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【速度】
Should All Young Americans Be Fiscal Conservatives? http://business.time.com/2012/06/27/should-young-americans-all-be-in-the-tea-party/
【计时1】
Today’s government deficits allow the older generation to live at the expense of the young and those not yet born. So said eminent British historian and Harvard professor Niall Ferguson in a recent lecture. It is indeed remarkable that the young accept the fact that they will eventually end up having to pay off a mountain of debt at the same time that their own standard of living is eroding. But what is even more surprising, as Ferguson went on to add, is how easy it is “to win the support of young voters for policies that would ultimately make matters even worse for them, like maintaining defined-benefit pensions for public employees. If young Americans knew what was good for them, they would all be in the Tea Party.”
Instead, polls show that young Americans have become increasingly liberal at the very time that their financial prospects are deteriorating. Today’s voters under the age of 30 favor Democrats over Republicans by more than 14 percentage points, while voters under 30 were evenly divided between the two parties in the 1980s (and have remained more conservative as they have aged).
Ferguson is known for being provocative, and there was a bit of mischief in his assertion. The Tea Party isn’t the most neutral choice as a symbol of fiscal responsibility. In addition, some critics argue that the Tea Party is willing to preserve programs that serve the old, such as Social Security, and slash spending elsewhere, particularly on programs that benefit the young. So let’s rephrase the question to make it less loaded: If young Americans knew what was good for them, would they all support aggressive deficit-cutting plans that slash government spending across the board?
[285 words]
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One way of analyzing such questions that has become increasingly popular among policy makers is what is known as intergenerational equity. The basic idea is straightforward: Public policy decisions should not enrich one generation at the expense of another. Ideally, in fact, each generation should leave the world a little better for the next one. This standard is relevant to a lot more than just the budget debate – it also applies to global warming, health care, and even zoning. People shouldn’t be allowed to trash the environment to maximize short-term profits or put up cheesy buildings that disfigure a historic neighborhood just to make a fast buck. There is a responsibility not to degrade the world that the next generation will inherit.
But intergenerational equity doesn’t always lead to the conclusions you might expect. It isn’t so much about good intentions as it is about weighing benefits against costs. For example, policies to prevent global warming may always sound progressive, but those that are badly crafted could slow economic growth and ultimately result in a lower standard of living for future generations. It might be smarter to spend on, say, converting power plants from coal to cleaner natural gas rather than using the same money to put up wind turbines. The key test is which policies figure to leave the next generation better off in objective terms several decades from now.
When it comes to government finances, the facts are as well known as they are stark. The federal government spends more than seven times as much on someone 65 or older as it does on a child. Even after you include state and local spending on public schools, total spending per person on children is less than half that for the elderly. Over the past decade, the number of children in poverty has soared, and over the rest of this decade, spending on children will shrink by a fifth (as a percentage of total federal spending), while spending on the elderly will swell even more. On the current path, in 25 years Social Security, health-care and interest on accumulated debt would consume all Federal government revenue, according to the latest Congressional Budget Office projections. As a percentage of GDP, all other Federal spending would fall by at least 15%.
[380 words]
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There are counter-arguments for some of these statistics. The young will be old some day, and it may be in their interest to spend whatever is necessary for the aged – assuming that the same money will be available when today’s young people reach their 60s. Some of the deficit could be eliminated by ending the Bush tax cuts, projected to cost more than $3.5 trillion over the next 10 years. But it is important to note that 78% of the tax cut has gone to the middle class. And so far, neither party has wanted to raise taxes on people earning less than $200,000 a year.
Current policies will continue to shift resources from the young to the old. Moreover, these policies are ultimately unsustainable, so that when today’s young people retire, they will not be able to count on full benefits. Without a change in policy, in 40 years Social Security will only be able to pay three-quarters of the payouts that have been promised. The gap cannot be closed by tax increases alone without sizable spending cuts.
So Niall Ferguson’s challenge remains: Why aren’t today’s young people all fiscal hawks? One explanation is that social and financial attitudes are inseparably mixed together in people’s political beliefs, and financial interests alone aren’t enough to change their loyalties. Or perhaps young people are simply idealistic. Either way, Americans over the age of 55 who are able to retire under old-fashioned defined-benefit pension plans and who can look forward to keeping their full Social Security benefits should heartily salute the younger generation for their extraordinary generosity.
[265 words]
【计时4】
Behavioral economist Dan Ariely, who teaches at Duke University, is known as one of the most original designers of experiments in social science. Not surprisingly, the best-selling author’s creativity is evident throughout his latest book, The (Honest) Truth About Dishonesty. A lively tour through the impulses that cause many of us to cheat, the book offers especially keen insights into the ways in which we cut corners while still thinking of ourselves as moral people. Here, in Ariely’s own words, are seven lessons you didn’t learn in school about dishonesty. (Interview edited and condensed by Gary Belsky.)
1. Most of us are 98-percenters.
“A student told me a story about a locksmith he met when he locked himself out of the house. This student was amazed at how easily the locksmith picked his lock, but the locksmith explained that locks were really there to keep honest people from stealing. His view was that 1% of people would never steal, another 1% would always try to steal, and the rest of us are honest as long as we’re not easily tempted. Locks remove temptation for most people. And that’s good, because in our research over many years, we’ve found that everybody has the capacity to be dishonest and almost everybody is at some point or another.”
2. We’ll happily cheat … until it hurts.
“The Simple Model of Rational Crime suggests that the greater the reward, the greater the likelihood that people will cheat. But we’ve found that for most of us, the biggest driver of dishonesty is the ability to rationalize our actions so that we don’t lose the sense of ourselves as good people. In one of our matrix experiments [a puzzle-solving exercise Ariely uses in his work to measure dishonesty], the level of cheating didn’t change as the reward for cheating rose. In fact, the highest payout resulted in a little less cheating, probably because the amount of money got to be big enough that people couldn’t rationalize their cheating as harmless. Most people are able to cheat a little because they can maintain the sense of themselves as basically honest people. They won’t commit major fraud on their tax returns or insurance claims or expense reports, but they’ll cut corners or exaggerate here or there because they don’t feel that bad about it.”
[386 words]
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3. It’s no wonder people steal from work.
“In one matrix experiment, we added a condition where some participants were paid in tokens, which they knew they could quickly exchange for real money. But just having that one step of separation resulted in a significant increase in cheating. Another time, we surveyed golfers and asked which act of moving a ball illegally would make other golfers most uncomfortable: using a club, their foot or their hand. More than twice as many said it would be less of a problem — for other golfers, of course — to use their club than to pick the ball up. Our willingness to cheat increases as we gain psychological distance from the action. So as we gain distance from money, it becomes easier to see ourselves as doing something other than stealing. That’s why many of us have no problem taking pencils or a stapler home from work when we’d never take the equivalent amount of money from petty cash. And that’s why I’m a little concerned about the direction we’re taking toward becoming a cashless society. Virtual payments are a great convenience, but our research suggests we should worry that the farther people get from using actual money, the easier it becomes to steal.”
4. Beware the altruistic crook.
“People are able to cheat more when they cheat for other people. In some experiments, people cheated the most when they didn’t benefit at all. This makes sense if our ability to be dishonest is increased by the ability to rationalize our behavior. If you’re cheating for the benefit of another entity, your ability to rationalize is enhanced. So yes, it’s easier for an accountant to see fudging on clients’ tax returns as something other than dishonesty. And it’s a concern within companies, since people’s altruistic tendencies allow them to cheat more when it benefits team members.”
[311 words]
【越障】
The Rise of Innovative State Capitalism
Over the past five years, as much of the developed world has staggered through crisis, a new type of capitalism has emerged as a challenger to laissez-faire economics. Across much of the developing world, state capitalism—in which the state either owns companies or plays a major role in supporting or directing them—is replacing the free market. By 2015 state-owned wealth funds will control some $12 trillion in assets, far outpacing private investors. From 2004 through 2009, 120 state-owned companies made their debut on the Forbes list of the world’s largest corporations, while 250 private companies fell off it. State companies now control about 90 percent of the world’s oil and large percentages of other resources—a far cry from the past, when BP (BP) and ExxonMobil (XOM) could dictate terms to the world. Even as state capitalism has risen, some writers, business leaders, and politicians contend that such systems fail to encourage innovation, the key to long-term growth and economic wealth. Ian Bremmer, the president of Eurasia Group and author of The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between Corporations and States, argues that state capitalists “fear creative destruction—for the same reason they fear all other forms of destruction that they cannot control.” In China 2030, a recent analysis of China’s economy, the World Bank concurred, noting that the country needs “a better innovation policy, which will begin with a redefinition of government’s role in the national innovation system … and a competitive market system.” It is a mistake, however, to underestimate the innovative potential of state capitalism. Rising powers such as Brazil and India have used the levers of state power to promote innovation in critical, targeted sectors of their economies, producing world-class companies in the process. Despite its overspending on some state sectors, the Chinese government has nevertheless intervened effectively to promote skilled research and development in advanced industries. In so doing, the state capitalists have shattered the idea that they can’t foster innovation to match developed economies. State capitalists’ combination of government resources and innovation could put U.S. and European multinationals at a serious disadvantage competing around the globe. State intervention in economic affairs runs against the established wisdom that the market is best for promoting ideas. At the same time, throughout history, the governments of many developed nations have actively fostered groundbreaking companies, from Bell Labs in the U.S. to Airbus in Europe. Brazil is perhaps the best current example of how a state-capitalist system can build innovative industries. Successive Brazilian governments have intervened—with incentives, loans, and subsidies—to promote industries that otherwise would have needed long-term private investment to make them competitive with U.S. and European rivals. At the same time, Brazil preserved strong, independent management of state-backed firms, ensuring they did not become political boondoggles. Three decades ago, for example, the Brazilian government gave aircraft manufacturer Embraer lucrative contracts and various subsidies, recognizing that it could potentially find a niche in producing smaller, regional aircraft. Private investors were dubious of Embraer’s chances. Had it relied solely on private investment, the company probably would have failed; instead, it flourished, becoming the world’s biggest maker of regional jets. Similarly, by investing in deep-sea drilling technology, Petrobras, a state oil company with an independent management board, has made itself competitive with multinational giants such as Chevron (CVX), Shell (RDS/A), and BP. By picking industries it could dominate and supporting them even when private capital was scarce, Brazil has created internationally competitive companies in a range of industries, from aerospace to clean energy. Today the government often backs companies as a minority shareholder or through indirect vehicles, allowing for corporate independence while still helping companies make important investments in research and skills. Many of Brazil’s state-backed companies have survived the global slump far better than multinationals because they can rely on government assistance to see them through. Combining government support with a mandate for profitability and independent management has yielded successful businesses in other state-capitalist economies. Singapore has used government incentives to push companies to move into industries such as solar and other clean energies, which, although not necessarily profitable now, will be the emerging technologies of this century. A comprehensive 2009 paper by Harvard Business School looked at India’s more than 40 state-owned science and engineering research laboratories, which have used a similar type of public-private collaboration. It found that the Indian state labs had “more U.S. patents than all domestic [Indian] private firms combined.” In China, greater political interference in state-supported companies has been worse for profitability and innovation than in places like Brazil. And yet in recent years, China’s score has steadily risen on the Global Competitiveness Index, a World Economic Forum ranking of nations, even as the score of the U.S. has dropped. The rise of innovative state capitalists presents a more than formidable challenge to U.S. and European businesses; it could push multinationals out of some markets entirely. In oil and gas, for example, state companies already control most of the world’s reserves, and as state companies like Petrobras become as innovative as multinationals, they will not require foreign companies for exploration, deepwater technology, or refining. In their own large domestic markets the innovative state capitalists will be able to match multinationals’ technology, giving them dominance over mobile communications, high-end retailing, and other businesses. Some developed countries may respond by either curbing state-capitalist companies’ access to their markets or by intervening heavily in their own economies. Neither of these solutions is really viable. As the state capitalists’ biggest companies expand their global operations, their technology, connections, and capital will be almost impossible to keep out. And aging, heavily indebted nations face huge challenges reforming their entitlement programs: They’re in no position to pour the amount of resources into companies that Brazil, India, or China can. Instead of trying to prevent—or worse, dismiss altogether—the rise of state-capitalist systems, U.S. and European companies and governments would do better to learn from them. Singapore offers one model of how the state can intervene in the economy without stifling entrepreneurship. The government there identifies industries that are critical to innovation and future technology, helps provide initial angel investments in small companies, tries to woo talented men and women from other countries who work in these industries, and uses state resources to ensure that universities focus on basic science research that will yield dividends in the future. All these strategies require only modest state investment, and nothing on the scope of China’s or Brazil’s large-scale lending to state companies. The U.S. itself has effectively employed such policies in the past—before restrictive immigration policies kept skilled foreigners out, state and federal governments robbed funds from universities for other programs, and even the idea of the government helping foster new industries such as clean energy became politically toxic. (See Solyndra.) Developed nations still possess a huge advantage over their emerging-market competitors: The U.S. and countries in Europe have mature, large venture capital firms, while places like India don’t. In emerging markets, when innovative companies become large enough to leave the state’s embrace, they may have nowhere to turn. Venture capital giants, on the other hand, can help small groundbreakers grow. This advantage can be enormous for countries like the U.S. And in a world where the emerging-market giants are learning to innovate, any advantage will be critical. [1211 words] |
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