45 求确认公司compensate based

ouying0501

本月机经：
[版本1] by smilingyuer
公司的compensate based的structure跟information sharing的关系，三段。
第一段提出中心提出中心是person compensate 会促使员工的information sharing比以team 和company 为group的information sharing要少。第二段详细的对这个观点进行描述，第三段举了个例子，说某公司换了新的ceo后才用了team和company based提高了公司的效益还是什么的

考古：
V1
我的第一篇文章。三段，文章很简单，但题目不简单（我觉得）。讲sharing information的。
第一段说管理层发现员工不sharing information。然后做了个research。
第二段讲research发现1）只关心individual performance的sharing information最少2）group还是什么performance的sharing information多一些3）the whole company performance需要sharing information最多。总之意思就是说要为了整个公司的利益就应该sharing information。
第三段举了个例子。说一个公司过去只以员工个人performance为标准，现在新manger来了，改了政策。要求所有人都sharing information，否则就fire什么的。还改革了管理层。然后提高了公司的profit之类的。
有主旨题。还有一道问以下哪个方法符合文章的论述什么的 ：选项一个是开办小组什么的（有单词不认识），员工自愿参加。还有一个是员工项上级回报他的progress什么的。最后选了第一个。（还有一个是员工分享bonuses什么的，我觉得不对）
V2
考了一个sharing information的，有道题问下列哪个方法符合文章，我选公司组成小组写文档供其他组参考。跟JJ上的不一样
V3
讲员工information sharing 与公司的政策相关。如果公司主要重视individual performance,那么就会information sharing的情况就会来的少。如果公司规定个人福利与团队利润挂钩，共享讯息的情况会好的多。如果是要求与公司的绩效挂钩， most information sharing的情况最好。
第二段举了例子，有一个公司的新ceo，改变了以往以个人为单位进行评估，实行以team为单位进行评估，结果公司有很大起色。通篇都在赞美以公司绩效何个人福利挂钩，所收到的成效最好
V4information sharing。说公司要鼓励员工分享信息，那么公司应该怎么激励员工呢？研究发现，如果公司基于员工个人的业绩来给奖金的话，员工就不乐意分享信息。如果是基于team 或company的业绩来给奖金的话员工就乐于分享。
V5有一篇是公司的bonus选择对于information sharing的关系。说经过研究，三类bonus对于information sharing的影响，personal bonus的话sharing最少，team-based bonus略好，最好是以公司业绩发bonus。文章不到一屏，三道infer题，不难，有一道是作者最赞成以下哪种措施，我选的是给员工讲讲过去年度公司挣了多少钱。

我把本月的和考古的都列出来了，如果没有人来确认，同学们自己对比着鉴别吧。

ouying0501

背景资料：
虽然大多数高管都知道激励措施应该有利于知识共享，但令人吃惊的是，许多企业仍然强调奖励个人的绩效而非团队或者公司的绩效。例如，在律师、会计、管理咨询等领域，大多数针对白领的“不升职就出局”的激励机制，都只根据少数几个指标（例如销售额）评定员工的绩效，然后奖励那些表现最好的人，结果把同事变成了竞争对手。

本文作者研究了3家猎头公司的知识共享与生产率问题，结果发现，按个人绩效获取报酬的人共享信息最少，按团队绩效获取报酬的人共享信息较多，而按整个公司绩效获取报酬的人共享信息最多。

作者以IBM公司的经历为例，说明了知识共享的重要性。在郭士纳（Lou Gerstner）到任之前，IBM公司3/4以上的奖金都是按个人绩效来确定的--结果整个公司因为各自为政而几乎瘫痪。但郭士纳上任之后明确指出，凡拒绝共享有价值信息的人都会受到斥责甚至被解雇。结果，信息的流动状况得到了明显改善，为IBM在20世纪90年代的巨大增长立下了汗马功劳。


Create Colleagues, Not CompetitorsIf managers want their employees to share information, why do they encourage them to hoard it by rewarding competition among them? My colleagues Erik Brynjolfsson at MIT and Nat Bulkley at the University of Michigan and I have been studying knowledge sharing and productivity in the executive recruiting industry. We asked 71 employees, from partners to IT staff, at three recruiting firms about their compensation structures and their attitudes toward sharing information with colleagues, and we tracked their individual contract revenues and the e-mail activity among them.
We found, as predicted by economic theory, that the people rewarded for individual performance shared information least; the people rewarded for team performance shared more; and the people rewarded for company performance shared most. In each case, the degree of sharing reflected the sharer’s self-interest. If compensation is linked to one’s performance relative to others, then employees are likely to hoard information to both maximize their own performance and undermine (or, at least, not benefit) others. But if rewards are tied to firm performance, then individuals stand to gain most from activities—like free knowledge sharing—that benefit the company.
This effect is demonstrated in the exhibit at right, which shows the network of e-mail traffic in a recruiting firm composed of two offices. Though this firm, overall, shared information to a moderate degree (as measured by the volume of e-mail among employees), the employees in office 1, on the left side of the network, were rewarded principally for organizational performance. The employees in office 2, on the right, were rewarded principally for individual performance. It’s clear which office shared more.
Though most executives intuitively grasp the relationship between incentives and knowledge sharing, it’s surprising how many companies—even those where knowledge sharing is critical—still emphasize rewards for individual performance rather than encourage team or firm performance. They turn colleagues into competitors. Most white-collar, up-or-out incentive schemes in law, accounting, management-consulting, and other fields rank employees on a few indicators such as sales volume or hours billed, and then reward those at the top.
Lines of Communication
Consider IBM’s experience over the past 15 years. Before Lou Gerstner arrived, more than three-quarters of IBM’s bonuses were based on individual performance—and the company was almost paralyzed by fiefdoms. But Gerstner made it clear he would reprimand or fire anyone who refused to share valuable information. Executive compensation became more team based, and management invoked Gerstner’s name and fearsome reputation to win compliance among recalcitrant employees. The result was improved information flow, which contributed significantly to IBM’s enormous growth during the 1990s.
Our research confirms that aligning incentives with team or firm performance effectively enhances information flow. But as IBM’s experience shows, if you want to maximize sharing, sometimes inducements to share are best coupled with deterrents to hoarding

lynnzhou83

谢谢LZ!

yyt19

可以当背景读,但是不一样,第一段有几句比较像,后面就不大一样了

41394437

可以当背景读,但是不一样,第一段有几句比较像,后面就不大一样了

-- by 会员 yyt19 (2011/10/1 0:53:02)

和一楼的考古一样不？

yyt19

看叉了...我是说下面的英文背景资料...忽略咱吧...

gogogmat800

ding

思之如狂