose? Prepare to be left black and blue — all over, over and over again. Purpose beats you up; it bruises you; it's no mere shadow-boxing with "life goals" but a bare-knuckle gladiatorial contest between you, and the heavyweight champion known as a life that matters. Like Big Love, it doesn't just give you scrapes — it leaves with you scars.
And maybe that scar tissue, to those sunning themselves on the bleachers, ironically, coolly grinning at life — instead of struggling with living it — looks disfiguring, ugly, something to jeer at and mock. But those of us privileged by purpose? We know a secret: that growth sometimes feels like suffering.
Purpose, like any great love, redeems us. Perhaps not from the inferno, but from the void. Of a life, starved by insatiable self-regard, that comes to feel desperately empty — because, in truth, it has been. There is no singular, simple, final meaning to life. And it is the scars of purpose that, finally, don't just merely give meaning to life — but endow us with a greater privilege — giving life to meaning.
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发表于 2012-10-25 20:33:33
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