久尔捌早场狗

smilingyuer

aa: The following appeared as part of an annual report sent to stockholders by Olympic Foods, a processor of frozen foods.
“Over time, the costs of processing go down because as organizations learn how to do things better, they become more efficient. In color film processing, for example, the cost of a 3-by-5-inch print fell from 50 cents for five-day service in 1970 to 20 cents for one-day service in 1984. The same principle applies to the processing of food. And since Olympic Foods will soon celebrate its twenty-fifth birthday, we can expect that our long experience will enable us to minimize costs and thus maximize profits.”
ai: People have the duty to disobey laws that they consider unjust

考前看了下数学和作文狗,其他的没看.
数学碰到的狗, 做的时候感觉比现在的狗狗难, 做的挠头还是只有50分.  时间很紧张!

1. 记得一题 x1, x2, x3......x10
                 y1, y2, y3......y10
y1, y2,y3......y10, 是x1, x2, x3的除以2的余数, 求y1, y2,y3....y10的和.
条件1, x1, x2,x3......x10中有6个的偶数
条件2, x1, x2,x3......x10的sum已知

2. restaurant 有三种东西 x, fish, bouquet,  serve的比例是 7:5:2, 并且fish比bouquet的个数至少要多5个,求这三个东西serve的sum.
条件1: fish serve的个数少于 30
条件2: 另外一个东西,忘记哪个了serve的个数少于25

3. 前10个primer中, 从中抽取三个, 问这三个sum是奇数的概率 (这个好像是变体,即得狗中是求偶数的,大家考场小心,注意题目的意思)

4. 两个rectangle ABEF和EFCD垂直连接ABCD也成rectangle,并且ABCD化为阴影部分求ABCD的面积
条件1, EF=CD = 一个数
条件2, 角ACE为30度

5. 有一个表格公司关于reimburse医疗费用的，这题没算出来，怕时间不够了蒙的
 x                                     premium early     d
 no dependency                  p1                     d1
 dependcy                          p2                     d2
multi dependency                2150$                925$
上面两行表格的数据没记住，用字母来代替, 不过不影响做题，最后用的是第最后一行的数据计算的。说公司会reimburse 80%的 的d之后的money。然后对于premium early的钱之后的钱公司付70%，个人付30%。
然后o这样一个人采用的是multi dependency，这一年总共花费了5000￥的医疗费，问这个人reimburse多少钱?

6. 60个人，30个有p的，20有s的，求仅仅有p的是多少个
条件一，非p非s的15个
条件二，非s的40个

7. 还有一个是狗上的W*=(w-1)/2, 求（w*)* 和w都是整数，w小于10，求w
其他几个跟狗重复的，就不说了。暂时只能想起来这么多，等想起来再补充吧

阅读做的很匆忙只记得两个了，没看狗，不知道是否有重复的，就列一下吧！
1. supernova 的一题，好多段，太阳可能是星簇中的一员。后面的几段都是为了说明这个问题的，还有就是sun的组成成分irion60 跟 xxx60的。还有就是说一个成分，当star距离中心越近的时候那个成分越rich这个成分。，中间还有讲comet的orbit 怎样的，最后一段好像是说检查跟sun同一个arc的，如果有star跟sun是同一个cluster的话，那他们的成分应该是类似的，回忆的是在零碎，就不误导了哈，希望有考古

2 公司的compensate based的structure跟information sharing的关系，三段。
第一段提出中心提出中心是person compensate 会促使员工的information sharing比以team 和company 为group的information sharing要少。第二段详细的对这个观点进行描述，第三段举了个例子，说某公司换了新的ceo后才用了team和company based提高了公司的效益还是什么的
还有一个暂时没想起来，最后一个没时间了，也没看内容，看题目全蒙的。

语法还是逻辑意思为主，句子结构，平行对称比较多

lz记忆力不好，暂时就想起来这么多，后面想到再补充吧！

思之如狂

谢谢楼主。

rubyrain0607

第5题费思量呀~

最上面一行的premium early和d，那个$5000是premium early+d的钱么？

棉花糖机

请问楼主，company compensate是这篇么？
http://forum.chasedream.com/GMAT_Math/thread-595393-1-1.html?postid=15395176&searchmode=TopicContent&searchtext
考古：
V1
我的第一篇文章。三段，文章很简单，但题目不简单（我觉得）。讲sharing information的。
第一段说管理层发现员工不sharing information。然后做了个research。
第二段讲research发现1）只关心individual performance的sharing information最少2）group还是什么performance的sharing information多一些3）the whole company performance需要sharing information最多。总之意思就是说要为了整个公司的利益就应该sharing information。
第三段举了个例子。说一个公司过去只以员工个人performance为标准，现在新manger来了，改了政策。要求所有人都sharing information，否则就fire什么的。还改革了管理层。然后提高了公司的profit之类的。
有主旨题。还有一道问以下哪个方法符合文章的论述什么的 ：选项一个是开办小组什么的（有单词不认识），员工自愿参加。还有一个是员工项上级回报他的progress什么的。最后选了第一个。（还有一个是员工分享bonuses什么的，我觉得不对）
V2
考了一个sharing information的，有道题问下列哪个方法符合文章，我选公司组成小组写文档供其他组参考。跟JJ上的不一样
V3
讲员工information sharing 与公司的政策相关。如果公司主要重视individual performance,那么就会information sharing的情况就会来的少。如果公司规定个人福利与团队利润挂钩，共享讯息的情况会好的多。如果是要求与公司的绩效挂钩， most information sharing的情况最好。
第二段举了例子，有一个公司的新ceo，改变了以往以个人为单位进行评估，实行以team为单位进行评估，结果公司有很大起色。通篇都在赞美以公司绩效何个人福利挂钩，所收到的成效最好
V4information sharing。说公司要鼓励员工分享信息，那么公司应该怎么激励员工呢？研究发现，如果公司基于员工个人的业绩来给奖金的话，员工就不乐意分享信息。如果是基于team 或company的业绩来给奖金的话员工就乐于分享。
V5有一篇是公司的bonus选择对于information sharing的关系。说经过研究，三类bonus对于information sharing的影响，personal bonus的话sharing最少，team-based bonus略好，最好是以公司业绩发bonus。文章不到一屏，三道infer题，不难，有一道是作者最赞成以下哪种措施，我选的是给员工讲讲过去年度公司挣了多少钱。

谢谢！

棉花糖机

背景资料：
虽然大多数高管都知道激励措施应该有利于知识共享，但令人吃惊的是，许多企业仍然强调奖励个人的绩效而非团队或者公司的绩效。例如，在律师、会计、管理咨询等领域，大多数针对白领的“不升职就出局”的激励机制，都只根据少数几个指标（例如销售额）评定员工的绩效，然后奖励那些表现最好的人，结果把同事变成了竞争对手。

本文作者研究了3家猎头公司的知识共享与生产率问题，结果发现，按个人绩效获取报酬的人共享信息最少，按团队绩效获取报酬的人共享信息较多，而按整个公司绩效获取报酬的人共享信息最多。

作者以IBM公司的经历为例，说明了知识共享的重要性。在郭士纳（Lou Gerstner）到任之前，IBM公司3/4以上的奖金都是按个人绩效来确定的--结果整个公司因为各自为政而几乎瘫痪。但郭士纳上任之后明确指出，凡拒绝共享有价值信息的人都会受到斥责甚至被解雇。结果，信息的流动状况得到了明显改善，为IBM在20世纪90年代的巨大增长立下了汗马功劳。


Create Colleagues, Not CompetitorsIf managers want their employees to share information, why do they encourage them to hoard it by rewarding competition among them? My colleagues Erik Brynjolfsson at MIT and Nat Bulkley at the University of Michigan and I have been studying knowledge sharing and productivity in the executive recruiting industry. We asked 71 employees, from partners to IT staff, at three recruiting firms about their compensation structures and their attitudes toward sharing information with colleagues, and we tracked their individual contract revenues and the e-mail activity among them.
We found, as predicted by economic theory, that the people rewarded for individual performance shared information least; the people rewarded for team performance shared more; and the people rewarded for company performance shared most. In each case, the degree of sharing reflected the sharer’s self-interest. If compensation is linked to one’s performance relative to others, then employees are likely to hoard information to both maximize their own performance and undermine (or, at least, not benefit) others. But if rewards are tied to firm performance, then individuals stand to gain most from activities—like free knowledge sharing—that benefit the company.
This effect is demonstrated in the exhibit at right, which shows the network of e-mail traffic in a recruiting firm composed of two offices. Though this firm, overall, shared information to a moderate degree (as measured by the volume of e-mail among employees), the employees in office 1, on the left side of the network, were rewarded principally for organizational performance. The employees in office 2, on the right, were rewarded principally for individual performance. It’s clear which office shared more.
Though most executives intuitively grasp the relationship between incentives and knowledge sharing, it’s surprising how many companies—even those where knowledge sharing is critical—still emphasize rewards for individual performance rather than encourage team or firm performance. They turn colleagues into competitors. Most white-collar, up-or-out incentive schemes in law, accounting, management-consulting, and other fields rank employees on a few indicators such as sales volume or hours billed, and then reward those at the top.
Lines of Communication
Consider IBM’s experience over the past 15 years. Before Lou Gerstner arrived, more than three-quarters of IBM’s bonuses were based on individual performance—and the company was almost paralyzed by fiefdoms. But Gerstner made it clear he would reprimand or fire anyone who refused to share valuable information. Executive compensation became more team based, and management invoked Gerstner’s name and fearsome reputation to win compliance among recalcitrant employees. The result was improved information flow, which contributed significantly to IBM’s enormous growth during the 1990s.
Our research confirms that aligning incentives with team or firm performance effectively enhances information flow. But as IBM’s experience shows, if you want to maximize sharing, sometimes inducements to share are best coupled with deterrents to hoarding